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ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN SPARTA

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE

IN SPARTA as in Athens¹ administrative bodies and officials had also judicial powers and duties. The two kings, the five ephors, and a council of twenty-eight elders constituted the criminal court. The ephors were the presiding officers. The elders were recruited from the nobility; the ephors from the whole people. Candidates for the council of elders annually appeared before the popular assembly called the *Apella* in the order determined by lot. Each candidate was received with more or less shouting. Those who received the most applause were elected.² A committee who could hear the shouting but was unable to see the candidates determined which candidate received the most applause. Aristotle characterizes the election of both elders and ephors as "childish," and from this it has been properly inferred that the election of the ephors was effected in the same way as that described for the elders.³

There are no records of litigation in Sparta such as are found for Athens in the Attic orators. But there are accounts of trials found in various sources. It is proposed to set down what is known about

¹ Bonner and Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, I, 84 ff., 279 ff. For a description of the Spartan constitution cf. Gilbert, *Handbuch der griechischen Staatsaltertümer*, I, 46 ff.; Busolt and Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, pp. 671 ff.

² Plutarch *Lycurgus* 26.

³ *Politics* 1270b. 23 ff. Cf. Gilbert, *op. cit.*, I, 52 and 57 f.; Busolt and Swoboda, *op. cit.*, p. 686.

the trials in the fifth and fourth centuries in chronological order.⁴ Appropriate comments will follow, with the purpose of giving a picture of the various aspects of criminal justice in Sparta.

Pausanias, the Spartan commander of the Hellenic forces against Persia, was summoned home for trial on charges of both private and public wrongdoing. Thucydides' statement is as follows: ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τῶν μὲν ἰδίᾳ πρὸς τινα⁵ ἀδικημάτων ἡθύνθη, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα ἀπολύεται μὴ ἀδικεῖν· κατηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμὸς καὶ ἐδόκει σαφέστατον εἶναι. This makes it clear that there were both complaints by individuals and public accusations that correspond to a γραφή προδοσίας in Athenian practice. There is no hint of the nature of the private wrongdoing or any details of the trial beyond the fact that he was punished (ἡθύνθη).⁶ On the charge of treasonable plotting with the Persian king he was acquitted, but he was not sent back to his command.

Shortly after his acquittal, on his own initiative, he sailed on a ship of Hermione on the pretense of joining the war against Persia, but in reality he planned to betray Greece to the Persian king. Thucydides reproduces in Attic Greek a treasonable letter to the king and the royal answer.⁷ He took up his residence in the Troad and gave such clear indications of his treasonable intentions that he was summoned home by the ephors and incarcerated. Later he contrived to get out of

⁴ It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into discussions of disputed chronology. In general we have accepted the dates given in the *Cambridge Ancient History*.

⁵ i. 95. 5. There is no need of emending *τινα* to *τινας*, as was suggested by Cobet, nor is there any doubt that *τινα* is to be interpreted as masculine accusative singular and not as neuter accusative plural (cf. Morris, *Thucydides*, Book I, p. 328).

⁶ For the trial of Pausanias see Thucydides i. 95, 128-29. Regarding the meaning of ἡθύνθη (i. 95. 5) there has been some difference of opinion. Smith ("Loeb Classical Library") tries to keep the technical meaning of *εἶθυνα* in Attic law and translates "was held to account." Other renderings are "was corrected" (Morris), "was censured" (Dale), "wurde zur Strafe gezogen" (Classen), "was punished" (Jowett). In an Athenian inscription of 446 B.C. (*IG*, I², 39.70) *εἶθυνας* undoubtedly means "punishments." This justifies Jowett's rendering. In this case the punishment could only have been a fine. In Attic procedure the suit would be classed as a *δίκη κατὰ τινας*. *πρὸς τινα* is not used in the regular Attic sense.

⁷ It has been clearly shown by A. T. Olmstead in "A Persian Letter in Thucydides" (*American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature*, XLIX [1933], 155 ff.) that the royal letter is a genuine Persian document. Thucydides' immediate source was an Ionic translation.

prison and presented himself for trial.⁸ But neither his personal enemies nor the ephors had any evidence that would warrant the condemnation of a man of such importance.

For the moment the matter was dropped, but in due time convincing evidence was brought to the notice of the ephors. A man of Argilus, a trusted servant of Pausanias, noticed that none of the messengers employed to deliver letters to the king ever returned. Accordingly, when Pausanias intrusted a letter to him to take to the king, he opened it so skilfully that it could be closed again in case Pausanias might wish to add anything. But the servant, as he had suspected, found that the letter contained his own death sentence. Even this evidence did not convince the ephors to whom the letter was shown. They advised the servant to take refuge in the sanctuary of Taenarum, where he constructed a hut divided by a partition. Pausanias soon visited the suppliant and admitted everything but guaranteed his safety if he left the sanctuary. The ephors, who were concealed in the inner room, were now fully convinced of the guilt of Pausanias and decided to arrest him. But he guessed their intention and escaped into a building in the sacred precinct of Athena of the Brazen House. The ephors took measures to prevent his escape and he starved to death.⁹

Charges of bribery against Spartan officials were not uncommon. Herodotus gives a long and intricate account of an expedition led by King Cleomenes against Argos. Although he utterly defeated the Argives, he failed to take the city, and on his return his enemies brought him before the ephors on a charge of bribery. However, he defended himself so well that he was acquitted.¹⁰ Afterward he became insane and committed suicide.¹¹ There is no suggestion that there was any connection between his trial and his suicide, though Herodotus does express some doubt as to the truthfulness of his de-

⁸ i. 131. 2. καθίστησιν ἐαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν. The use of τοῖς βουλομένοις is comparable to the Athenian use of ὁ βουλόμενος (cf. Bonner and Smith, *op. cit.*, I, 168; II, 39 ff.).

⁹ Thucydides i. 132-34. The frequent resort to religion in Spartan practice makes Spartan administration of justice appear more primitive than Athenian.

¹⁰ Herodotus vi. 82. For the date of the defeat of the Argives by Cleomenes cf. Larsen, *CP*, XXVII (1932), 139, n. 3.

¹¹ Herodotus vi. 74 f.

fense. Xenophon¹² criticizes the Spartans of his day for their fondness for appointments as harmosts and their readiness to yield to flattery and bribes.

By the time of the Persian Wars the power of the ephorate had developed so far that two ephors, like the modern Russian commissars, accompanied a king on a campaign.¹³ If the king was suspected of any wrongdoing by the ephors, he was brought to trial on his return to Sparta, before the council of elders and the other king. Shortly after the Persian Wars the Lacedaemonians sent an expedition into Thessaly under the command of King Leotychidas to punish the princes of Larisa for Medism. Instead of prosecuting the war to a successful issue as he might have done, he withdrew. It was suspected that he had accepted a bribe. The finding of a large amount of silver on his person in camp was deemed sufficient evidence to warrant his being brought to trial. The verdict of the court was banishment from Sparta and the destruction of his house.¹⁴

An earlier trial of Leotychidas, involving an international matter, is reported by Herodotus.¹⁵ After the death of Cleomenes, the Aeginetans sent to Sparta to accuse Leotychidas in the matter of the Aeginetan hostages, who had been seized by the two kings and given into the keeping of the Athenians.¹⁶ The Spartan criminal court condemned Leotychidas to be given up and carried to Aegina in requital for the men who were held at Athens. The sentence, however, was not carried out.

Pleistoanax, son of the victor of Plataea, invaded Attica in 446 B.C. but advanced only as far as Eleusis. On his return he was tried and condemned for accepting a bribe from Pericles.¹⁷ The scholiast on Aristophanes' *Clouds*¹⁸ says he was fined fifteen talents and went into banishment because he was unable to pay the fine. But it is a matter for surprise that a Spartan king could not pay a fine of this

¹² *Laked. Pol.* 14. 2 ff.

¹³ Herodotus ix. 76; Xenophon *Hell.* ii. 4. 36; and *Laked. Pol.* 13. 5.

¹⁴ Herodotus vi. 72.

¹⁵ vi. 85. For the chronology cf. *CAH*, IV, 259 ff.

¹⁶ Herodotus vi. 73.

¹⁷ Thucydides i. 114. 2; ii. 21. 1.

¹⁸ Line 857. Cf. Plutarch *Pericles* 22 with Holden's notes.

amount. Furthermore, a passage in Thucydides¹⁹ leads one to suspect that none of the sources has told the real story of the trial and condemnation of Pleistoanax. He had fled to Mount Lycaeus, where there was an ancient sanctuary of Zeus. There, through fear of the Lacedaemonians, he built himself a two-roomed hut, of which one room was in the sacred precinct. The obvious reason for this arrangement was that he might take sanctuary at a moment's notice and so avoid the danger of extradition. Normally, he lived in the room outside the sanctuary to avoid profanation of the sacred precinct. Such precautions against extradition by the Lacedaemonians indicate that he had not gone into exile because of failure to pay a fine. Busolt has correctly inferred that Pleistoanax, having failed to appear in court for trial, was condemned to death *in absentia*.²⁰

In 418 B.C. the Lacedaemonians, under the leadership of King Agis, made an expedition against Argos. Instead of attacking the Argives and their allies, Agis made a four months' truce. For this failure in judgment he was brought to trial, and the court determined to fine him ten thousand drachmas and to raze his house. But Agis begged them not to carry out the sentence but to give him a chance to redeem himself by some act of daring. His request was granted, and the proposed sentence was suspended; but a new law was passed according to which ten Spartans were chosen to accompany him whenever he led an army from the city.²¹

In 403-2 B.C. the Spartans sent Pausanias, the grandson of the victor of Plataea, to Athens to support the Thirty Tyrants against Thrasybulus and the democrats. Instead of doing this, he used his influence to achieve a reconciliation between the two factions.

Returning from Athens with these barren laurels, he was impeached by his enemies. Now when a king of Lacedaemon was put upon his trial, the court was composed of the elders, as they were styled, eight-and-twenty in number, the whole bench of the ephors, and the king of the other royal house. Well, fourteen of the elders and with them Agis, the king of the other house, found Pausanias guilty; but the rest of the court acquitted him.²²

¹⁹ v. 16. 3.

²⁰ Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 1, 428. Cf. Busolt and Swoboda, *op. cit.*, p. 661, n. 6.

²¹ Thucydides v. 63.

²² Pausanias iii. 5. 2, translated by Frazer.

Since the membership of the court amounted to thirty-four, it is logical to assume that fifteen voted for condemnation and nineteen for acquittal.²³ It is difficult to see how the dealings of Pausanias in Athens, as they are related by Xenophon²⁴ and by Aristotle,²⁵ could have aroused any general animosity in Sparta. But Lysander, who was still powerful in Sparta, doubtless resented the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants and may very well have instituted legal proceedings against Pausanias. The only account of the trial is preserved by Pausanias, but it is so detailed and circumstantial that it can surely be trusted.²⁶

During a sacrifice by King Agesilaus in 398 B.C., the officiating priest said that a terrible conspiracy was indicated. Shortly afterward an unnamed citizen denounced Cinadon to the ephors as the head of a widespread conspiracy against the state. The ephors were thoroughly alarmed and acted with great caution and secrecy so as not to alarm Cinadon and precipitate the outbreak of the conspiracy. They consulted with only a few of the senators.

Cinadon was summoned and given a warrant for the arrest of some inhabitants of Aulon. He was accompanied by some young men who had secret instructions to arrest Cinadon in Aulon and secure the names of his accomplices. This they did. Xenophon²⁷ says nothing about the means used to secure the confession. But Polyaeus says that the list of names was extorted by torture.²⁸ There was some semblance of a trial. Cinadon was asked why he had entered into the conspiracy. He answered: "I wanted to be inferior to no man in Sparta." The confession of Cinadon and his accomplices seemed to be quite sufficient evidence to warrant their conviction. The sentence

²³ Beloch (*Griechische Geschichte*, III, 1, 15) argues that Pausanias was acquitted because the votes were even. The case, like a Scotch verdict, was not proved. The basis for this unique view he finds in the fact that three ephors approved of his expedition (Xenophon *Hell.* ii. 4. 29). For this reason he assumes that the other two ephors voted against him. This by no means follows.

²⁴ *Hell.* ii. 4. 38.

²⁵ *Ath. Pol.* 38. 4.

²⁶ Cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, V, 44 ff., and Busolt and Swoboda, *op. cit.*, p. 681, n. 6.

²⁷ *Hell.* iii. 3. 4-11.

²⁸ *Strategemata* ii. 14. 1; Grote (*Hist.*, IX, 350) accepts this view.

of the court was that the defendants should be shackled and flogged through the streets. Xenophon does not say that they were put to death, but here again it is most reasonable to accept the statement of Polyaeus that they were executed.²⁹ Indeed, it would have been dangerous to allow such men to live. Apparently, precautions were taken to conceal the identity of the informer. He was not permitted to be present at the execution.³⁰

Pausanias was brought to trial a second time in 395-94 B.C. A detailed account of the trial appears in Xenophon.³¹ After telling of the death of Lysander and many of his followers under the walls of Haliartus, he says that, upon his return to Sparta, Pausanias was summoned to trial on three counts: First, he had failed to meet Lysander at Haliartus as he had agreed. Second, he had recovered the bodies of the dead by truce, instead of trying to get possession of them by battle. Third, he had failed to crush the Athenian democrats when he had them in his power in Piraeus.³² Furthermore, he failed to appear in court to answer these charges. Consequently, he was condemned to death *in absentia*. He went into exile in Tegea, where he died a natural death.³³

In 382 B.C. Phoebidas marched through Boeotia on an expedition to break up the Chalcidian Confederacy. Leontiadas, the most prominent member of the Philo-Laconian party in Thebes, concocted a plot with the Spartan commander to seize the Cadmea. The plot was successful. Leontiadas appeared in Sparta before the Apella and strongly advised them to retain control of the Cadmea. Upon hearing Leontiadas, the Spartans resolved to keep the Cadmea garrisoned. But Phoebidas was tried and fined one hundred thousand drachmas and deprived of his command. All Greece wondered at the inconsistency of the Spartans, since they punished the doer but approved the deed.³⁴ Xenophon does not mention the trial, but he does say

²⁹ *Loc. cit.* Cf. Grote, *op. cit.*, IX, 351.

³⁰ Polyaeus *loc. cit.*

³¹ *Hell.* iii. 5. 25; cf. Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 2, 218.

³² He had already been acquitted on the third charge (Pausanias iii. 5. 2.; cf. *supra*, pp. 117 f.).

³³ Xenophon *Hell.* iii. 5. 25; Pausanias iii. 5. 5-6. Cf. Beloch (*op. cit.*, III, 1, 71) for a discussion of the likely causes for his failure to appear for trial.

³⁴ Plutarch *Pelopidas* 6. Cf. Diodorus Siculus xv. 20.

that when the news of the seizure of the Cadmea reached Sparta the ephors and the majority of the citizens were incensed because Phoebidas had acted without authorization of the state. But Agesilaus expressed the opinion that if what Phoebidas had done was harmful to the state he ought to be punished; otherwise not.³⁵ It was not a question of justice but of expediency. A further indication of the real attitude of the Spartans is shown by the fact that in 378 B.C. Phoebidas was appointed harmost at Thespieae.³⁶

In 379 B.C. Pelopidas attacked the Spartans, who had held the Cadmea of Thebes since 382, and forced the garrison of fifteen hundred to surrender.³⁷ One or more of the commanders were brought to trial. Xenophon³⁸ says one harmost was put to death for not holding out until assistance arrived. On the other hand, Diodorus Siculus³⁹ states explicitly that three harmosts were brought to trial. Of these, two were put to death and the third was fined so heavily that he was unable to pay the amount.⁴⁰

The Spartans sent an army into Theban territory in 378 B.C. in the vague hope of recovering the Cadmea. King Cleombrotus, who was in command, accomplished nothing but left Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespieae, with some troops and money to hire mercenaries. It was expected that he would do something to forward the enterprise. Instead, he attempted a surprise attack upon the Piraeus, which was not yet fully fortified. The raid failed because he did not surprise the Athenians as he had planned. Xenophon says that it was suspected that the Thebans had bribed him. Their purpose was to embroil

³⁵ Xenophon *Hell.* v. 2. 32.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 4. 41.

³⁷ Diodorus Siculus xv. 25 ff.; Plutarch *Pelopidas* 12.

³⁸ *Hell.* v. 4. 13.

³⁹ xv. 27; Plutarch *Pelopidas* 13.

⁴⁰ The account of Diodorus is to be preferred to that of Xenophon. Cf. Meyer (*op. cit.*, V, 376), who follows Diodorus' account. H. W. Parke in his article entitled "Herippidas, Harmost at Thebes" (*Classical Quarterly*, XXI [1927], 159-65) has thoroughly discussed the whole problem. His conclusion is as follows: "The presence of three harmosts in Thebes seems possible of explanation by assuming that one (Lysanoridas) was the regular harmost of the garrison; a second (Herippidas) was a harmost in command of a field force; as for the third (Arcissus) we have no information. Perhaps he was another leader of a field force or, more probably, he was the acting harmost of the garrison in Lysanoridas' temporary absence."

Athens with Sparta.⁴¹ Meyer suggests that Sphodrias acted with the knowledge of leading men in Sparta. At the same time he does not exclude the possibility of the truth of Xenophon's story. These suggestions are not very attractive.⁴² Beloch thinks it improbable that the Thebans bribed Sphodrias but is inclined to think Cleombrotus was privy to the plot.⁴³ The view of Grote that the scheme was due to the ambition of Sphodrias to emulate the exploit of Phoebeidas is preferable.⁴⁴ Two arguments may be advanced in support of Grote's conclusion. Plutarch⁴⁵ says quite definitely that the exploit of Phoebeidas in taking the Cadmea incited Sphodrias to undertake some enterprise that would render him equally famous. Furthermore, it is difficult to explain the presence of a Spartan embassy in Athens if leading men in Sparta had any knowledge of the plot to seize the Piraeus. The envoys were in a dangerous predicament. The Athenians promptly took them into custody but soon released them on their assurance that the government knew nothing of the project of Sphodrias and that he would suffer the extreme penalty. The ephors at once summoned him to trial. It was generally expected that he would be convicted. Sphodrias himself shared this expectation, for he failed to appear for trial. However, he was acquitted. "It seemed to many," says the Philo-Laonian Xenophon, "that the verdict was the most unjust ever rendered in Sparta." He records the various influences that in his opinion may have caused this striking miscarriage of justice.⁴⁶

The ephors had control of the police. Lycurgus is said to have established a very effective body of secret police, known as the "Crypteia," to deal with the helots and keep them in subjection by assassinating those who showed too much boldness. As soon as the ephors entered upon their office, they declared war upon the helots so that they could, like enemies in battle, be slain without involving pollution.⁴⁷ Isocrates states very explicitly that the ephors had the power

⁴¹ *Hell.* v. 4. 20. Plutarch (*Pelopidas* 14, and *Agessilaus* 24) tells a similar story, but without throwing any suspicion upon it. Diodorus Siculus (xv. 29) names Cleombrotus as the real instigator.

⁴² *Op. cit.*, V, 376 ff.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, IX, 315.

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, III, 1, 146-47.

⁴⁵ *Agessilaus* 24.

⁴⁶ *Hell.* v. 4. 22 ff. Cf. Glotz and Cohen, *Histoire grecque*, III, 117, for some suggestions as to the reasons back of the acquittal.

⁴⁷ Plutarch *Lycurgus* 28. Plutarch cites Aristotle for his authority, but there is no reference to the matter in the *Politics* or any other extant work.

of putting to death perioeci without trial (*ἀκριτος*).⁴⁸ There are several grounds for suspecting the correctness of Isocrates' statement that perioeci could be executed by the ephors without trial. Grote long ago pointed out that the explanation given by Isocrates in this same passage of the "origin of the distinction of Spartans and perioeki is nothing better than a conjecture, nor is it even a probable conjecture."⁴⁹ This error should warn us against accepting at face value the rest of the passage regarding the perioeci. Furthermore, we have in this same speech a comparison between the judicial records of Athens and of Sparta during the periods of their respective supremacies in Greece which bears on this problem. "The Lacedaemonians have executed without trial more Greeks than we have brought to trial since the foundation of Athens."⁵⁰ This cannot be true; it is mere rhetoric. Neither Isocrates nor anyone else could have any evidence to support such an amazing statement.

Larsen is of the opinion that the statement of Isocrates is an exaggeration (*Uebertreibung*).⁵¹ This is equivalent to saying that Isocrates is mistaken. A plausible explanation of the error of Isocrates may be suggested. All criminal charges were regularly brought before the ephors for investigation. If they deemed the available evidence adequate, the alleged criminal was brought to trial before the regular criminal court, consisting of the ephors, the elders, and the kings. Now if it is assumed that charges against perioeci were dealt with by the board of ephors as a criminal court without reference to the regular criminal court, it is easy to see why Isocrates in his zeal to find fault with the Spartans chose to say that perioeci thus condemned were not tried at all.⁵²

⁴⁸ *Panathenaicus* 181. This statement is accepted without any expression of doubt by Busolt and Swoboda (*op. cit.*, p. 664, n. 2). Gilbert (*op. cit.*, p. 64, n. 3) cites the passage, saying that he does not feel at liberty to doubt it.

⁴⁹ *Op. cit.*, II, 488.

⁵⁰ Isocrates *op. cit.* 66.

⁵¹ Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Realencyclopädie*, XIX, 820, s.v. *περίοικοι*.

⁵² Isocrates was familiar with a use of *ἀκριτος* in Athenian practice that may help to explain his error in Spartan practice. The *boulé* had the power at one time to fine, imprison, or put to death defendants convicted by it. This power was afterward restricted to a fine of 500 drachmas. If the *boulé* thought that a criminal deserved a heavier penalty, e.g., capital punishment, it referred the case to a *dicastic* court with a recommendation that the penalty be death. On occasion the *boulé* inflicted the death penalty

There is one case in which the inhabitants of a Spartan colony were put to death without trial. In 426 the Spartans determined to occupy Heraclea in Trachis.⁵³ They sent a number of Lacedaemonians and invited other Greeks who were friendly to their cause to join the colony, which was to be an outpost to protect their interests in the north. In 399 serious factional strife arose. Herippidas was sent out as harmost to quell it. Two accounts of the incident are preserved. Diodorus Siculus says that Herippidas arrested and put to death 500 persons whom he considered responsible for the trouble, *αἰτίους*.⁵⁴

Polyaenus has a slightly different account.⁵⁵ Herippidas proclaimed in an assembly that the Trachinians were to be tried in fetters, as was customary in Laconia, for the wrongs they had done. Upon being arrested, they were taken outside the gates and put to death. This event furnishes not the slightest evidence for the theory that the ephors could put perioeci to death without trial. There is no indication that any of the ephors had anything whatsoever to do with the slaughter of these men. Moreover, there is no proof that any of them were perioeci. Indeed, Meyer, with good reason, thinks they were "die alten malischen Einwohner."⁵⁶

In studying the administration of justice in Sparta, one inevitably compares it with Athenian litigation in the fifth and fourth centuries. In the ephors Sparta had an annually elected board of public prosecutors. In Athens, on the other hand, any citizen could prosecute a wrongdoer. The abuse of this privilege gave rise to sycophancy and all its attendant evils. In Sparta there were no sycophants.

If the two ephors, who always accompanied a king on his military expeditions by the time of the Persian Wars, suspected him of any wrongdoing, they doubtless brought the matter before the board of ephors, which held a preliminary examination comparable to the

without reference to a dicastic court. Such criminals were said to have been executed *ἀκριτοι*. Here *ἀκριτος* does not mean "without trial" but rather "without due process of law." It means that the *boulé* was acting *ultra vires* in itself conducting the trial and inflicting capital punishment (cf. Bonner and Smith, *op. cit.*, I, 336).

⁵³ Thucydides iii. 92; Diodorus xii. 59. 5. Cf. Beloch, *op. cit.*, II, 1, 325; Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht*, I, 23, n. 6; Grote, *op. cit.*, IX, 396.

⁵⁴ xiv. 38. 4.

⁵⁵ *Strategemata* ii. 21.

⁵⁶ *Geschichte des Altertums*, V, 54.

Athenian ἀνάκρισις. If the majority voted that there was a *prima facie* case, the accused person was brought to trial.⁵⁷

The ephors were always ready to listen to informers, whether they were patriotic citizens or personal enemies of the accused person. The first trial of Pausanias is a good example of the intervention of personal enemies.⁵⁸ The case of Pausanias indicates that others than Spartan citizens could appear as informers. It would appear that care was taken not to disclose the identity of informers.⁵⁹ But it is entirely likely that everyone guessed that Lysander started proceedings against Pausanias. The purpose was no doubt to protect the informer and insure that information should not be lacking where crimes were known or suspected.

Once the ephors decided that they had evidence enough to warrant starting proceedings, they were empowered to arrest and hold in confinement the alleged criminal.⁶⁰ In court the ephors presided and one or more of their number acted as prosecutors. In the case of Pausanias the ephors themselves heard his confession, which would have constituted convincing evidence of his guilt if the case had ever come to trial. The most amazing feature of the Spartan criminal justice was the fact that the ephors were not only prosecutors and witnesses but were also judges.⁶¹

There is very little mention of evidence. The ephors, in addition to their knowledge of the confession of Pausanias, were in possession of his treasonable correspondence with the Persian king. In the case of Cinadon, the court had his written confession and a list of his fellow-conspirators. No speeches of accusers or defendants have been preserved. It is clear that Cleomenes must have made a considerable speech in his own defense, if he told the whole story preserved in the pages of Herodotus.⁶² When the verdict of the court that tried King

⁵⁷ These inferences are justified by the known fact that questions that came before the board were decided by a majority vote (Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 57, n. 3).

⁵⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 114.

⁵⁹ Cf. trial of Cinadon, *supra*, p. 118.

⁶⁰ Thucydides i. 131. 2; cf. Xenophon *Laked. Pol.* 8. 4.

⁶¹ Pausanias iii. 5. 2. Cf. *supra* the trial of Pausanias, the grandson of the victor of Plataea. In Athens the presiding magistrates or boards had no vote on the verdict.

⁶² vi. 82. Cf. *supra*, p. 115.

Agis was announced, he begged that the fine be remitted and that he be granted an opportunity to redeem himself. It may be assumed that the remission of the verdict involved considerable discussion between the defendant and the members of the courts.⁶³

In capital cases the Spartans deliberated more than one day, because, if the defendant was condemned, the wrong done was irreparable. On the other hand, if the defendant was acquitted, he could be tried again. He was not allowed to plead that he had already been tried and acquitted (*autre fois acquit*).⁶⁴ The only known defendant who was twice put in jeopardy of his life was the younger Pausanias. In his second trial the third count in the indictment was the whole indictment in his first trial.⁶⁵

In early times criminals were executed by being precipitated into an abyss known as the "Kaiadas."⁶⁶ Later it was used as a repository for the bodies of executed criminals. It was proposed to cast the body of Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, into the Kaiadas, but in the end it was decided to bury him near the city.⁶⁷ After they discontinued the use of the Kaiadas as a means of execution, they executed criminals by strangling them (*ἀποπνίγοντες*).⁶⁸ But whether the criminals were hanged or otherwise strangled is not stated. However, a passage in Plutarch clearly proves that the victims were hanged.⁶⁹ King Agis was executed along with his grandmother about the middle of the third century B.C. When his mother was admitted to the execution chamber, she saw the body of her son lying on the ground and the corpse of her mother still hanging in the noose (*τὴν μητέρα νεκρὰν ἐκ τοῦ βρόχου κρεμαμένην*). Manifestly, the same noose had been used to execute both of them. Criminals were regularly executed at night in

⁶³ Cf. *supra*, p. 117.

⁶⁴ *Laconica apophthegmata*, Alexandridas, 6, in Plutarch, *Moralia* (Didot ed.) I, 265. The doctrine of the finality of *res judicata* and *autre fois acquit* prevailed in Athens (Demosth. xx. 147; Plato *Crito* 50B). Plato (*Apology* 37A) represents Socrates as saying that several days should be devoted to trying capital cases as is done elsewhere. He doubtless has Spartan practice in mind.

⁶⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 119.

⁶⁶ Pausanias iv. 18. 4-5.

⁶⁷ Thucydides i. 134. 4. Cf. *supra*, p. 115. The use of the Kaiadas closely parallels the use of the Barathron in Athens (cf. Bonner and Smith, *op. cit.*, II, 278 ff.).

⁶⁸ Plutarch *Agis* 19. 6.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 20. 4.

a special chamber of the prison.⁷⁰ Cinadon and his fellow-conspirators were treated with more severity by being flogged through the streets on their way to execution.⁷¹

CIVIL JUSTICE

Suits regarding contracts were decided by the ephors sitting as individual judges. The distribution of cases was made by the board of ephors.⁷² Like the Athenian magistrates, they possessed the right to inflict a fine upon anyone who, by disobedience or opposition, interfered with the performance of any of their functions.⁷³ All magistrates were accountable to the ephors, who had the power to deprive them of their offices during their years of tenure, if they discovered that they were breaking the law.⁷⁴ A passage in Plutarch suggests that the ephors dispensed justice frequently, if not every day.⁷⁵

Other magistrates had, like the ephors, the right to punish anyone who interfered with the performance of their functions just as did those in charge of public games.⁷⁶ The ἀγορανόμοι had charge of markets. In the course of their official duties some kind of judicial power was necessary to enforce their authority. Hesychius is our only source of information about these officials.⁷⁷ Another board known as ἀρμόσυννοι had charge of the behavior of women.⁷⁸ The ephors also had authority to deal with women, as may be inferred from the instructions given to Cinadon to arrest "the fairest woman in Aulon, who corrupted every Lacedaemonian who came there."⁷⁹ The Spartans sent annually to the island of Cythera a magistrate called κυθηροδίκης, who undoubtedly had judicial duties of some sort, as his name indicates.⁸⁰

⁷⁰ Herodotus iv. 146.

⁷¹ Xenophon *Hell.* iii. 3. 11; cf. Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 90, n. 1.

⁷² Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1275b. 10; 1270b. 28.

⁷³ Xenophon *Laked. Pol.* 8. 3-4; Busolt and Swoboda, *op. cit.*, pp. 689 f.; cf. Bonner and Smith, *op. cit.*, I, 279.

⁷⁴ Aristotle *Politics* 1271a. 7; Xenophon, *Laked. Pol.* 8. 4.

⁷⁵ *Laconica apophthegmata, Eurycratidas, Son of Anaxandridos*, in Plutarch *Moralia* (Didot ed.), I, 271.

⁷⁶ Xenophon *Laked. Pol.* 8. 4.

⁷⁷ Hesychius, s.v. ἀγορανόμοι.

⁷⁹ Xenophon *Hell.* iii. 3. 8. Cf. *supra*, p. 118.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, s.v. ἀρμόσυννοι.

⁸⁰ Thucydides iv. 53.

The Spartans had a system of private arbitration. The arbitrator chosen by the litigants took them into the Bronze Temple and administered to them an oath that they would abide by his decision. He proclaimed that they were not to leave the temple until the case was settled.⁸¹

There are several recorded cases of rival claims to a kingship. One of the earlier cases is that of Leotychidas v. Demaratus. King Ariston had divorced two wives because they had borne no children. He induced his friend Agetus to divorce his wife and then married her. Less than ten lunar months after the marriage, when Ariston was sitting in the council with the ephors, a servant came and announced the birth of a son. On hearing the news, he said with an oath, "The boy cannot be mine." In due time Demaratus, as the boy was called, succeeded to the throne. It would appear that Ariston regretted his hasty words and accepted the boy as legitimate. It may be that he believed the story of his wife that the child was prematurely born.⁸²

Cleomenes, the other king, became the bitter enemy of Demaratus and promised Leotychidas, a member of the royal family, the kingship if he could prove that Demaratus was illegitimate. Accordingly, Leotychidas took an oath of accusation (*κατόμνυται*) and proceeded to prosecute the case. As witnesses he called the ephors who had heard Ariston disown Demaratus. Finally, the Spartiatai, being at a loss how to decide the case, referred it to Delphi. The priestess, who, according to Herodotus, was bribed, answered that Demaratus was not the son of Ariston.⁸³

When Alcibiades was summoned home for trial on the charge of profaning the mysteries, he escaped and took refuge in Sparta,⁸⁴ where he is said to have seduced Timea, the wife of King Agis, and to have been the father of her son Leotychidas.⁸⁵ On the death of Agis,

⁸¹ *Laconica apophthegmata*, Archidamus, Son of Zeuxidamus, 6, in Plutarch, *Moralia* (Didot ed.), I, 267.

⁸² Herodotus vi. 69. Cf. Plutarch *Agesilaus* 3 and *Lysander* 22 for a different explanation of his change of mind.

⁸³ Herodotus vi. 62-69.

⁸⁴ Thucydides vi. 61. 4; 88. 9-10.

⁸⁵ Plutarch *Alcibiades* 23 and *Agesilaus* 3. This rather fantastic story is justly suspected by Beloch (*op. cit.*, I, 2, 188) as an idle invention (*müssige Erfindung*). Cf. Marchant and Underhill, notes on Xenophon *Hell.* iii. 3. 1.

his brother Agesilaus claimed the throne in opposition to Leotychidas. Xenophon's account of the trial is the best description of Spartan court proceedings that we have. For this reason we have transcribed it.

LEOTYCHIDAS: The law, Agesilaus, prescribes that a son, not a brother, should succeed a king. If, however, there should happen to be no son, then a brother would succeed.

AGESILAUS: It is I then who should succeed to the throne.

LEOTYCHIDAS: How could you while I am alive?

AGESILAUS: Because he whom you call your father denied that you are his son.

LEOTYCHIDAS: But my mother, who knows far better about my paternity than he did, said and continues to say that I am his son.

AGESILAUS: But Poseidon showed that you are quite wrong, for by an earthquake he drove your father from your mother's chamber into the open. And time, the most truthful witness, as it is said, bears testimony to support the god, for you were born in the tenth month after he fled from the chamber.⁸⁶

An unusual feature of this case is the appearance of advocates on both sides. Diopieithes, an expert in oracles, quoted an oracle of Apollo which advised the Spartans to beware of a lame reign. Diopieithes interpreted the oracle as referring to the lameness of Agesilaus. But Lysander replied in behalf of Agesilaus with a different interpretation: Apollo was not referring to mere physical lameness but rather to the succession to the throne of one who did not belong to the royal stock. For that, indeed, would be a lame reign if one who was not a descendant of Heracles became king. After hearing these arguments on both sides, the city (*ἡ πόλις*) chose Agesilaus.⁸⁷

The body that decided such rival claims was the assembled Spartiatai. The evidence for this view is found in two cases. Xenophon says that, in the trial involving the rival claims of Agesilaus and Leotychidas, the state (*ἡ πόλις*) decided in favor of Agesilaus. Here *ἡ πόλις* beyond question means the assembled Spartiatai. The only assembly of the Spartiatai was the Apella. The ephors presided at its meetings.

⁸⁶ Xenophon, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁷ Xenophon *Hell.* iii. 3. 1-3. Xenophon has contrived to give a touch of linguistic realism to the speeches of the claimants by introducing a few words of Doric (cf. Bonner, "The Mutual Intelligibility of Greek Dialects," *Classical Journal*, IV, 360 ff.).

Herodotus tells the story of the contention between Leotychidas and Demaratus for the throne.⁸⁸ Finally, the Spartiatai, being at a loss how to decide the case, determined to refer the dispute to Delphi. Again, the only assembly of the Spartiatai which could make such a decision was the Apella.

Pausanias⁸⁹ reports another case of rival claimants for the throne, Cleonymus versus Areus. This case, according to Pausanias, was decided by the Gerousia. Busolt and Swoboda attempt to reconcile these cases by assuming that in later times such claims came before the Gerousia as *Staatsgerichtshof*.⁹⁰

How and Wells argue that, since the ephors and the Gerousia had criminal jurisdiction in the state, they must have tried these cases in spite of the fact that there is no indication of criminal acts in any one of them. Their further argument—that it may have been the duty of this body to guard against the extinction of the royal line—could have no application where there were rival claimants, one of whom was chosen to be king.⁹¹ Gilbert is right in assigning these cases to the Apella and rejecting by inference the evidence of Pausanias. There is no reason why the Spartiatai should have in later times resigned this important function to the Gerousia. It seems better to reject the evidence of Pausanias altogether as an error.⁹²

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⁸⁸ Herodotus vi. 65. 6.

⁸⁹ iii. 6. 2. Gilbert (*op. cit.*, p. 57) lists among the functions of the Apella the decision of rival claims for the throne on the basis of Agesilaus v. Leotychidas (Xenophon *Hell.* iii. 3) and Leotychidas v. Demaratus (Herodotus vi. 65-66).

⁹⁰ *Staatskunde*, p. 673.

⁹¹ Note on Herodotus v. 40. 1.

⁹² Or it might be suggested that the question of illegitimacy in the other cases heightened their importance.

THE ORIGIN OF *ORNAMENTA TRIUMPHALIA*

ALINE ABAECHERLI BOYCE

DURING the Roman Republic the triumphal dress had been worn by victors at the celebration of their formal triumphs and by officials who gave the circus games at certain great festivals.¹ In special cases prominent generals who had triumphed had been awarded the right to wear the dress at the *ludi circenses*;² and it was sent as a gift of the senate, along with other symbols, to certain co-operative kings.³ Except for the officials at the games, no Roman who had not triumphed appeared in triumphal dress. During the early career of Octavian this tradition was not kept inviolate. At the beginning of his power, in the year 40 B.C., Octavian, alone on one occasion and with Antony on another, entered the city in triumphal dress without having received the honor of a triumph.⁴ Later, after 19 B.C., the formal triumph for all qualified victorious generals was abolished.⁵ The statement made over and over again that thereafter the triumph was reserved for the emperor and his family, while *ornamenta triumphalia* were granted to victorious generals outside the imperial family, does not tell the whole story. For members of the imperial family itself under the early Empire did not celebrate a triumph without having previously won *ornamenta triumphalia*. This fact, as well as their name, brings *ornamenta triumphalia* into close relation with *ornamenta consularia* and *ornamenta praetoria*, which came into ex-

¹ Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, I³, 412-14. Specific evidence for the wearing of the dress at the games by the presiding official under the Republic is almost entirely lacking (see Livy v. 41 and Dion. Hal. vi. 95), but the custom is probably as old as the *pompa circensis*.

² L. Aemilius Paullus (*Lib. de vir. ill.* lvi. 5); Pompey (Vell. Pat. ii. 40; Dio xxxvii. 21. 3-4); cf. Caesar's privileges (Appian *BC* ii. 106; Dio xlv. 4. 2); Mommsen (*op. cit.*, p. 408, n. 1) does not regard the wearing of the *picta* by Metellus Pius (Val. Max. ix. 1. 9; Macrobian. *Sat.* iii. 13. 9; Plutarch *Sertor.* 22) as of public significance.

³ Livy xxx. 15; xxxi. 11; xlii. 14; cf. Tacitus *Ann.* iv. 26, where an instance under the Empire is described as *ex vetusto more*.

⁴ See p. 135.

⁵ See pp. 139-40.

istence as formal institutions under Julius Caesar and Augustus. Early awards of *ornamenta* were bestowed on various imperial princes—even on the emperor himself—before they received the consulship, the praetorship, or the triumph.⁶

It would be helpful for us to know just what constituted *ornamenta triumphalia*. Unfortunately, there is little specific evidence on the elements which made up the award. The principal elements in the old triumphal paraphernalia were the *toga picta* and *tunica palmata*, the *corona laurea* and *scipio eburneus*.⁷ We can be sure that the *ornamenta* consisted of one or more of these, plus a statue of the victor. The erection of bronze statues of victors was authorized by the laws of the temple of Mars Ultor dedicated in the Forum of Augustus in 2 B.C. If these statues have been correctly identified with honorary statues of victors called *laureatae*, the laurel clearly formed part of the *ornamenta*.⁸ It is possible that the *scipio eburneus*, too, was included.⁹ A single specific passage on the subject of the toga involved shows that both the *picta* and the *praetexta* could be concerned in the institution. Suetonius (*Claud.* 17) tells us that at Claudius' triumph over Britain there were two categories of triumphal honors—one for the emperor's *legati* in general, who went on foot and wore the *praetexta*, and another for M. Licinius Crassus Frugi, who, because he had received triumphal honors once before, rode a horse and wore the *vestis palmata* or,

⁶ Tiberius (Suet. *Tib.* 9; Dio liv. 31. 4; 34. 3), Germanicus (Tacitus *Ann.* i. 55; ii. 41; Dio lvi. 17), and Claudius (Suet. *Claud.* 17) received *ornamenta triumphalia* before they were granted triumphs. Augustus assumed triumphal dress before he received a triumph (see p. 135 of this paper). He was offered but refused *ornamenta consularia* before he won the consulship (Dio xlv. 41. 3-4). Tiberius allowed Claudius to have *ornamenta consularia* when the latter desired the consulship (Suet. *Claud.* 5). As an institution, *ornamenta consularia* appear to go back to the time of Julius Caesar (Suet. *Iul.* 76; cf. Dio xliii. 47. 3; St. Borzák in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, s.v. "*ornamenta*," col. 1117; cf. col. 1112). *Ornamenta praetoria* were given to Marcellus, Tiberius, the elder and the younger Drusus, and Germanicus before they held the praetorship (Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 462, n. 1).

⁷ Mommsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 411, 425-27; Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, II², 586-87.

⁸ S. Peine, "*De ornamentis triumphalibus*," *Berliner Studien*, 1885 (also published separately as a Leipzig diss., 1885), 319.

⁹ Compare Dio iv. 10. 3 with Suetonius *Aug.* 29. Dio says the crowns and scepters of those who had held triumphs were to be dedicated in the temple of Mars Ultor in the Forum of Augustus; Suetonius uses the more general term *victores*: "quique victores redissent, huc insignia triumphorum conferrent."

in more technical terms, the *toga picta*.¹⁰ It has been supposed from this passage that the *praetexta* was the regular garb for the recipient of *ornamenta triumphalia*,¹¹ and the statement of Suetonius invites this interpretation. But the passage cannot be taken as unconditionally proving the pre-eminent place of the *praetexta* in *ornamenta triumphalia*, for it describes only one set of circumstances under which *ornamenta triumphalia* were awarded, namely, when they were given to subordinates of an emperor actually celebrating a triumph.¹² The honors were granted also to victorious generals as a substitute for the triumph when the emperor himself did not celebrate a triumph. The first certain records we have of the honors awarded under the name *ornamenta triumphalia* (τιμαὶ ἐπινίκιοι, νικητήριοι) were of this latter type, and they were awarded to the closest relatives of the princeps, Tiberius and Drusus.¹³ As curule officials they had already worn the *praetexta* on many occasions, and, as former curule officials, they were permitted to wear it on certain occasions for life.¹⁴ This is also true of other recipients of *ornamenta triumphalia*. It is therefore difficult to see what special distinction it would have been for them to appear in the *praetexta* as a reward for victories. When Tiberius' second triumph was postponed in A.D. 9 as a result of the disaster to Varus' legions, he appeared in the *praetexta* and with the people engaged in religious rites,¹⁵ but there is no indication that this was an award of *ornamenta triumphalia*.¹⁶ It may not be without significance here that the honors of M. Licinius in the triumph of Claudius were in form precisely the honors which Drusus and probably Tiberius received in 11 B.C., *ornamenta triumphalia* plus the *ovatio*.¹⁷ For, although M. Licinius wore a

¹⁰ By the time of Suetonius the *toga picta* was frequently called the *palmata* (Courby in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des ant.*, s.v. "toga," p. 349).

¹¹ Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 412, and L. R. Taylor, "M. Titius and the Syrian Command," *JRS*, XXVI (1936), 170; cf. Alföldi, "Insignien und Tracht der röm. Kaiser," *Roem. Mitt.*, L (1935), 26. But see Marquardt, *op. cit.*, p. 592.

¹² Another instance of this kind is to be found in Vell. Pat. ii. 121.3 and Suet. *Tib.* 20; cf. Dio li. 20.

¹³ See nn. 23 and 24.

¹⁴ Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

¹⁵ Suet. *Tib.* 17.

¹⁶ Tiberius had already celebrated a triumph in 7 B.C. (Dio lv. 8. 2).

¹⁷ Dio liv. 33. 5; liv. 34. 3; cf. lv. 2; cf. also xlviii. 31. 3—a passage which shows that the triumphal dress was worn for an *ovatio* even as early as 40 B.C.

toga similar to the emperor's, his means of proceeding was that of the *ovatio*, or minor triumph, while Claudius rode in a chariot, the mark of a genuine triumph.

While in the triumph the *ornamenta* appear to be conditioned at least in part by the regalia of the emperor, it is a mistake to assume that the triumphal toga could be worn only by the emperor.¹⁸ To specific instances of the wearing of the toga by other men must be added the cases where the emperor had the special honor of a *statua triumphalis* conferred on specially favored victors. There can be little doubt that men were represented in triumphal dress in these statues.¹⁹ While *statuae triumphales* are to be distinguished from the *statuae laureatae* which went with *ornamenta triumphalia*,²⁰ a man could receive at the same time the *ornamenta* and a *statua triumphalis*. Nero on one occasion honored two men with both *ornamenta triumphalia* and *statuae triumphales* (Tacitus *Ann.* xv. 72). The recipients of these statues could hardly have been represented in triumphal dress without having previously worn the *toga picta*. Since they were also recipients of *ornamenta triumphalia*, it is probable that their right to wear the *picta* was connected with this honor. I am suggesting that the triumphal toga cannot have been eliminated entirely from use in connection with the institution of *ornamenta triumphalia*. It may be that the emperor's recommendation conditioned the type of dress in each instance. In any case this controversial subject does not affect the facts

¹⁸ The dress was worn at least by the praetor at certain circus games; even the tribunes were allowed to wear it at the first performance of the *Augustalia* established in A.D. 14 (see n. 1), though the games did not remain in their hands. It may be significant that the triumphal dress became more, not less, common as time went on and was eventually made the festal dress of the consuls (see Marquardt, *op. cit.*, p. 593). Circumstances leading to this may be seen in Tacitus xi. 20; Suet. *Claud.* 24. 3. Ausonius (*Gratiarum actio* [ed. Peiper] xi. 21. 52) indicates the dual status of the dress in the time of Gratian: "iste habitus (palmata vestis), ut in pace consulis est, sic in victoria triumphantis." It is interesting to note that Alföldi (*Roem. Müll.*, XLIX [1934], 95, n. 2) regarded the decline of *ornamenta triumphalia* as a condition leading to the holding of festival processions resembling triumphs by private individuals, though nothing is said of the dress, which elsewhere (see n. 11 of this paper) he regards as peculiar to the emperor.

¹⁹ This must follow from the fact that they were painted silver alloy (Pliny *NH* xxxiii. 9. 131; Peine, *op. cit.*, p. 322); cf. Alföldi's remarks on the implication of *triumphalis* in relation to *vestis* and *corona* (*Roem. Müll.*, L [1935], 26, n. 6).

²⁰ Peine, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-20.

leading up to the establishment of *ornamenta triumphalia*, to which we shall now turn.

The award of the symbols of the triumph, in place of a formal triumph, to victors under the early Empire is sometimes looked upon as a result of Agrippa's refusals to celebrate triumphs for his victories in 37, 19, and 14 B.C.²¹ There is no evidence to show that Agrippa himself received these honors;²² the first to win the distinction, it is pointed out, were Tiberius in 12 B.C.²³ and Drusus in 11 B.C.²⁴ In the latter

²¹ R. Cagnat in Daremberg-Saglio, *op. cit.*, s.v. "triumphus," p. 491; A. Bruhl, "Les Influences hellénistiques dans le triomphe romain," *Mél. d'arch. et d'hist.*, XLVI (1929), 94. M. Reinhold (*Marcus Agrippa* [Geneva, N.Y., 1933], p. 116, n. 60) points out the incorrectness of this assumption but regards Agrippa as setting the precedent for the substitution of *ornamenta triumphalia* for triumphs as rewards for victorious generals (p. 153); cf. his statement (p. 116, n. 60) that Agrippa's action in accepting military decorations, namely, the naval crown, the naval banner, and the mural crown, was the model for the policy of accepting *ornamenta triumphalia*.

²² Agrippa's refusals in 37, 19, and 14 B.C. are recounted by Dio (xlviii. 49. 3-4; liv. 11. 6; liv. 24. 7). In liv. 24. 7 Dio certainly does not attribute the establishment of *ornamenta triumphalia* to Agrippa. He does say (1) that Agrippa did not notify the senate of what he had accomplished and as a result subsequent conquerors also gave up the practice of sending reports to the public; (2) that Agrippa would not accept the celebration of a triumph; (3) that this was the reason why, in his (Dio's) opinion, no one else of Agrippa's peers was permitted (italics mine) to do so any longer, but they enjoyed merely the distinction of triumphal honors. Nowhere is it indicated here that Agrippa himself ever enjoyed *ornamenta triumphalia* or that he was responsible for the policy of giving *ornamenta triumphalia* as a substitute for the triumph. Cagnat (*op. cit.*) notes that *ornamenta triumphalia* are represented on coins of Augustus. H. Mattingly (*Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, Vol. I, p. cxi) calls these symbols on the coins the *ornamenta triumphalia* which Augustus accepted. In this paper these coins are discussed in some detail on pp. 137-39.

²³ Dio liv. 31. 4. M. Hammond (*The Augustan Principate* [Cambridge, Mass., 1933], p. 228, n. 33 [chap. vi]) says that Suetonius suggests (*Tib.* 9. 2) that Tiberius was the first to receive *ornamenta triumphalia*: "quas ob res [Raetic, Vindelici, Pannonian, and German wars] et ovans et curru urbem ingressus est, prius, ut quidam putant, triumphalibus ornamentis honoratus, novo nec antea cuiquam tributo genere honoris." This statement may also be said to suggest Suetonius' doubt as to the original award of these honors. Furneaux, commenting on Tacitus *Ann.* i. 72, indicates the uncertain state of information on the subject when he says that some believe that this minor honor was first given to Tiberius. Reinhold (*op. cit.*, p. 16) says that Tiberius and Drusus were the first recipients of the award. S. Peine, who made a special study of *ornamenta triumphalia* (*op. cit.*), was unable to present positive conclusions as to their origin, although he appears to suspect that they were awarded before 14 B.C. (see pp. 316 and 326). In his list of the recipients of *ornamenta triumphalia*, Peine places Tiberius at the head. Mommsen (*op. cit.*, p. 466, n. 1) attributed *ornamenta triumphalia* in general to Augustus, their first award to Tiberius and Drusus (pp. 465, 466).

²⁴ Dio liv. 33. 5; Suet. *Claud.* 1; cf. Dio liv. 2. Tiberius received them a second time in this same year for successes in Dalmatia (Dio liv. 34. 3).

year Tiberius received a second award. These dates are close enough to Agrippa's last rejection of the triumph to be interesting, but they certainly do not mark the earliest occasions when triumphal symbols provided a substitute for the triumph. Recently the question of the origin of triumphal honors has been reopened, and a good case has been made for a possible award of *ornamenta triumphalia* to Tiberius and M. Titius for successes in the East in 20 B.C.²⁵ But there are some facts concerning the princeps himself which bear on the origin of these honors, and they suggest further reasons for placing the formal institution of the honors close to the date most recently proposed. They reveal *ornamenta triumphalia* as the slow development of a policy rather than a newly created honor conferred upon Tiberius in 12 B.C.

The establishment of technical *ornamenta triumphalia* was preceded by a period in which, with the exception of Octavian's triumph in 29 B.C., formal triumphs were deliberately avoided by Octavian as well as by Agrippa. But it is a period when Octavian, later as Augustus, made much use of triumphal symbols, though Agrippa never accepted so much as a part of the triumphal regalia proper. From 40 B.C. to 19 B.C. there is a fairly steady record of the use of triumphal symbols by the former. In 40 B.C., after the capture of Perugia, the people conveyed Octavian into the city in triumphal dress, and he was given the right to wear the laurel wreath on every occasion on which those who had triumphed were accustomed to use it.²⁶ After Octavian's reconciliation with M. Antonius, he and Antony together entered the city in triumphal clothes.²⁷ In 36 B.C., after the defeat of Sextus Pompey, Octavian's privilege of wearing the laurel wreath was extended to all occasions.²⁸ In the years 30 and 29 B.C. Octavian was the recipient of many honors, among which was the *stephanos of victory* to be used at all festivals.²⁹ This decree was passed after a triumph had already been voted for the same year. Since Octavian had already re-

²⁵ L. R. Taylor, "M. Titius and the Syrian Command," *JRS*, XXVI (1936), 169-70 and 173.

²⁶ Dio xlviii. 16. 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 31. 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.* xlix. 15. 1; cf. Appian *BC* v. 130: Octavian received boundless honors, with the privilege of accepting or rejecting such as he chose.

²⁹ Dio li. 20. 2. If the laurel is meant, then the honor is unnecessarily being decreed a second time, or Dio has mistakenly recorded the same award twice.

ceived the laurel for all occasions, this *stephanos* was probably a gold diadem.³⁰

The triumphal garb, unassociated with a formal triumph, came to Augustus by decree in 25 B.C., when he did not care to celebrate a triumph voted him for his exploits in Africa, Spain, the East, and Germany.³¹ A triumphal arch was erected in his honor in the Alps, and he was granted the right to wear both the *stephanos* and the triumphal dress on the first day of the year. Presumably Augustus still had the right to wear at all festivals the *stephanos* which he had received in 29 and the laurel granted for permanent use in 36.³² The chief additions here, then, are the *toga picta* and the *tunica palmata* and probably with them the *triumphator's* scepter, the *scipio eburneus*. The triumphal symbols are associated with the refusal of a formal triumphal celebration. This, so far as I know, is the first association of such honors with the refusal of a formal triumph. Similar honors, plus a chariot of special status, were accorded Augustus in connection with a similar refusal in 19 B.C. This we see from a variety of sources.

In 29 B.C. Octavian had celebrated a threefold triumph over a period of three days for victories over the northern tribes, at Actium, and in Egypt.³³ He had refused a triumph in 25, as we have seen, and instead had received the triumphal garb for every New Year's Day, making the recurrence of each year a triumph for him.³⁴ After his recovery of Roman standards from the Parthians, he again refused a triumph, and, according to Dio (liv. 10. 3), he accepted upon his return later only an altar (*Fortuna Redux*) and a new festival (*Augustalia*). But Augustus regarded his diplomatic victory over the Parthians in 20 as a military success, and there is clear evidence that the symbols of the triumph were deposited along with the recovered standards in a temple especially built for them in accordance with his

³⁰ Alföldi, "Insignien und Tracht der röm. Kaiser," *op. cit.*, p. 39; cf. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 427, n. 4; W. Ehlers in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "triumphus," col. 501.

³¹ Dio liii. 26. 5.

³² See nn. 26 and 29 of this paper.

³³ Dio li. 19. 1; li. 21. 5-9.

³⁴ See n. 31. Cf. Tiberius' triumph in 7 B.C. (Dio lv. 8. 2), celebrated on January 1. It is evident that on this day both Augustus and Tiberius appeared in triumphal dress—Augustus because he had the privilege of wearing the dress every January 1 and Tiberius because he was celebrating a triumph on that day.

wishes and a senatorial decree. The story for this occasion can be constructed from an earlier account in Dio and a record in the *Chronica* of Cassiodorus. Both sources are illustrated and supplemented by coins. According to Dio, the recovery in 20 B.C. of the Roman legionary standards taken by the Parthians earlier in the century was celebrated at Augustus' command by sacrifices and the construction of a temple to Mars Ultor on the Capitol.³⁵ This temple was to contain the recovered standards. On his return, says Dio, Augustus rode into the city on horseback, which would indicate an *ovatio*, as Cary has pointed out in a note on this passage. But from a later statement in Dio and other evidence it appears impossible that Augustus celebrated an *ovatio* at this time.³⁶ Augustus did not therefore celebrate any kind of triumph. That he refused to ride in a chariot voted him in this year is stated by Cassiodorus under the year 19: "Caesari ex provinciis redeunti currus cum corona aurea decretus est, quo ascendere noluit";³⁷ and a statement from the same source under the year 20 B.C., taken together with the account in Dio, makes it certain that the incident is to be connected with the Parthian honors: "M. Apuleius et P. Silius. His cons. aquilas et signa Crassiana de Parthis Caesar recepit."³⁸ Mattingly, moreover, has seen in coins bearing a driverless chariot in which stands an eagle-tipped scepter (Mattingly calls this simply an *aquila*) a representation of the triumphal chariot which Augustus refused.³⁹ All the types concern Augustus, for either the obverse or the

³⁵ Dio liv. 8. 3. The day of the dedication of the temple was probably May 12 (Mommsen in *CIL*, I, 1², p. 318), but the year is not certainly known. It is not likely that the dedication took place in 20, though some writers give that date, while others give 19. A discussion of this point requires too much space to be included here.

³⁶ Dio liv. 10. 4; Vell. Pat. ii. 92. Augustus himself claimed to have celebrated two ovations (Mommsen, *Res gestae* [Berlin, 1883], p. 10); these took place in 40 B.C. for the peace with Antony and in 36 after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in Sicily (*CIL*, I, 1³, p. 180; cf. Suet. *Aug.* 22; Appian *BC* v. 66; v. 130; Plutarch *Ant.* 31; Dio xlviii. 31. 3; xlix. 15. 1; Orosius vi. 18; Eusebius (*Chron. ab Abr.* 1986, 1984). From the fact that Augustus refused to ride in the chariot voted him, Dio may have concluded that the princeps celebrated an *ovatio* (see Mommsen, *Res gestae*, pp. 10 and 19). The privilege of riding on horseback was often associated with triumphal honors; sometimes it was designated as *ovatio*, sometimes not.

³⁷ *Chronica* ([ed. Mommsen] *Chron. min.*, II), p. 135, in *Monumenta Germaniae historica* (Berlin, 1894).

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, Vol. I, pp. cxi, 67-70, and Pl. VIII, Nos. 10-20; Pl. IX, Nos. 1-3; cf. Alföldi, *Roem. Mitt.*, XLIX (1934), 94.

reverse carries the dedicatory legend *Caesari Augusto*. This chariot is represented sometimes alone, sometimes in a small round temple of Mars Ultor, obviously the very temple built to house the recovered standards, which on still other types are shown within the temple in place of the chariot. It is clear from these representations that the chariot, like the standards, was dedicated in the temple. Augustus had obtained in addition to triumphal garb and symbols a chariot to which he could ascribe the status of a sacred dedication, comparable to the chariot which was placed in Julius Caesar's honor in the precinct of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol.⁴⁰ The *scipio* placed in the chariot, moreover, lends to it this further interest, that it appears to give the chariot the status of a *tensa*, the sacred car which bore the symbols of a god to the Circus Maximus from the Capitol.⁴¹ With the *scipio* goes the *corona* mentioned by Cassiodorus, for which precedent as a symbol for ritual use may be seen in the gold *coronae* of Caesar and Marcellus, which were carried into the theater during festivals.⁴² It is to be noted that the chariot in many of the representations (which do show variation) has a pedimental front, undoubtedly reminiscent of the honor of the pediment, which both Caesar and Augustus enjoyed.⁴³ In other words, this chariot is not the usual triumphal chariot, which was tower-like or semicircular,⁴⁴ but it has a shape especially adapted to the honors of the princeps. Sacred cars tended to have distinctive forms for individual gods.⁴⁵ The *scipio* and *corona* are interesting for another reason. As dedicatory objects in the small temple of Mars Ultor on the Capitol they provide a precedent for the dedication of

⁴⁰ Dio xliii. 21. 2; cf. xliv. 6. 3. In 35 B.C., after the death of Sextus Pompey in the East, Octavian set up for Antony a chariot in front of the *rostra*.

⁴¹ See my article on these vehicles (A. L. Abacherli, "Fercula, Carpentae, and Tensae in the Roman Procession," *Boll. dell'Assoc. internaz. studi mediterranei*, Vol. VI (1935). For the importance of Augustus' chariot as an imperial symbol see Alföldi, *Roem. Mitt.*, XLIX (1934), 94.

⁴² Dio xlv. 6. 3; liii. 30. 6; Appian *BC* iii. 28; Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum*, II, p. 405; III, Pl. CIV, No. 12.

⁴³ Cicero *Philipp.* ii. 110; Florus ii. 13 (iv. 2). 91; cf. Suet. *Claud.* 17 and Seneca *Clem.* i. 26. 5. The tiny *quadriga* which crowns the pediment identifies the chariot as triumphal; at the *ludi* a *biga* seems to have been used (Mommson, *Röm Staatsrecht*, I², 394).

⁴⁴ Zonaras vii. 21. Cf. reliefs and coins.

⁴⁵ See n. 41.

later triumphal scepters and *coronae* in the great new temple of Mars Ultor which Augustus dedicated in his forum in 2 B.C. One of the provisions made for the new temple in 2 B.C. required the dedication of these scepters and crowns in this temple.⁴⁶

The triumphal toga and tunic granted to Augustus at this time are themselves represented on the obverse of some of our coins, together with the laurel wreath and the eagle-tipped *scipio*.⁴⁷ The presence of the *scipio* here clinches the identification of the *aquila* in the chariot of Augustus as a *scipio*. One must distinguish between the *aquila*-standard and the *aquila-scipio*, both of which were dedicated in the same temple at the same time in honor of the same event.⁴⁸ With certainty, then, we can say that Augustus' chariot, with the *scipio* and probably with the *corona*, was dedicated alongside the recovered standards in the temple of Mars Ultor on the Capitol. When we add to our evidence for these objects the coins bearing the triumphal dress with the laurel wreath and the *scipio*, we can say that Augustus had been awarded full triumphal honors for the return of the standards.⁴⁹ In addition to these, the chariot was something very special; that the right to wear triumphal clothes did not necessarily carry with it the right to ride in a chariot is clear from other sources.⁵⁰ That the chariot was not an ordinary one its form on the coins makes certain. It has been pointed out that the last triumph listed in the *Acta triumphorum* falls in 19 B.C. ("L. Cornelius P. f. Balbus pro cos. ex Africa VI K. April."), the year conspicuous for Augustus' rejection of a triumph for his diplo-

⁴⁶ Dio lv. 10. 3; Suet. *Aug.* 29: *insignia triumphorum*, which probably includes the standards (Marquardt, *op. cit.*, p. 589, n. 6).

⁴⁷ Mattingly, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70 and Pl. IX, Nos. 1-3. Sufficient attention has not been paid to the fact that Mattingly (p. cxi) regarded these symbols as *ornamenta triumphalia* accepted by Augustus.

⁴⁸ Mattingly (*ibid.*, pp. 67-70, cf. p. cxi) simply calls each type an *aquila*, and it is difficult to know whether he is using the word of both standard and scepter, or whether he supposes that only a standard is represented in all cases. Alföldi (*Roem. Müt.*, L [1935], 29) recognized the object in the chariot as a *scipio*.

⁴⁹ Other standards were recovered by Augustus (Mommsen, *Res gestae*, p. 124); and, since our coins were issued in Spain, one is tempted to suppose that the standards represented on them were recovered from the Cantabrians. The literary evidence, however, and similar coins from the East (Mattingly, *op. cit.* Pl. XVII, No. 12; Cohen, *Médailles impériales*, I; *Oct. Aug.*, p. 90, No. 202) point to the more celebrated diplomatic victory.

⁵⁰ Tacitus *Ann.* i. 15; Suet. *Claud.* 17; Dio xlviii. 31. 3; liv. 33. 5; lvi. 46. 5; cf. liv. 34. 3.

matic victory in the East.⁵¹ This, it has been said, was no coincidence. Thereafter the triumph was the monopoly of the imperial family, and henceforth the symbols of the triumph were virtually the emperor's to dispense.⁵² For us the important point is that this date coincides with the date of Augustus' refusal of a triumph, *followed by* his institution of a new triumphal cult in a temple which became the depository or treasury of some of the symbols of the triumph. Augustus' own triumphal symbols were the first to be dedicated to Mars Ultor. There is no more plausible moment in the early history of the principate for the final establishment of the institution of *ornamenta triumphalia* than the date of the dedication of the first temple to Mars Ultor, the god in whose cult the military life of the Empire was to center. The continuity of the cult from the establishment of the temple on the Capitoline to the dedication of the large temple in the Forum of Augustus in 2 B.C. is proved by the law of the later temple, which, following the precedent established here, provided for the dedication to Mars Ultor of the victor's scepter, his *corona*, and standards recovered from the enemy. Awards of the symbols of the triumph to Tiberius and M. Titius for their part in the solution of the Parthian and Armenian question could well have taken place about this time, in connection with the dedication of the temple⁵³ or soon after its dedication.

Now let us look more closely at other cases where triumphs were refused or not celebrated. Agrippa refused a triumph in 37 B.C. because he thought his good fortune in battle would contrast too painfully with Octavian's bad fortune.⁵⁴ He refused again in 19 B.C.,⁵⁵ and a third time in 14 B.C.⁵⁶ Agrippa, then, was apparently the first to refuse a triumph and made his first refusal the basis of a consistent policy, but what is more significant here than his refusals is the fact that he received none of the triumphal symbols proper. The honors he accepted—the naval crown, the blue banner, and the mural crown

⁵¹ Reinhold, *op. cit.*, p. 93; E. Pais, *Fasti triumphales populi Romani* (Rome, 1920), p. 318. After Balbus' triumph and Augustus' refusal in 19, the princes and the senate offered Agrippa a triumph, which was refused (Dio liv. 11. 6).

⁵² Nominal power was held by the senate (see Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, I, 467).

⁵³ See p. 135 and also nn. 25 and 35.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* liv. 11. 6.

⁵⁵ Dio xlviii. 49. 4.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 24. 7.

—were badges of a different category, new or almost unknown, as contrasted with the ancient and sacred symbols of the *triumphator*.

Ornamenta triumphalia were conferred upon Tiberius in 12 B.C., as we have said. The honors were not given to Tiberius in 12 because he rejected a triumph. The emperor did not let him celebrate a triumph.⁵⁷ In 7 B.C. when Tiberius celebrated his first real triumph,⁵⁸ it was because Augustus allowed him to do so, since the princeps himself did not wish to celebrate one. Policy, dictated by the emperor himself, runs through these events. That the refusal of a triumph goes back to Agrippa, the facts at hand indicate. But the development which led to the acceptance of the triumphal symbols as a substitute for the triumph and the crystallization of a policy which made *ornamenta triumphalia* a conventional honor on the pattern of other *ornamenta* recognized by the senate are by the same standard the work of Augustus, who himself accepted triumphal symbols in lieu of a triumph. The pre-eminent part played by the princeps in the creation of the institution as part of an imperial military cult contrasts sharply with the occasionally reckless dispensation of the honors by his successors, who in some cases readily granted *ornamenta triumphalia* to individuals with little or no claim to the trappings of the triumph.

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⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 31. 4; Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, I³, 131, n. 2.

⁵⁸ Voted in 8 B.C. (Dio lv. 6. 5), celebrated in 7 B.C. on January 1 (Dio lv. 8. 2). For Augustus' direction of policy in the conferring of awards cf. Dio lvi. 17; liv. 12. 2; Suet. *Aug.* 38.

CRITICAL NOTES ON MICHIGAN OSTRACA¹

HERBERT C. YOUTIE

I. O. MICH. I, 151

UNDER "grain accounts" the editor of the Michigan ostraca from Karanis² has given as No. 151 a text of the late fourth or the fifth century A.D.,³ which is susceptible of improvement. My own reading of the ostrakon deviates seriously at several points from Amundsen's text and leads to a more precise interpretation. The new text is worth calling to attention because it throws some light on the operation of an interesting institution known as *πιττάκιον*.⁴ It runs as follows:

Ὅλ' Ἰωάννου (ἐνάτης) ἰνδικ(τίονος)
 μισθ(ωτής) Σενᾶ ριπαρ(ίου) ὑπ(έρ) πιττακ(ίου)
 Περμέσ' Ἀλεξάνδρου μφ' Ὅλ' μ(οδίου) τνς
 5 (καὶ) ὑπ(έρ) π(ιττακίου) Χαιρ(ήμονος) Παπνουθί(ου) μφ' Χαιρ(ήμονος)
 μ(οδίου) ,αφο κ(αθαρούς).

2. Σενᾶ: so Amundsen; the three letters after σ very doubtful. *ριπαρ(ίου)*: Amundsen has placed a dot under α, but unnecessarily. *πιττακ(ίου)*: *πιττακ*, ostr., π() ττδ μ(όνος) Amundsen. 4. π(ιττακ(ίου) Χαιρ(ήμονος): π() Χαιρ(ήμων) Amundsen. *Χαιρ(ήμονος)*: *Χαιρ*, ostr. with typical Byzantine formation of α; [v . .] Amundsen. 5. κ(αθαρούς): μ(όνος) Amundsen, but κ is read with certainty.

The ostrakon may be simply a memorandum or account, but it has very much the look of a receipt. Not all the difficulties of interpretation are eliminated by the revised text, but the outlines of the transaction are clear. Ol, son of John, as lessee of Senas, the *riparius*, has paid the dues on two parcels of land, one in the *pittacium* of Pemes, son of Alexander, the other in the *pittacium* of Chaeremon, son of Paphnutius. Pemes and Chaeremon are *πιττακιάρχαι*, the responsible

¹ O. Mich. I = Leiv Amundsen, *Greek Ostraca in the University of Michigan Collection*, Part I: "Texts" ("University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series," Vol. XXXIV [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1935]).

² Now Kôm Aushim (Egypt).

³ "IV cent. A.D." is the date adopted by Amundsen.

⁴ P. Berl. Leihgabe 22, *Introd.*, and the references there given to earlier literature; cf. F. Preisigke, *Fachwörter des öffentlichen Verwaltungsdienstes Ägyptens* (Göttingen, 1915), s.v. *πιττάκιον*.

heads of agricultural firms which cultivate government land on a system of lease and sublease, and Senas is a *συγγέωργος*.⁵

The only remaining obstacle to a successful interpretation of the text lies in the abbreviation *μφ*. Amundsen proposed, evidently with considerable hesitation, the resolution *μ(αγδωλο)φ(ύλαξ)*; but this word is not more pertinent than a number of other suggestions that might be made. The context permits another approach. If *μ(ετα)φ(έροντος)* is supplied, then the actual delivery was in the one case made by Ol himself, in the other through Chaeremon, the chief of the *pittacium*.⁶ The verb *μεταφέρειν* was in common use in connection with the transportation of fodder, chaff, grain, reeds, wine, bricks, and animals. With donkeys as its subject it may be found in P. Lond. I, 131r. 73 (p. 172); III, 1170v (pp. 202, 204, *passim*); P. Flor. II, 226. 8. Dr. Pearl has called my attention to the same usage in an unpublished papyrus at the Sorbonne (Inv. No. 2066v.). With a personal subject it is used for the transportation of grains in BGU, I, 33. 9; P. Tebt. I, 61b. 373; 72. 375; P. Amh. II, 35. 18; of hay in P. Oxy. IV, 728. 11; of wine in P. Oxy. IX, 1220. 13; of gravel in P. S. I. VIII, 890. 29 f. Nowhere else, however, have I found a similar abbreviation of the verb. It recalls the abbreviation of *κεφαλαιωτής* in O. Mich. I, 249, as *κφ* with an oblique stroke rising from below *κ* up through the body of *φ*.⁷ A closer parallel is afforded by *βφ* for *βενεφικιάριος*, an abbreviation which imitates the Latin *singulae litterae*.⁸ The combination *μφ* for *μεταφέροντος* would treat the parts of the compound in the same way.

Among the unpublished ostraca in the Michigan collection is one of the early fourth century A.D., also from Karanis, which concerns from another point of view the fulfilment of obligations by *pittacia*. Here we observe three members of the *pittacium* of Sotas and two of the *pittacium* of Plēin being credited with the provision of one donkey each for the transport of government grain.

⁵ Cf. P. Berl. Leihgabe 22. 12.

⁶ The use of the participle to mark the agent has interesting parallels in O. Mich. I, 186. 2: *Σαραπάμμων καὶ Ἰσιδωρος ἀπερ(γαζόμενοι) δι(ὰ) Πεηοῦ*; 445. 2: *ὄνδ(ματος) Πτολεμαίου Κοπρῆ καὶ Πεηοῦ, Πτολεμαίου ἀπερ(γαζομένου) δι(ὰ) Πεη(οῦ)*. Cf. Amundsen's comments in O. Oslo, p. 57.

⁷ Amundsen took the oblique to be a mark of cancellation, but it is surely a mark of abbreviation.

⁸ Ulrich Wilcken, *Grundzüge u. Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912), I, i, Introd., p. xlii; *RE*, 2te Reihe, II, art. "Siglae" (Bilabel), p. 2301.

O. MICH. INV. NO. 9998

πιτ(τακίου)* Σώτα
 Μιὸς Ἀμουλλῇ ὄν(ον) α
 Οὐενᾶφρις Παησίου ὄν(ον) α

[.....]

5 Μέλας Ἀτισίου ὄν(ον) α
 γί(νονται) γ
 πιτ(τακίου) Πλήειν
 Εὐδαίμων Μέλανος ὄν(ον) α
 Οὐενᾶφρις Πρίσκου ὄν(ον) α
 10 γί(νονται) β

II. O. MICH. I, 180

This ostrakon bears a receipt of 298 A.D. covering a delivery of chaff at Karanis. A misreading of lines 3-4 has concealed the fact that the receipt acknowledges delivery not only of a certain quantity of chaff but of carriage charges thereon as well. My revision of these lines brings the text into relation with others in which the phraseology is similar and recovers the name of a collector not mentioned in the other chaff receipts.

Καρανίδος Παν-
 τῆλις σαργ(άνην) μία(ν)
 καὶ τὰ ναῦλα. Ἡρώδης
 Σαρ(). (ἔτους) ἰδς' καὶ ιγς'
 5 καὶ ςς' Τῦβις.

2-3. σαργ(άνην) . . . ναῦλα: cf. O. Mich. I, 179. 7-9; O. Oslo 22. 5-6, together with Amundsen's very useful notes on p. 69. 3-4. καὶ . . . Σαρ(): εἰς τὴν αὐλή(ν) Ἡρωδίου Amundsen.

The relation of the parts in this concise receipt is illustrated in the following expansion of the text: <ὑπὲρ κώμης> Καρανίδος <παρήνεγκε> Παντῆλις <ἄχύρων> σαργ(άνην) μία(ν) καὶ <τούτων> τὰ ναῦλα. Ἡρώδης Σαρ() <σεσημείωμαι>. Date.

III. O. MICH. I, 308

This text of the third century A.D. is found in Amundsen's edition in the section entitled "Work on the Embankments" but relegated to the group labeled "Uncertain." As given by Amundsen, it reads

Φαρμ(οῦθι) κδ-
 Σεπρίων ε-.

* The ostrakon has πτ' here and in l. 7. With the genitive understand ὑπέρ. This construction is normal in the abbreviated style of the ostraca.

A revision effected on an excellent photograph enables me to provide a new text, which follows a formula illustrated repeatedly among the genuine corvée receipts:

Φαρμ(ούθι) κδ-
Σεπρίων¹⁰ π(αρέδωκεν).¹¹

With this may be compared, e.g., O. Mich. I, 280 and 281, which also use the one-letter abbreviation of παρέδωκε.¹² Closely related in time are a few examples from the unpublished Karanis ostraca in the Michigan collection; they are brief enough to give here.

INV. NO. 9555

Παχών ι-
'Αφρ(α)δίσιω(ς) Ιατρὸς
π(αρέδωκεν).

INV. NO. 9659

δ (ἔτους) 'Επίφ κα-
'Ανθέστις Τουαμ()
π(αρέδωκεν).

INV. NO. 9905

δ (ἔτους) Μεσορή α-
'Αφροδίσις Χαιρήμ(ονος)
π(αρέδωκεν).

IV. 'Ανδρέας δεκάπρωτος

Amundsen has published a very large number of transport receipts from Karanis. Of those which were issued between the years 298 and 301 A.D., eleven bear in Amundsen's edition the names of the δεκάπρωτοι

¹⁰ With the odd name Σεπρίων cf. the common Σαπρίων listed by F. Preisigke, *Namenbuch* (Heidelberg, 1922) and the remarks of Perdrizet and Lefebvre in *Les Graffites grecs du Memnonion d'Abydos* (Paris, 1919), No. 506.

¹¹ To read ε, as Amundsen has done, is certainly excusable; but he has had to overlook the strangeness of its form as compared with the characteristic third-century ε in Σεπρίων no less than its close resemblance to π in that name. The upward inclination of the writing raises the right leg of the letter 2 mm. above the left, and the same disposition is found in the preceding ν and ω.

¹² The natural complement of the verb is *ναίβια*, and the formula has been found only in the Fayûm. Cf. Amundsen's discussion of π/ in O. Oslo 14; my comments on two receipts of the same type in *TAPA*, LXXI (1940), 624-28; and O. Cairo Lewis 7 in *Etudes de papyrologie*, III (1936), 96.

Severinus and Andriscus. The name of the latter is reported by Amundsen as 'Ανδρίσκος, but he found the name in every instance abbreviated and never extant beyond the first σ. When I first examined the photographs of these ostraca, I did not doubt the correctness of Amundsen's reading. Subsequently, however, I read the names of these officials in unpublished ostraca as Severinus and Andreas, and a conscientious re-examination of all the material has made it abundantly clear that the man's name was 'Ανδρέας, sometimes given as 'Ανδρίας.¹³

It will suffice to list the passages and the new readings.

O. Mich. I, 465. 3	Correct 'Ανδρίσ(κου) to 'Ανδρέα
466. 3	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρέα
469. 2	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρέα
470. 2	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρία
471. 2	'Ανδρί(σκου) 'Ανδρέα
472. 2	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρία
473. 2	'Ανδρ(ίσκου) 'Ανδρ(έα)
474. 2	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρία ¹⁴
477. 2	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρία
479. 2	'Ανδρ(ίσκου) 'Ανδρέα
490. 2-3	'Ανδρίσ(κου) 'Ανδρέα

V. 'Αφήλιξ

In O. Mich. I, 616. 6, there is mention of a certain Παιάνης 'Αφήλικος,¹⁵ and in 106. 21 the same person recurs as Παιάνις 'Αφήλεως.¹⁶ In four other texts the father's name is abbreviated but has been resolved as 'Αφήλικος. No. 616. 6 has, however, not 'Αφήλικος, but 'Αφήλεως, just like No. 106. 21. This reading of the name is further supported by evidence from an unpublished papyrus. In P. Mich. Inv. No. 4613, a register of money payments from Karanis, Dr. Pearl has read Παει-

¹³ For the spelling 'Ανδρίας see F. Preisigke, *Namenbuch*, s.v.; W. Pape, *Wörterbuch d. griech. Eigennamen*, s.v.; F. Bechtel, *Die historischen Personennamen d. Griech. bis z. Kaiserzeit* (Halle, 1917), p. 52.

¹⁴ Here the final α does very much resemble σ.

¹⁵ In the same text, l. 3, read Μεσορή γ̃ in place of κ.ζ̃ καί., and l. 8, Τρου κεφαλ(αιωτής?) in place of μη(τρὸς) Ούκεφελ(). The latter correction is due to Dr. O. M. Pearl.

¹⁶ In the same text, l. 20, read Πηοῦς in place of Πησις and (δραχμαί) ῥ̃ in place of (δραχμαί) ρ̃. The editor has similarly mistaken ῥ̃ for υ in No. 108. 2, and for ρ in No. 110. 6.

ânos 'Αφήλεως. There is consequently no justification for the resolution 'Αφήλικος in the ostraca. I give here the passages and the true readings.

106. 21. Παιᾶνις 'Αφήλεως	337. 10. Παιᾶνος 'Αφήλ(εως) ¹⁷
185. 2. Παιᾶνος 'Αφή(λεως)	582. 4. Παιᾶνος 'Αφή(λεως)
335. 6. Παιᾶνις 'Αφήλ(εως)	616. 6. Παιάνης 'Αφήλεως

In No. 111. 7 Amundsen has read Πεκῦσις 'Αφή(λικος), doubtless taking his text of 616. 6 as justification for this resolution of the father's name.¹⁸ Πεκῦσις, however, is a false reading of the ostrakon, and for it we must substitute Παιάνης. Hence, the full name is Παιάνης 'Αφή(λεως), as in the ostraca studied above.

With these corrections we have eliminated from O. Mich. I every trace of ἀφήλιξ used as a proper name.

VI. O. MICH. I, 664

The two lines of writing on this ostrakon are badly injured. Although the editor ventured to submit a text, he remarked that the "reading is rather uncertain." As printed, the text is a date in the year 299 of the current era:

(ἔτους) ιε καὶ [ιδ καὶ] ζζ
'Επειφ ι.

An excellent photograph prepared by Mr. G. R. Swain, university photographer, shows that Amundsen was right in representing (ἔτους) ιε as certain, but beyond the immediately following κ nothing else can be read with certainty in the first line except another κ toward the end of the line. In line 2 'Επειφ does not stand at the beginning but is preceded by σ. The following is as accurate a transcript as I can give:

(ἔτους) ιε Κ. [. .] . . . κ . . [. .]
σ(υντάξεως) 'Επειφ . . .

¹⁷ In the same text, l. 7, read Οθενᾶφ(ρις) 'Αειῶνεως in place of Θέων ἀπ(ελεύθερος) 'Αειῶνος. Paleographically it would be impossible to prefer 'Αειῶνεως to 'Αειῶνος, but parallels show that the man's name is 'Αἰῶνις, also spelled 'Αειῶνις. Οθενᾶφρις, son of 'Αειῶνις (or 'Αἰῶνις), is known also from other texts: O. Mich. I, 4. 9; 342. 6; 520. 3. In No. 4. 9 the father's name has been resolved by the editor as 'Αἰῶν(ος), but 'Αἰῶν(εως) is required. It may be remarked incidentally that No. 4, which is part of the Askren collection, can be identified as a Karanis text from the coincidence of certain of its names with those in ostraca known to come from Karanis.

¹⁸ Amundsen's note on this line is: "αφη' ostr. ἀφή(λιξ)?"

A more daring paleographer might venture Κᾰ[ρα]νος for the first name in line 1 and β for the day of the month in line 2. After the day of the month there was recorded the amount paid in silver or copper, but this I cannot pretend to recover.

Receipts for *syntaxis* are fairly numerous among the unpublished ostraca in the Michigan collection. The reader may find it useful to have two of them transcribed here.¹⁹

INV. NO. 9584

ἔτους κβ Κεφαλαῖ(ς) Παπέ(ι)τος
συν(τάξεως) Ἀθ(ύρ) ἔ ρ.

INV. NO. 9405

(ἔτους) ιγ Ὀρσεν(ούφης) Θρᾶξ
σ(υντάξεως) Παῦν(ι) Ὶ (δραχμήν) α.

These texts may be assigned on paleographic grounds to the first century B.C. or the early years of the first century A.D. I have no doubt that O. Mich. I, 664 belongs to the same period.

VII. O. MICH. I, 656

This is a list of deities, whose names are given in the genitive.²⁰ The total number is seven, and of these six are well known: Isis, Sarapis, Hermes,²¹ Harpocrates, Apis, and Anubis. In line 6, however, a difficulty arises. Amundsen has read [Λρ] Ταούτμιδο[s] and naturally finds real difficulty in explaining the name.²²

¹⁹ A number of these texts are discussed in my "Notes on O. Mich. I," *TAPA*, LXXI (1940), 642-45. With regard to the resolution σ(υντάξεως), see the warning in the "Addendum to Section 7" (*ibid.*, p. 659).

²⁰ A similar list composed entirely of names of Greek gods and goddesses is found in the Ptolemaic school manual published by Guéraud and Jouguet, *Un Livre d'écolier du III^e siècle avant J.-C.* ("Publ. Soc. royale égypt. papyrol., textes et documents," Vol. II [Cairo, 1938]), p. 8. These distinguished editors draw the comparison with the Michigan ostrakon and state that the latter is without doubt "un exercice scolaire."

²¹ I.e., Thoth, from the Egyptian point of view. Cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, 2te Reihe, VI, i, art. "Thoth" (Rusch), pp. 383-86.

²² Amundsen's interesting note reflects the great erudition and the active mind that has made his work in P. Oslo and O. Oslo a mine of information for other scholars, but his remarks have unfortunately no pertinence in the present instance. I cite only that sentence which has a bearing on the paleography of the line: "It seems impossible to read Πατραουτμιδος."

A close inspection of our photograph of the ostrakon has convinced me that *Μεστασύτιμιδο[s]* is the true reading. The correction of *σ* to *ς* is obligatory, and the initial letter is *μ* beyond any doubt.²³ With regard to the second and third letters, I understand how Amundsen came to read them *Αρ*, but I do not understand why he failed to put dots under them. The letters, however they are read, are doubtful; they are rubbed beyond recognition. Nevertheless, a divine name beginning with *μ* and continuing after two letter spaces with *τασύτιμιδο[s]*, can be only *Μεστασύτιμιδο[s]*.

Μεστασύτιμις is known as the name of a deity from Tebtunis papyri of the second century B.C.²⁴ and from an unpublished papyrus of the third century A.D. in the British Museum.²⁵ He is described as *θεός* or *θεός μέγας* or *θεός μέγας μέγας*. On the analogy of *Θοσύτιμις*, Coptic ΘΟΥΤΥΤΟΜ, "Thoth hears,"²⁶ *Μεστασύτιμις* should mean "Mesta hears." Mesta or Amset, as the name is usually written, was one of the four sons of Horus under whose protection were placed the viscera of the dead.²⁷

Like many other divine names, *Μεστασύτιμις* came also to be used as a personal name, and the same is true of the uncompounded forms *Μεστᾶς* and *Μεσθᾶς*. As the names of persons they have a characteristic Ptolemaic savor.²⁸

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²³ An independent inspection by Dr. O. M. Pearl has confirmed my judgment.

²⁴ P. Tebt. I, 72. 27; 94. 34; 105. 13; 106. 9.

²⁵ P. Lond. III, 1282 (p. lxxi; descr.).

²⁶ Wilhelm Spiegelberg, *Aegyptische und griechische Eigennamen* ("Demotische Studien," Heft I [Leipzig, 1901]), p. 15*, No. 90; Gustav Heuser, *Die Personennamen der Kopten* ("Studien zur Epigraphik und Papyruskunde," Band I, Schrift 2 [Leipzig, 1929]), p. 62. For reasons unknown to me Heuser questions the explanation.

²⁷ R. V. Lanson, *Dizionario di mitologia egizia*, II (Turin, 1883), 329; I (1881), 59-61; E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Mummy* (Cambridge, 1925), pp. 240-46. For the role of the four sons in the Osiris myth see Adolf Erman, *Die Religion der Ägypter* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1934), p. 71.

²⁸ The papyri cited by F. Preisigke (*Namenbuch*) under these names are all of the Ptolemaic period. *Μεσθ(ᾶς)* occurs also in O. Mich. I, 40, which is one of a large group of ostraca assigned by the editor to the first century A.D. I have read *Μεσθ(ᾶς)* in O. Mich. Inv. No. 9527 (I cent. B.C. or early I cent. A.D.) and *Μεστασύ(τιμις)* in Inv. No. 9580 (I cent. B.C.).

REMARKS ON ANTHIMUS *DE OBSERVATIONE*
CIBORUM

GORDON M. MESSING

ANTHIMUS, the last of the Vulgar Latin writers, has been investigated much less thoroughly than he deserves. Thus, for example, the one commentary which has been written upon his tractate, *De observatione ciborum*, is not to be mentioned in the same breath with Löfstedt's masterly interpretation of the *Peregrinatio ad loca sancta* or again with such a painstaking dissertation as that of Ahlquist upon the *Mulomedicina Chironis*. Yet the little essay of Anthimus, which in its matter judiciously combines the arts of cookery and dietetics, may be viewed in its form and style as a source book for Vulgar Latin. "Ecrivant pour des barbares et traitant de matières dont s'occupait le personnel des cuisines plutôt que des lettrés de la chancellerie, le médecin de Théodoric ne s'est pas soucié de la stylistique classique,"¹ remarks Hermann Janssens, with what is perhaps an excessive politeness. Actually, much more than "la stylistique" was neglected by this author; his spelling, his grammar, his syntax, his vocabulary, combine to give us a faithful representation of the last stages of spoken Latin which preceded the evolution of the Romance languages. Precisely because his language is so important for the student of Late Latin and of Romance languages, the problem of the text itself, with its innumerable variants and dubious readings, becomes a very delicate one and is of general interest.

In the course of this paper I should like first to synopsise and estimate the not very extensive literature which has been published about Anthimus, namely, editions, reviews, and the like. From this material I hope to comment in a general way upon the complex and devious task which faces any editor of a Late Latin text. Finally and most important, there is a certain number of special points in the interpretation and reconstruction of Anthimus which I should like to bring forward here.

¹ Bull. bibliothèque Mus. belge, 1925, p. 188.

The first publication of Anthimus was in 1870 in the second volume of Valentin Rose's *Anecdota Graeca et Graeco-Latina*,² accompanied by a short account of the manuscripts and of such few facts as are known concerning the life of Anthimus. Rose identified our author with a physician mentioned in a fragment of Malchus (*Hist. Graec. min.* I [p. 400, Dind.]), who was expelled from Constantinople about the year 477-78 during the reign of the eastern emperor Zeno, as the result of what we should nowadays call "fifth-column activity." While Zeno was negotiating with Theodoric, son of Triarius, king of the eastern Goths, the court managed to get hold of some letters from "Anthimus the physician," one Marcellinus, and a certain Stephen, addressed to the rival Theodoric, son of Walamir, king of the Frankish Goths, who was assured of co-operation in the city. Banished for treason as a result, Anthimus seems to have sought refuge with the latter king and, after his death, to have entered Italy among the followers of Theodoric the Great. To him, Anthimus, as court physician, dedicated his essay. The work is thus to be dated during the reign of Theodoric, that is, after 511 and surely long before 534: an earlier date is favored, since Anthimus at the latter date would be a very old man indeed.

Rose, for this text and his later Teubner text which appeared in 1877,³ recognized three principal manuscripts—G (Sangallensis 762 of the ninth century), A (Londinensis, seventeenth century but based on a lost ninth-century manuscript), and B (Bambergensis, ninth century, leaves out much). Like all subsequent editors, he leaned most heavily upon G but was too eager to "improve" the text and introduce into it readings judged more correct by the standards of classical Latin.

After the two editions of Rose, as a Dutch scholar remarks, philological interest in Anthimus became somnolent for nearly half a century.⁴ In 1917, however, a Princeton doctoral dissertation entitled

² IV, 63-98. In 1867 Moriz Haupt had read a paper before the Berlin Academy, "Ueber eine Diätetik des sechsten Jahrhunderts," but did not publish his material out of consideration for Rose.

³ Unfortunately not owned by Widener Library. The manuscripts are most fully discussed in the Praefatio to Liechtenhan's Teubner ed. of 1928.

⁴ "Bijna een halve eeuw gesluimerd" (F. Muller in *Museum: Maandblad voor Philologie*, 1930, p. 85).

Anthimus De observatio⁵ ciborum presented the first translation into English, together with an interesting commentary, glossary, and study of the Latinity. The author, Shirley Howard Weber, made no advance over Rose in the text itself; he did no more than print an unmodified transcription of G and was content to indicate in the notes any departure from G, usually on the basis of Rose's suggestions. He justifies himself with the explanation: "Textual emendation with a text like *Anthimus* is, at the best, futile."⁶

This critical policy of Dr. Weber has, I believe, led to the underestimation of his thesis, especially abroad. Weber was not preparing an edition of *Anthimus* but was explaining and commenting upon the manifest difficulties and wavering Latinity of his author; and he has acquitted himself of this task with considerable competence, thereby furnishing the Romance scholar in particular with a mine of valuable material, some of which is not otherwise accessible. But only Boisacq seems to have divined Weber's aim and commended it.⁷ Professor Ernout⁸ thinks that the thesis "témoigne de plus de bonne volonté que d'expérience." The most valuable review of Weber's work was that of Baehrens in the *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*,⁹ which I shall discuss presently. To my mind a serious mistake in Weber is to be noted on page 90 in the note to 32. 11: "*infirmus, infirmitas* is preferred by *Anthimus* to *aeger, aegritudo*, a late Latin usage that did not survive." He does not take into account Spanish and Portuguese *enfermo* and Old French *enfer(m)*; French *infirm*, on the other hand, is a Latin loan word of the sixteenth century. Again, on page 63, a note to 4. 12 on the reading *crudus humoris* (for *crudos humores*, acc. pl.) is inexact as it stands: we must surely take as starting-point the well-known phonetic confusion of *ũ* and *õ*, *ĩ* and *ẽ*, which fell together in Vulgar Latin, not the confusion of *o* and *u* and of *-ĩs* and *-ẽs* as Weber maintains. It is also important to note, as has not been done

⁵ Sic. This unfortunate blunder has invited the barbed sarcasms of most reviewers and editors. The dissertation was reprinted in 1924 by E. J. Brill in Leiden.

⁶ *Anthimus De observatio ciborum*, p. 3.

⁷ *Rev. belge phil. hist.*, 1926, p. 996. His review includes an interesting etymological note on "butter" and its cognates.

⁸ *Rev. phil.*, 1929, p. 357. Cf. the petulant remarks of A. Souter in *Class. Rev.*, 1924, p. 206.

⁹ 1926, pp. 850-55.

by anyone, as far as I know, that this (and similar passages) is at least a possible confirmation of Rose's statement¹⁰ that Anthimus learned his Latin in Italy, for in Eastern Romance the *u*-vowels were kept distinct from the *o*-vowels. On the other hand, we know now that the use of *nam* *non* for *sed* *non*, which is advanced by Rose as his most telling argument in the matter, was not confined to Italy.¹¹

To continue, in 1926 appeared the *Lexicon Anthimeum* of Nardus Groen, a doctoral dissertation of the University of Amsterdam. This is a work of some value for the student of Anthimean usage; it is viti-ated at the present moment by the fact that Rose's edition rather than Liechtenhan's was used as the basis of the lexicon. Also, in my opinion, Groen has paid too little attention to the matter of orthographical variations.

With the appearance of E. Liechtenhan's Teubner edition in 1928, the text of Anthimus was for the first time soundly established. The prodigious diligence of this editor is monumentalized in the elaborate *apparatus criticus*, "tale selva selvaggia di varianti,"¹² which often covers three-fourths of a page. He has added two new manuscripts, both Parisian (H and N of the *apparatus*), and his three indexes are a marvel of completeness. In his "Ad lectorem praefatio" he discusses the manuscripts in considerable detail and has much to say upon the spelling variants to be observed not only from manuscript to manuscript but even in the course of one manuscript.

It is just this appalling variation which brings me, for a moment, to the general question of methodology. Says Max Niedermann in the best review of Liechtenhan's text: "Für konjektural Kritik ist bei der Beschaffenheit der Überlieferung des Anthimustextes nur wenig Raum."¹³ This is true for Anthimus, and luckily so; it is the editor's task, rather, to pick and choose out of a plethora of variant possibilities. In the selection an editor must steer an uneasy course between the Scylla of overnormalization and the Charybdis of overvulgarization.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹¹ Liechtenhan's Praefatio to Teubner ed. of 1928, p. vi: "illam formulam non esse peculiarem Italiae." Löfstedt (*Philologischer Kommentar zur Peregrinatio*, pp. 34-35) gives several examples of this use of *nam* "um einen wirklichen Gegensatz einzuführen."

¹² Camillo Cessi in *Boll. filol. class.*, XXXV (1928-29), 302-4.

¹³ *Gnomon*, 1929, p. 567.

In the review of Weber previously mentioned, Baehrens pointed out with great acumen that "es erscheinen . . . im Texte nicht selten Lesarten von G welche zunächst den Eindruck von Vulgarismen machen, aber in Wahrheit nur Schreibfehler sind und in der weiteren Überlieferung fehlen." We may be sure that Liechtenhan has faced the problem with countless readings of G, although his natural tendency is to err, when he does err, on the Charybdis side. He declares modestly in his Praefatio: "Nullo modo quae supra dixi ita intellegi velim, quasi ipse numquam dubitaverim, quid sit auctori attribuentum, quid librariis, neque umquam erravisse mihi videar."¹⁴ The only way out, needless to say, is the detailed citation of all possible variants. It appears to me that Heidel¹⁵ in an attack on Liechtenhan's edition misses the issue entirely when he says: "How can one be sure that a text is correct when the manuscripts are full of barbarisms? The editor tried to distinguish between the barbarisms of his author and the barbarisms of the scribes, but how is one to determine the difference?" The difference can be determined partially on the coincidence of the manuscripts in "barbarisms" and partially on the evidence of other Vulgar Latin writers and inscriptions. Even here there is a further point: we must strike a balance between the spelling of the manuscripts and what we know to have been the Vulgar Latin pronunciation. We must write *multum* and not **molto*, *frigida* and not **fregda* or **fredda*, etc. We cannot go beyond the manuscripts, nor do we wish to copy their scribal blunders; but by displaying the variants, many of which present a very vulgar character, we can indicate the contrast, the time lag, between spelling and pronunciation. "Pareille abondance (de lectures)," observes Professor Ernout with reference to our text, "n'est pas inutile quand on sait combien il est difficile dans un texte de latin vulgaire de distinguer ce qui revient à l'auteur de ce qui peut être simple faute de copie, et de prononcer avec certitude."¹⁶ In this, as in most judgments, a *via media* is indicated.

In the readings and notes which follow, I wish to discuss merely some philological points which seemed to me of interest. For a general discussion of some of the strange items of vocabulary—*sodinga*,

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. vii.

¹⁵ *AJP*, 1930, p. 198.

¹⁶ *Loc. cit.*

esox,¹⁷ *capriare*, *sitri*, *esicium*—one may consult with great profit the glossary of Weber and the "Index verborum memorabilium" in Leichtenhan's edition with the valuable bibliographical references suggested there.

One of the most curious words found—*nauprida* (so GA; *lamprida* l)—has been the subject of much learned discussion. All the Romance forms of the word "lamprey" begin with *l*. Except for this passage, the form *nauprida* is known only in two places, both in Gaul: in the *Laterculus* of Polemius Silvius and in an eighth-century life of St. Hermelandus. On the other hand, the glossaries give us both *nacopretis* and *nocopretis*. Rose,¹⁸ who believed that the form *nauprida* was the true one, derived it from Celtic to mean "nine-eyed, nine-spotted." A. Thomas,¹⁹ though he knows a French dialect term for the lamprey, *sept-yeux*, rejected Rose's explanation as unsound. Another derivation was suggested by H. Schuchardt,²⁰ who saw the Greek *vau-* in the first part and compared the late Greek *ναυκράτης*, a sort of "barnacle" (*ἐχένη*); perhaps another fish name was hidden in the second part of the compound. Ernout and Meillet in their *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*²¹ do not discuss the word but seem to assume, as is reasonable, that the forms in *l-* are the more ancient. It seems to me that the word (itself of uncertain origin) has suffered an initial change of *l* to *n* in accordance with a popular etymology of the well-known "asparagus" to "sparrow-grass" type. *Lamprida* (VL *lamprēda*) has become *naupreda* as if from **navi-praeda*, "that which preys on ships" (*praeda* is VL *prēda*), pointing to a bit of popular superstition paralleled in the case of the eel. One may compare French *niveau* and Italian *livello* (VL **libellus*), though this is more clearly a dissimilation. It may be further observed that the transition from *am*(=^m*ā*, a nasalized vowel probably)²² and *au* (pronounced at this

¹⁷ "Salmon-trout," a Celtic borrowing. Readers of George Borrow's *Wild Wales* will recall the Welsh "eog" which figures in an amusing anecdote.

¹⁸ *Anecdota*, pp. 53-55.

¹⁹ *Romania*, XXXV (1906), 724.

²⁰ *Zeitschr. f. röm. Phil.*, XXX (1906), 724.

²¹ Paris: Klincksieck, 1939. A derivation in the older works from **lambere-petras* may be dismissed summarily as a flight of fancy.

²² At least the nasal before a labial was very indistinct. Cf. C. H. Grandgent, *Intr. to Vulgar Latin* (New York: Heath, 1907), p. 128.

time *av* if not *o*) is not excessive, so that the folk etymology is possible phonologically.

Tufera—a first-declension form corresponding to the *tuber* of classical Latin—though preserved only in two inferior manuscripts, *g* and *P*, at 18, 5²³ (*tuferas meliores ab aliis boletis sunt*) is the link we need between the Romance forms of *truffle* and the *tufer* known in glosses. The medial *f* points, of course, to a dialectal form in Latin which is alone represented in the Romance languages, while the true Latin form was lost, except as a loan word. Liechtenhan, however, brackets the passage, presumably because of its provenance.

The sense of *facio* found at 22, 9—*cocurbitas* [nom. pl.] . . . *ad contemperandas febres faciunt* ("are beneficial, may be used"), common to Anthimus and the *Mulomedicina*—may be seen or at least adumbrated in Martial i. 51. 1: "Non facit ad saevos cervix nisi prima leones."

At 3, 7–8, *quomodo caballi furiosi ustulantur* is the reading of Rose, Weber, and Liechtenhan, although based on only one manuscript, the inferior *Londinensis* Harleianus 1 of the eleventh century. To me it seems impossible to justify this reading. The *apparatus* shows us *furias* GAH *furies* g(*furias e* corr) B *furiis* N, which surely points unmistakably to the true reading *furias* as well as to the hand of l's emending scribe, whose policy was regularly to correct and transform his text;²⁴ *furiosi* would be hard to justify on paleographic grounds. Baehrens²⁵ justifies *furias* for *furiæ* on the presumption that Anthimus, being nurtured from childhood on the concept of the Eumenides,²⁶ used the noun for the adjective. The reading is secure, but I suggest that *caballi* be taken as genitive singular rather than nominative plural: we have a periphrasis familiar both in Greek and in Latin, where the "ragings of the horse" can mean "raging horses."²⁷ This, though a little forced, is better than the assumption that a Christian physician of the sixth century, by harking back to the bugaboos of

²³ Beginning with this note, references are to page and line in Liechtenhan's edition unless stated to the contrary.

²⁴ Cf. Liechtenhan's *Praefatio*, p. ix.

²⁵ *Berl. phil. Woch.*, 1926, p. 852.

²⁶ "Durch die ihm von Jugend an vertraute Vorstellung der *furiæ* verleitet."

²⁷ Notice also that this introductory epistle, while no more correct as to Latinity, is meant to be more high flown stylistically.

his boyhood, could fail to distinguish between *furia* and *furiosus*, words common at all periods and particularly familiar to him in the course of his professional experience.

Liechtenhan at 3, 14, retains the *nos agimus* of the best manuscript tradition, instead of adopting the reading *angimus* proposed by Rose. For this sensible procedure he is criticized by Max Niedermann,²⁸ although Weber (see his note *ad loc.*) has found parallels for *se agere* in the sense of *versari*. The full passage runs as follows, after a claim that the health of the noble savage lies in his enforced temperance: "nam nos qui diversis cibis et diversis deliciis et diversis poculis nos agimus." It seems clear that the conjecture *angimus*, which at first blush appears brilliant, is in reality superfluous. The tone is wrong. Anthimus, the doctor, states a fact; himself a courtier, he is not censuring the richer foods of civilized people. This is apparent from the sequel in which his sole advice is a counsel of moderation (*magis parcius agentes*). Our Anthimus is not a Rousseau *manqué*. Weber translates: "But we who trifle with different foods and different delicacies and different drinks."²⁹ To Niedermann this is repugnant as "ein blosser Trick zur Umgehung der Schwierigkeit,"³⁰ but his criticism goes much too far. It is true that Weber, perhaps involuntarily, has introduced a notion of elegant dalliance alien to the original. I suggest a more colorless version—"we who have to do with, we who make use of," or the like.

The reading *coctiar bonum plenum* ("a good, heaping spoonful") at 25, 10, is of especial interest. Weber's note speaks of it as "a variation of *bene plenum* but very like the English expression, 'good teaspoonful,' which is found in our cookbooks, and logically formed in the same way as the Latin. Good and *bonus* have extended their meaning to that of *generous, full*." In my opinion, at least as regards *bonus*, this is to put the cart before the horse. If *bonus*, Old Latin *duenos, duonus*, are indeed to be connected with the IE **dōy-* in a reduced grade (compare the optative *duim*), then we must rather start with the meaning "that

²⁸ *Loc. cit.*

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

³⁰ *Loc. cit.*; incidentally, such a formation as *diversa cibora* (12, 10) is not, as Niedermann implies, exclusively an Italianism. Compare the common "heterogenous" nouns in Rumanian: e.g., *foe, focuri*.

which gives" or "he who gives" with an easy semantic shift, for men are always prone to identify the good with the profitable. Note that it is not the etymology of *bonus* which is here being defended but its semantic development, which is very nearly the same even with the alternate etymology favored by Walde.³¹ In other words, instead of being an extension of the sense, this may very well be an extremely ancient usage, grown specialized in this culinary sense. In English, on the other hand, it is entirely possible, as Weber says, that the expression is "logically formed." Our "good" derives from "what is fitting," according to Skeat, who attaches it to Teutonic **gad-* (cf. Russian *godno*, "suitable"). The *NED s. v.*, definition 20, recognizes a meaning: "Qualifying definite statement of quantity to indicate an amount not less and usually greater than what is stated," and cites "gode hand fulle" in a text before the Norman Conquest. I suspect that the expression, as it occurs in the Romance languages,³² is directly descended from the Latin usage outlined above, though in default of early examples this must be mere conjecture.

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³¹ *Lateinisches etym. Wörterbuch*, s.v. He connects it with an IE root **deu-* seen in Sk. *duṣasyati*, "rewards, honors," and with Lat. *beāre*. But see Ernout and Meillet, *op. cit.*, for a third derivation.

³² See Littré, s.v. "bon": "bon poids, bonne mesure, poids, mesure qui sont plutôt au delà qu'en deçà du poids, de la mesure exacte."

PLATO'S *PARMENIDES*. II

RICHARD ROBINSON

VI

THE second part of the *Parmenides*, then, is not a statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly. Is it a direct or indirect statement of method? There is one extremely good reason for holding it to be a direct statement of method, a straightforward example of a method that Plato recommends us to practice, and this is that Plato makes Parmenides deliberately and seriously introduce it as such. The transitional passage says, with every appearance of earnestness, that Socrates' difficulties about the Forms are due to his want of training. Parmenides prescribes for him a training which he defines as Zeno's procedure with certain modifications. He then gives the illustration.

The second part of the *Parmenides* certainly does illustrate (whether well or badly may be a question) the procedure of getting oneself into a better position to judge whether a proposition is true by ascertaining its consequences; and it also certainly illustrates (whether well or badly may again be a question) the procedure of ascertaining both its own consequences and those of its contradictory. To this extent the illustration really does illustrate what it is said to; and the theory that the second part of the *Parmenides* is a direct statement of method is correct.

Yet there are also extremely grave difficulties in saying that the second part of the *Parmenides* is a model of reasoning which Plato meant us to copy. They are as follows:

1. The example seems bewildering and absurd. We can hardly believe that it would really put Socrates in the way of escaping his former bewilderment.

2. Even in the apparently serious introduction Parmenides once refers to the example as "play."⁵⁷ An example held up for imitation

⁵⁷ *Pa.* 137B.

to all who profess the serious business of philosophy does not seem naturally described as "play."

3. There seem to be some rather crass sophisms in the example, which Plato apparently must have intended as such. Interpreters differ greatly whether the movements are fallacious in the large and radically; but most are agreed that there are one or two apparently wilful sophisms of detail. For example, Plato surely must have believed that there was something wrong with this:

The one will not be the same as itself.—Why not?—Because the nature of the one is, of course, not also the nature of the same.—How so?—Because a thing does not become one whenever it becomes the same as something else.—What then?—If it becomes the same as the many it must become many and not one.—True.—But if the one and the same are in no way different, whenever anything became the same it would always become one, and whenever one, the same.—Certainly.—If therefore the one is to be the same to itself, it will not be one to itself; and so being one it will not be one. But this is impossible; and so it is impossible for the one to be either other than an other or the same as itself.⁵⁸

Again, Plato surely believed that there was something wrong with this:

Since we found it different from the others, the others would surely be different from it.—Of course.—It would be just as different from the others as they from it, and neither more nor less?—Obviously.—If then neither more nor less, equally.—Yes.—Then in that it was of a nature different from the others and the others were of a nature different from it in the same way, in this way the one would be the same as the others and the others the same as the one.⁵⁹

In the subsequent fuller statement of this fallacy Plato probably knew that he was crassly overlooking the possibility of ambiguity when he said: "Whether you utter the same word once or many times, you must always mean the same thing." He probably saw that this fallacy of division is a fallacy: "If any thing were a part of many things among which was itself, it will of course be a part both of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, since it is a part of all."⁶⁰

These are all very minor parts of the argument; but it is a strange procedure to introduce even a single rusted link into a chain on which you advise men to depend.

⁵⁸ 139DE.

⁵⁹ 147C.

⁶⁰ 157CD.

4. We have adopted with reason the view that Plato held the conclusion of his example to be false.⁶¹ Since he even held the conclusion of the first movement by itself to be false, we may confidently say that he also held the combined conclusion of the first four and the combined conclusion of the second four each to be false, taken separately. We have also adopted with reason the view that Plato held that either the hypothesis of the first four movements or that of the last four was true.⁶² But when the premise is true and the conclusion false, it follows that the reasoning is invalid.

5. We have adopted with reason the view that Plato believed the arguments in the first part of the *Parmenides* to be invalid, although by no means crassly so. We shall therefore be giving some unity to our interpretation if we also hold that he considered those of the second part invalid, though not always crassly so.

For these reasons it is necessary to eliminate the attractive idea that the second part is meant to be a model for our reasoning; and to hold the somewhat difficult view that, while the introduction does seem to promise us a model for our reasoning, while the example does illustrate the precept there given that we should examine the consequences of our hypotheses, while it does illustrate the other precept that we should examine also the consequences of their contradictories, it nevertheless did not seem to Plato valid reasoning. The nature of the introduction to the second part forces this conclusion on every interpreter who refuses to say that Plato thought the second part valid reasoning.

There is only one alternative left of the four we enumerated above, namely, that this example is an indirect statement of method, a proof of the fallaciousness of a certain kind of reasoning by showing that it leads to all possible conclusions, whatever premises it starts from. On this hypothesis Plato must have thought the passage contained a fallacy other than those minor and crass examples previously mentioned. Let us therefore see what pervasive fallacies we can discover.

It is not at all easy to say what fallacies occur in the second part of the *Parmenides*, unless we content ourselves with very vague language. It would be true to say that practically every invalid infer-

⁶¹ See above (*Class. Phil.*, January, 1942), p. 70.

⁶² See above, p. 76.

ence here is made possible by an ambiguity. As in the *Euthydemus* and the *Sophist*, Plato here shows us vague and formal terms, such as "one" and "same" and "other," being used abstractly and absolutely, without the definite references that alone can make them serviceable, and so permitting many strange and subtle ambiguities. His hypothesis itself is most remarkably vague. Among the conceivable translations into English are these: "If everything is one," "If it is one," "If the one exists," "If unity exists," "If unity is one." On reflection we may well be amazed that, given such a cryptic and ambiguous phrase, anyone should immediately infer consequences therefrom, and not rather ask himself what it means. This readiness to infer consequences from sentences which, because they take relative words absolutely and syntactical devices as names of things, are nearly empty of meaning and may be filled with whatever the momentary context suggests, is what people are condemning when they talk contemptuously of "dialectic."

So much may safely be said about the fallacies; but, when we try to say precisely what these ambiguities are, we step on to much more treacherous ground. It seems impossible to find any single ambiguity that makes possible the whole set of inferences. We have already seen that some links in the chains are quite special and isolated fallacies; and we may now add that this is particularly so in the movements that have affirmative conclusions. Plato seems to be able to base his negative inferences on a single error, notably the fourth and the eighth; but in the affirmative inferences he seems obliged to snatch at any and every fallacy in turn in order to reach the symmetrical conclusions he requires, especially in the fifth.

The syntactical forms "*X is Y*" and "*X is not Y*" may mean either identity and nonidentity or attribution and nonattribution. "The ruler of England in 1707 was Queen Anne" states an identity; but "The ruler of England in 1707 was feminine" states an attribution. There are places in the second part of the *Parmenides* where it seems fairly probable that the conclusion is obtained by assuming the equivalence of nonidentity and nonattribution, an assumption made easy by the fact that syntax does not always distinguish them. This is perhaps most likely in the fourth movement, which seems to be as a whole the argument that, since the others-than-the-one are not the

one (nonidentity), therefore they have no attributes that would entail their being in any way one (nonattribution). The whole of the first hypothesis, moreover, gets its persuasiveness in part from the fact that unity is not identical with anything but unity. This tautology is represented by the ambiguity of language as the important discovery that nothing can be predicated of unity or the one. The same fallacy seems to occur in some of the affirmative movements too, though less pervasively. Thus in the second movement we read the phrase, "The others-than-the-one neither are one nor share in it, since they are other,"⁶³ which is a neat example because here nonidentity and non-attribution are stated side by side. Professor Taylor finds this ambiguity in the first regress-argument in the first part of the dialogue.⁶⁴

There is no clear case of the affirmative form of the fallacy in the *Parmenides*. The dialogue does not anywhere clearly confuse the attribution of *X* to *Y* with the identity of *X* and *Y*. On the other hand, this affirmative form is, if not responsible for, at any rate favorable to, one of the characters of Plato's theory of Ideas. The doctrine that *Xness* is *X*, most strikingly stated in the *Protagoras*—in the example that justice itself is just—and never definitely scotched by Plato, becomes much easier if we confuse the attributive falsehood that *Xness* is *X* with the identifying tautology that *Xness* is *Xness*. And in this way the affirmative form of the fallacy is covertly operative in the *Parmenides*.

This is not to say that Plato himself never saw any difference between identity and attribution. On the contrary, he distinguished in the *Sophist*⁶⁵ between being one (πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν) and being unity (αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι); and in the *Parmenides* itself⁶⁶ he says: "Nothing but the one itself can be one. . . . But the whole and the part must share in the one." It is to say that both in the *Parmenides* and in the *Sophist*⁶⁷ he sets before us arguments that fallaciously overlook this distinction, and that he himself was habitually entangled in at least one form of the fallacy in his theory of Ideas.

⁶³ Pa. 149C.

⁶⁴ *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 50-51.

⁶⁵ *Soph.* 245A.

⁶⁶ Pa. 158A.

⁶⁷ E.g., *Soph.* 244BC and 250.

Another ambiguity seems to pervade the second part of the *Parmenides*, namely, the confusion between an adjective and a substantive considered as characterized by that adjective. This is most obvious in the two phrases "the one" and "the others." Do these mean unity and otherness? If so, they are only two out of innumerable entities that may be discovered in the universe. Or do they mean, on the one hand, some substance which is called the One because it is characterized by the adjective unity and, on the other hand, everything else in the universe? If so, they together exhaust the universe. They mean sometimes the first and sometimes the second. They must mean the second, for example, at the beginning of the fourth movement, when Parmenides explicitly says that besides the one and the others there is nothing whatever. Yet if the one is some substance characterized by unity in the movements that deal solely with the one, we cannot tell any more about it than the fact, from which we start, that it is one. And it is clear that in the first movement, at any rate, Parmenides' inferences seem plausible because we take his one not as a substance that has unity but as the adjective unity. Every time he mentions the one we take his sentence in the way that makes it most probable; and we do not notice the ambiguity because of the subtlety and strangeness of the distinction between a thing that is characterized by unity and the unity that characterizes it.

Perhaps these two forms of ambiguity are ultimately identical. Anyway, there seems to be a close connection in the *Parmenides* between confusing an adjective with the substantive characterized thereby and confusing nonidentity with nonattribution. Parmenides seems often to start from the truth that *Xness* is not *Yness*, infer that *Xness* is not *Y*, and infer, thence, that the thing that is *X* is not *Y*. In this process the first step uses the confusion between nonidentity and nonattribution; and the second uses the confusion between the adjective and the substantive it characterizes.

What we call "reification" is perhaps a third aspect of the same ambiguity. Plato's theory of Ideas makes universals into things, because it confuses them with perfect particulars. It fails to distinguish between circularity and the perfect circle, and so the idea becomes a thing as the perfect circle is a thing, the example or paradigm

that all other circles should follow. This is to make an adjective into a substantive characterized by that adjective.

The term "Other" is obviously relative. It applies to everything relatively to something. It is, as Plato expresses it in the *Sophist*, one of those kinds that communicate with all other kinds. It is, in medieval language, a transcendental, an attribute that transcends all categories and belongs to everything there is. The term "One" is also a transcendental. It is self-contradictory to assume, of any conceivable object or objects, that it or they are in no way one. The hypothesis of the last four movements, that the One is not, is therefore self-contradictory, if taken to mean that nothing is in any way one; and you can infer everything from it if you can infer anything. It may be that this is part of the explanation of those movements. It may be, also, that Parmenides obtains many of his conclusions by shifting from the transcendence of the adjectives One and Other to the departmentalness of some vaguely substantival One and substantival Others. It may be, again, that he uses an ambiguity by which One may mean either a transcendental adjective something like unifiedness or a departmental adjective something like "without parts." I have not, however, succeeded in isolating clear cases of these ambiguities anywhere in the argument.

An apparently quite distinct type of fallacy is the assumption that one of a set of adjectives must apply to a given subject, when in truth none applies; for example, that the One must be greater or less or equal, and that it must be in motion or at rest. This assumption made, it is possible to prove that one of the set applies by showing that the others do not. The fallacy is particularly bad when the argument by which we eliminate the other alternatives is an argument which, rightly understood, eliminates the whole set. If the only possible cases of P are p_1 and p_2 , and we prove that X is not p_1 by an argument which really shows that X is not P , we have no right to conclude that X is p_2 . This perhaps often occurs in the second part of the *Parmenides*; and there seems a clear case at 161C. Here considerations which really prove, if anything, that the One is neither equal nor unequal are used to prove that it is not equal and therefore unequal.

Moreover it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, it would be; and it would be like them in virtue of its equality. But these are both impos-

sible, if one is not.—Impossible.—And since it is not equal to the others, must not the others also be not equal to it?—They must.—And is not what is not equal unequal?—Yes.—And is not the unequal unequal to something unequal?—Of course.—So the one shares in inequality, with regard to which the others are unequal to it.⁶⁸

This review of the fallacies in the second part of the *Parmenides*, uncertain as it is, seems more probable than any attempt to point to one single pervasive fallacy. We need not insist upon its details, but only upon the general assertion that there is more than one major fallacy present. Even if, as suggested, the confusion between identity and attribution is not really distinct from that between the adjective and the substantive which it characterizes, a diversity of fallacies remains. For besides this there is the assumption that one of a set of adjectives must apply to a given subject, when in truth none applies, and the treatment of transcendentals as departmentals, and various minor invalidities.

The conclusion that there is more than one major fallacy in the second part of the *Parmenides* renders improbable the suggestion that this passage is an indirect statement of method, a proof of the fallaciousness of a certain kind of reasoning by showing that it leads to all possible conclusions whatever premises it starts from. For anyone who wished to defend one of these ways of reasoning could argue that the absurdity was due only to the other fallacies; and Plato would have weakened his case against one and all of them by introducing the others. We should hardly care to evade this conclusion by holding that Plato saw only one of the fallacies and thought the rest valid reasoning. Nor does it seem possible to make out that there is never more than one major fallacy in the same movement. But, before finally rejecting the view that this part of the *Parmenides* is meant to be an indirect statement of method, let us examine two attractive forms in which this view has been held.

First comes Professor Cherniss' belief that the passage contains throughout only one major fallacy. He writes as follows:

This result is accomplished by a systematic abuse of *ἐναι*, the meaning being swung from the copulative to the existential and stress being put now on the exclusive and again on the extended meaning of the word.

⁶⁸ *Pa.* 161CD.

Elvai in the copulative sense in A1, 4, B2, 4, in the existential sense in A2, 3, B1, 3.

There are other sources of fallacy which appear sporadically, e.g., the juggling of *ἐρερον* and *ἄλλο* in 164B ff.⁶⁹

Professor Cherniss does not go into further detail about this fallacy. He does not, for example, take the first movement and show us just how it uses the copulative-existential ambiguity of "is" to obtain its strange conclusion. The implication of the passage quoted seems to be that "is" is used unambiguously in the copulative sense throughout the first movement, unambiguously in the existential sense throughout the second and third movements, unambiguously in the copulative sense throughout the fourth movement, and so on. In other words, that it is used unambiguously in the copulative sense throughout all the movements that reach negative results, and unambiguously in the existential sense throughout all those that reach affirmative results.

If we take this interpretation of Professor Cherniss' view, according to which there is no ambiguity within each movement itself but only when two movements are added together, it ought to follow that, apart from minor or unintentional fallacies, each movement by itself is valid and reaches true results; that only when we add together the results of the affirmative and the negative movements do we get a falsehood. But this consequence cannot be accepted; for each of the affirmative movements taken by itself leads, roughly speaking, to the conclusion that the One (or the Others) are everything; and each of the negative movements to the conclusion that the One (or the Others) are nothing. Each of these results by itself is absurd; and Plato must have thought so; and he says at the end of the first hypothesis that he thinks that result absurd.

Leaving now this special interpretation of Professor Cherniss, which is likely to be wrong, let us turn to the general nature of his view, which is quite unmistakably that the fallacy in the second part of the *Parmenides* is first and foremost the ambiguity of the copulative and the existential senses of "is." It is very difficult to speak with any confidence about the nature of the invalidity of these arguments; but to the best of my judgment the fallacies are not this but such as I have

⁶⁹ *AJP*, LIII, 126.

described above. Professor Cherniss is right in finding an ambiguity of *εἶναι* here; but it is the confusion between the identifying and the attributive uses, not between the existential and the copulative. Furthermore, it is by no means the sole important fallacy here. And the fallacies here are by no means contemptible, but extremely difficult both to locate and to describe and to avoid.

The other special form which we may examine of the view that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of method is that which finds here an indirect statement of the doctrine of Communion put directly in the *Sophist*. It is attractive to suppose that this part of the *Parmenides* reaches its absurd results by a method which assumes that the doctrine of Communion is false; and then the *Sophist*, by establishing this doctrine, gives the reason for the fact already demonstrated as a fact by the *Parmenides*, that this method is unreliable. This supposition gives good sense to Parmenides' extraordinary "jest" and neatly links the dialogue with one composed at a comparatively near date. It gains support from the fact that Socrates appears to deny Communion in his original statement of his theory of Ideas in the *Parmenides*.

If therefore anyone tries to show that such things are both one and many, stones and planks and the like, we shall say that he demonstrates something to be one and many, but not the one to be many or the many to be one, and that he is not saying anything astonishing, but what we should all admit. But if anyone first distinguishes apart by themselves those forms of which I was now speaking, such as likeness and unlikeness and multitude and the one and rest and motion and all such, and then shows that they are capable of mixing and separating among themselves, I should marvel extremely.⁷⁰

As further evidence for the supposition that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of the doctrine of Communion, we may note this fact. Plato says⁷¹ that his doctrine of Communion is (among other things) a refutation of the view that we can only say "man is man" and cannot also say "man is good." Now why should anyone feel himself driven to the paradoxical view that you cannot say "man is good (or bad or tall or white or anything else)" but only "man is man"? Surely because he has failed to distinguish attribution from identification, and is therefore compelled to suppose that "man

⁷⁰ *Pa.* 129DE.

⁷¹ *Soph.* 251.

is good" asserts the identity of two things, whereas in reality it asserts that one of two nonidentical things characterizes the others. But this confusion between attribution and identification is the very fallacy which, according to our previous analysis, appears most pervasively in the second part of the *Parmenides*. Is it not probable, then, that this confusion is the subject of both dialogues? The *Parmenides* shows to what havoc the confusion leads; the *Sophist* shows just what the confusion is.

Perhaps someone might reply that the *Sophist's* doctrine of Communion is intended to clear up the puzzles about being and non-being developed in the *Sophist* itself,⁷² so that we have no reason for referring it to a previous work. But to this we could answer that the confusion between identification and attribution is probably the main source of the *Sophist's* difficulties also. For example, what the stranger represents as the limit of perplexity in 250 is apparently nothing but the argument that, since Reality is not identical with Motion or Rest, therefore Reality neither moves nor rests. Thus, both in the second part of the *Parmenides* and in the aporematic part of the *Sophist*, Plato would be playing with this ambiguity; and in the doctrine of Communion he would be sterilizing it for good and all.

Here is another argument in favor of the view that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of the doctrine of Communion. At the end of the discussion of Communion in the *Sophist* there is a passage that reads like a criticism of the second part of the *Parmenides*.

If anyone disbelieves these oppositions, let him inquire and say something better than has now been said. Or if he thinks he has discovered something difficult, and takes pleasure in dragging an argument now to this side and now to that, he is being earnest about what is not worth much earnestness, according to our present arguments. For there is nothing clever or hard to discover in this. It is that that is both hard and fine.

What?

What was said before, to let these things go and be able to follow what is said and examine each detail, both when a man says that what is other is in some way the same and when that what is the same is other, in that mode and that respect in which he says either of them to be so. But to show that the same is other in some sort of way, and the other the same and the great small

⁷² *Ibid.* 241-51.

and the like unlike, and to enjoy thus constantly producing contradictions in discussion—this is no true examination, but the manifest immaturity of someone who has only just begun to grasp reality.

Quite.

Why, my dear man, this trying to separate everything from everything is completely boorish and unphilosophic and unbecoming in every way.

Of course.

Isolating each thing from all things is the most complete destruction of all discussion; for it is the interweaving of the forms with each other that gives us speech.⁷³

This passage seems to fit very well the affirmative movements of the *Parmenides*, in which every predicate is indiscriminately affirmed of the subject, and the negative movements, in which every predicate is indiscriminately denied thereof. And we seem to be told that such activities involve a failure to respect the Communion of Kinds.

Yet the supposition that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of the *Sophist's* doctrine of Communion, and the arguments that have been suggested in its favor, seem too vague to be convincing; and if we try to make them more precise they seem to break down. Here follow five arguments for the proposition that Plato did not regard the second part of the *Parmenides* as an illustration of what happens if you deny Communion.

1. We have seen reason to believe that there is more than one fallacy in this part of the *Parmenides*. If this is so, it is far from clear how the doctrine of Communion could dispose of the whole paradox. Surely it could dispose of only one, or of a related group. The rest would remain unsolved—an unsatisfactory state of affairs—unless we could find that Plato dealt with them elsewhere.

2. The doctrine of Communion is not merely the doctrine that Kinds "communicate." It is also the doctrine that Kinds do not "communicate." It is the denial of the two universal statements: (1) that every Kind communicates with every other Kind and (2) that no Kind communicates with any other Kind; and the assertion of their two contradictories: some pairs of Kinds communicate and others do not. If, therefore, the second part of the *Parmenides* contravenes this doctrine, it must do so by assuming either that no Kind communicates with any other Kind, or that every Kind communicates

⁷³ *Ibid.* 259.

with every other Kind, or both. Now it will have to be both, for the results of the affirmative movements affirm certain cases of Communion, and the results of the negative movements deny certain cases thereof. On the theory, then, that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of the doctrine of Communion, we should have to say that the affirmative movements assume that every Kind communicates with every Kind and the negative movements assume that no Kind communicates with any Kind. If we do not say *at least one of these*, we shall not make the second part of the *Parmenides* contradict the doctrine; for the doctrine is precisely the compound assertion of the two contradictories of these two universal statements. And if we do not say *both of these*, we shall have no explanation either of all the affirmative or of all the negative movements. But when the theory that the second part of *Parmenides* is an indirect recommendation of the doctrine of Communion is thus made precise, it loses all the attraction it had in its vague form. We can find no evidence that the affirmative movements assume that *all* Kinds communicate; but, if fewer than all, the doctrine is not denied. And we can find no evidence that the negative movements assume that *no* Kinds communicate; but, if at least one pair is exempted from the assumption, the doctrine is not denied.

It might have been the case that a mistake was revealed in the *Parmenides*, not by the *Sophist's* general doctrine of Communion, but by one or more of the particular Communions which it establishes. Examination seems to show, however, that this is not the case either. The particular Communions which the *Sophist* establishes are, first, that Rest and Motion do not communicate with each other; and, second, that Being, Same, Other (and Not-being, if Plato regards that as distinct from Other), all communicate with everything. Here we note first that nothing is said about Unity or the One, although that seems the obvious Kind to discuss if you are going to expose a mistake in the *Parmenides*. Next we note that, since Motion and Rest are of very minor importance in the *Parmenides*, no doctrine about them in particular could clear up the errors of this dialogue. There remain Being, Same, Other (Not-being); and what we are told about them is that each of them communicates with every other Kind. Now about this information it can only be said that no one has yet shown *how* it

reveals, either directly or indirectly, the fallacy in the *Parmenides*, and it may be doubted whether anyone ever will.

3. The doctrine of Communion is itself entangled in one of the major fallacies of the second part of the *Parmenides*, namely, the confusion between the adjective and the substantive characterized thereby. For let us ask whether by the proposition that "X communicates with Y" Plato means that "the adjective Xness is characterized by the adjective Yness" or that "some or all substantives characterized by the adjective Xness are also characterized by the adjective Yness." We are obliged to answer that he means both because he fails to distinguish them.

Here is the evidence that the Communion of X and Y sometimes means that a substantive characterized by Xness is also characterized by Yness.

A. The doctrine of Communion is represented as refuting the contention of certain "late learners" that you must not say that "man is good." What sorts of proposition did these late learners think they were rejecting? Surely not the uncommon sort of proposition that attributes an adjective to an adjective, such as "Manness is good." Surely their delight and their absurdity came from their paradoxically denying the validity of all the most ordinary statements, such as "Socrates is good." The doctrine of Communion must therefore maintain that you can sometimes attribute an adjective to a substantive characterized by another adjective; otherwise it would be irrelevant as a reply to the "late learners."

B. The doctrine of Communion is represented as making possible certain physical doctrines:

And those who at one time put all things together and at another separate them, whether they put them together into one and separate an infinity out of one, or separate them into limited elements and put them together out of these, and whether they make this happen by turns or all the time—in any case they would be talking nonsense, if there is no mixing.⁷⁴

If Plato is thinking of physical theories here, as he seems to be, his doctrine of Communion must include the proposition that sometimes a substantive characterized by Xness is also characterized by Yness; for propositions that were only about the characters of characters

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 252.

would not affect the proposition that physical things join and separate.

On the other hand, there are also two convincing evidences that in his notion of Communion Plato included such propositions as that "Xness is Y." (A) He describes it as holding between Kinds or $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$,⁷⁵ not between things or $\delta\upsilon\tau\alpha$. And $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ are apparently the same as $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$.⁷⁶ (B) His proof that not everything communicates with everything is to appeal to Motion and Rest, a pair which he declares evidently do not communicate. Now he realized well enough, as his reference to spinning tops in the *Republic* shows, that a substantive somehow characterized by the adjective "moving" may at the same time be somehow characterized by the adjective "resting." He is not denying this familiar fact. He is denying, as he explicitly says, that "Motion itself" could rest.⁷⁷ That is, he is denying that the adjective "moving" could be characterized by the adjective "resting."

The above considerations make it clear that Plato's Communion includes both the case where an adjective is characterized by another adjective and the case where a substantive characterized by an adjective is also characterized by another adjective. It not merely includes them but confuses them. That it does so is another manifestation of the permanent failure of the theory of Ideas to distinguish between universals and perfect particulars. This is why Communion can include physical mixture, as it seems to do in 252B. If universals are treated as things, their mixture is the same as the mixture of things. In the absence of the concept of relation, all statements whatever appeared to Plato as either affirming or denying a Communion between at least two things. His Communion is thus an enormously ambiguous notion. It is supposed to be present whenever we can make any true statement that has a grammatically affirmative form; whereas, in fact, there is no one or two or three or even fifty kinds of relation or union or Communion one of which is meant by every affirmative statement.

So much for the argument that the doctrine of Communion is not the exposure of a fallacious method in the *Parmenides*, because it is itself vitiated by one of the major fallacies vitiating the *Parmenides*.

4. "But," it might be said, "even if the doctrine of Communion

⁷⁵ E.g., 253B8.

⁷⁶ 254C2.

⁷⁷ 252D6.

does suffer from one of the fallacies committed in the *Parmenides*, it may still detect and point out another of those fallacies; and we have seen reason above⁷⁸ to believe that it does so." Let us therefore examine that argument, which was to the general effect that the doctrine of Communion is the detection of the confusion between identity and predication, on which the second part of the *Parmenides* largely depends for its results. The answer to it is that only by a speculative interpretation can we obtain the statement that Plato regarded his doctrine of Communion as pointing to the distinction between identity and attribution. The suggestion made above was that the "late learners" rejected "man is good" because they confused this attribution with an assertion of identity. But it does not follow that Plato himself analyzed their mistake in this manner. Plato certainly thought of his Communion as refuting the "late learners." But it does not follow that he thought the manner of refutation was to show that they confused attribution with identity. Nor is there anything in the text to show that he thought this. He does not regard this or any other of his doctrines as the detection of an ambiguity or a confusion, though interpreters have sometimes written as if he did. The nearest he comes to such a twentieth-century way of talking is the following:

Therefore let no one say that we are presuming to assert the being of not-being represented as the opposite of being. We have long ago said goodbye to the question whether there is any opposite of being or not, either explicable or completely inexplicable. But as to our present account of not-being, let a man either refute it and convince us that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot, let him say as we do that the kinds mingle with each other; and that, since being and the other traverse all of them and each other, the other shares in being and *is* because of this sharing, while yet it *is not* that in which it shares, but, being other than being, is clearly necessarily not-being.⁷⁹

This passage cannot rightly be called the assertion of an ambiguity; and this is the nearest Plato comes to describing his doctrine of Communion in this way. There is therefore no force in the argument which attempts to show that the second part of the *Parmenides* depicts the consequences of denying Communion by reference to the confusion between identity and attribution.

5. Certain persons delight in the paradox that you must not say

⁷⁸ Pp. 168 f.

⁷⁹ *Soph.* 258E-259A.

that "man is good," as Plato says; but certain others, who do not delight in it at all, nevertheless may feel themselves urged toward it by certain difficulties. They may be in the dilemma that, on the one hand, they feel sure you can say "man is good," but, on the other hand, they do not see *how* you can, or they see something which appears to entail that you cannot. To such more responsible thinkers it is folly to say: "But you obviously can say 'man is good'; and, if you could not, all discourse whatever would be impossible, including the paradox that you cannot say 'man is good.'" For these thinkers already know that you can say that "man is good," and that the supposition that you cannot immediately destroys all thought and speech. Their trouble is that, nevertheless, they seem to see a good reason for denying that you can say that "man is good." What they want is to be shown the fallacy in the argument which troubles them. They know it must be a fallacy; but they want to see that it is. Now for such thinkers Plato's exposition of his doctrine of Communion is no help whatever. For he merely points to the fact that we *must* be able to say "man is good," because otherwise no thought or communication would be possible. He does not even notice any arguments to the contrary, much less show us where they go wrong. Nor does he do anything to elucidate the nature and presuppositions of this Communion which he asserts (unless you think it elucidated by his comparison of it to the arrangements of letters in significant words).⁸⁰ He does not tell us *what* it is, but only *that* it is. Having established its existence in one page⁸¹ by this sure but unsatisfying method, he spends the rest of his discussion in ascertaining which pairs communicate in a small selected set of kinds and applying the results to the notion of not-being. His procedure is thus rather like that of a scientist who should tell us that, in view of the evidence, we *must* say that this body passes from one place to another separated place without passing through the interval, but should leave it entirely to us to discover the fallacy in the arguments which seem to show that such a thing cannot happen.

These considerations show that if the doctrine of Communion were meant to be the key to the second part of the *Parmenides* it would be a

⁸⁰ *Soph.* 253.

⁸¹ *Soph.* 252.

very poor one. It would merely tell us that some things communicate and others do not, which we knew before, and would leave it to us to see our way through the fallacies of the eight hypotheses by this feeble ray, which cannot be done.

In view of these five arguments we must reject the suggestion that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of the doctrine of Communion. This concludes our examination of two specially attractive forms of the view that this part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect statement of method.

VII

We have now eliminated all four of the alternatives described above. It appears that the second part of the *Parmenides* is neither a direct nor an indirect statement either of doctrine or of method. (The only reservation we have had to make in this conclusion is that this passage does embody, though perhaps badly, two rules of method seriously recommended in the preceding part of the dialogue.)

The interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides* now to be recommended rests mainly on the notion of exercise or *γυμνασία*, which Parmenides stresses in the traditional part of the dialogue and which he names five times.³² The second part of the *Parmenides* is an exercise or gymnastic. It does not in itself attain truth of any kind; but it sets the muscles of the mind in a better state to obtain truth hereafter. Even to follow these arguments is a strenuous undertaking; to attempt, as we must, to see what is wrong with them calls for the greatest acuteness and persistence.

This is also the spirit in which Plato puts forward the objections to the theory of Ideas in the first part. We have seen that he thought them serious but not fatal. He offers them here as an exercise in logic. They must be invalid, for the theory of Ideas must be true; but who can see *where* they are invalid? Thus not merely the second part but the whole of the *Parmenides* is an exercise in method. The dialogue is a unity. A short central passage urges the need for training in logic. On either side of it are disposed long argumentations which are excellent material for such a training. Their excellence lies in this, that, on the one hand, they are both extremely difficult to see through, while,

³² *Pa.* 135C, 135D twice, 136A, 136C.

on the other hand, they would both incite Plato's readers vehemently to try to see through them—the first set because they attack the principles of Plato's own philosophy, the second set because their conclusion is profoundly unsatisfying to any human mind. In neither part did Plato think the arguments certain, and in neither part did he think them silly. In both he thought them very real and very difficult difficulties, but superable.

The dialogue is addressed primarily to Plato's own supporters. It rebukes them for being shallow and cocksure in their adhesion, first, by showing them serious difficulties in their view, then, by urging that they need more dialectic, and, lastly, by showing the kind of tangle the dialectician must fight his way through. It is a manifesto for more dialectic and less enthusiasm. Grote, to whom this interpretation is due, says that the dialogue is "intended to repress premature forwardness of affirmation, in a young philosophical aspirant,"⁸³ and that it is another way of doing what *elenchus* does and what Socrates in the *Apology* declares to be his business—combatting unexamined belief and overconfident affirmation.⁸⁴ The *Parmenides* does for the young philosopher what the Socratic *elenchus* did for the common man. It is the *elenchus* of the philosopher, who thought himself beyond the need of *elenchus*.

What relevance have Parmenides and Zeno to this purpose? Why are they introduced? To make Socrates the bearer of this rebuke would not have done; for he had become identified in the early dialogues with that *elenchus* of the common man, and in the middle dialogues with that enthusiastic theory of Ideas, which were now tending to raise an unjustifiable pride in some of Plato's pupils. Socrates excluded, no more authoritative figure than Parmenides could be found. Plato, who rightly thought himself a great man, very likely considered only Parmenides great enough and distant enough to be his critic. And Parmenides' pupil, Zeno, had concentrated on the hard and patient task of reasoning as Plato wishes his followers to do.

It is not inconsistent with this "gymnastic" theory of the *Parmenides* to hold that Plato regarded the dialogue, especially its latter part, as amusing. But the smile is not that of parody or satire; it is

⁸³ George Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates* (London, 1865), II, 263.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 296–98.

that which we reserve for some perfect but queer and inhuman achievement of the human spirit, for virtuosity divorced from significance and passion, for an amazing tour de force. The Academicians probably smiled at the second part of the *Parmenides* as the serious student of logic smiles at the perfection of the paradox of the class of all classes that are not members of themselves.

It is a defect of the gymnastic theory that it makes Parmenides seriously recommend a training in method, promise an example of that training, and then give, not exactly an example, but rather a material on which we may train ourselves. The second part of the dialogue is not really, as it professes to be, a case of the exercise that Parmenides recommends, but an argument by examining which we who read the dialogue may obtain that exercise. This seems to be, on the gymnastic theory, a real though slight incoherence and defect in Plato's composition. But there are only two ways out of it. One is to say that Parmenides' recommendations about method are not seriously meant; and the other is to say that the "illustration" really is good reasoning. Both of these seem much worse; and the incoherence on the gymnastic theory is much less than on the "parody" theory, according to which a serious recommendation about method is succeeded by an "illustration" which is a parody of a vicious logic.

The *Parmenides* thus comes nearest of all Plato's works to being wholly methodological. The *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, the *Phaedrus*, its only rivals, have a much larger proportion of matter of another sort. In the *Parmenides* everything, including the important contributions to the theory of Ideas, directly serves the purpose of urging the practice of dialectic.

Apart from the samples of argument proposed for study, the actual methodological recommendations of the *Parmenides* are three: (1) Follow the method of Zeno; (2) apply it to Ideas and not to things; (3) draw not merely the consequences of your hypothesis' being true but also those of its being false.

Parmenides does not tell us how he arrived at these maxims or give us any reason for believing them. He does not say that experience has shown him their value. Nor does he offer to deduce them from the nature of human learning or anything else. He simply presents them with his authority; and Socrates is concerned not to know their

warrant but to see what they mean. Parmenides does not even develop them at all in their abstract form. He only professes to "illustrate" them; and we have concluded that the second part of the dialogue is not really an illustration of a method Plato meant us to follow. Can we form a probable opinion whether there was more in his mind, and if so what it was?

In the first place, did Plato regard this procedure as only an exercise or as also an immediate means of reaching the truth? He recommends it primarily as an exercise.⁸⁵ But toward the end it is an exercise that attains truth: "if you are going to complete your training and really discern the truth."⁸⁶ The last account of it drops the notion of gymnastic altogether: "Without this wandering and peregrination through everything it is impossible to meet the truth and get understanding."⁸⁷ From these two passages we should perhaps judge that Plato thought of himself as here giving not merely a means of sharpening the mind but also a means of directly attaining truth. This view would be confirmed on some interpretations of what Plato here understands by the method of Zeno, which unfortunately he does not say.

What did Plato understand here by the method of Zeno? In the following list, each suggestion includes and is more specific than all the previous suggestions.

1. Pursuing long chains of rigorous reasoning
2. Setting up an hypothesis and deducing its consequences, as Zeno in his book set up the hypothesis "if it is many" (*εἰ πολλά ἐστι*)⁸⁸ and deduced consequences therefrom
3. Establishing a proposition by showing that its alternative leads to falsehoods, as Zeno established the proposition that "it is one"
4. Establishing a proposition by showing that its alternative leads to mutually contradictory pairs of consequences, as Zeno showed that the proposition that things are many leads to the consequence that things are both like and unlike⁸⁹
5. Establishing a proposition by showing that its alternative leads to worse self-contradictions than itself does, as Zeno showed that, while the propositions that it is one and that it is many both lead to self-contradictions, those of the latter are worse⁹⁰

⁸⁵ *Pa.* 135D4, 136A2.

⁸⁷ 136E.

⁸⁹ 127E.

⁸⁶ 136C.

⁸⁸ 136A5.

⁹⁰ 128CD.

The second of these suggestions is roughly the "second-best" method of the *Phaedo*, where the aim appears to be only to develop a deductive system. Plato probably means more than this here. He includes in Zeno's method the notion of reduction to absurdity, as it is implied in the three subsequent suggestions. That seems to follow reasonably from the description of Zeno's work in the early part of the dialogue,⁹¹ where it is essentially the disproof of a proposition by showing that it leads to absurdities. There is no reason to doubt, either, that Plato thought of the absurdities as contradictions, as he mentions here⁹² and as he declares to be characteristic of "the Eleatic Palamedes" in the *Phaedrus*.⁹³ We are thus brought as far as the fourth suggestion and left to choose between that and the fifth. The reason for adopting the fifth would be that Plato seems to represent Zeno as recognizing that contradictions follow not merely from the hypothesis that "it is many" but also from his own hypothesis that "it is one," and merely claiming that the former contradictions are worse.⁹⁴ The implication seems to be that, of two alternatives, we must adopt the one that leads to fewest absurdities, though both of them will lead to some.

Plato's hopes for human reason were always high; but they seem to be less high in the *Parmenides* than in any other work. The great theory of Ideas is not here the eminently reasonable hypothesis it was in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. The great method of hypothesis is severely lamed by the discovery that a hypothesis and its contradictory may *both* lead to absurdities. It is no longer sufficient to establish a proposition merely by deducing a falsehood from its contradictory. This is perhaps why we hear no more of the method after the *Parmenides*. The renewed enthusiasm of the *Sophist* is based on the new method of "division."

VIII

Professor Cornford's interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides*⁹⁵ is a combination of two interpretations which he represents as harmonizing with each other, whereas they really conflict and weaken each other.

⁹¹ 128.

⁹² 128D.

⁹³ 261D.

⁹⁴ 128CD.

⁹⁵ *Plato and Parmenides*. I thank Messrs. Harcourt, Brace & Co. for permission to quote from this book.

The first of Professor Cornford's interpretations is as follows: The second part of the *Parmenides* is not parody or sophistry, but a serious and very subtle analysis. Nearly all the conclusions of all the hypotheses are true and important. What Plato here analyzes is the logic of Parmenides, which he shows to be incorrect. The fifth hypothesis, for example, "is a brilliant refutation of the Eleatic dogma that nothing can be said about 'what is not.'" ⁹⁶ The explanation of the first and second hypotheses is as follows:

Hyp. I [shows] that from the notion of a bare unity which negates any kind of plurality, nothing can be deduced or evolved. Parmenides, who insisted on the absolute unity and indivisibility of his One, was logical in so far as he inferred the non-existence of anything else: there could be no "Others," no plurality of real things, no world of sensible appearances. But he was not justified in ascribing to his One itself any further attributes. It could not even exist or be the object of any kind of knowledge. He did, however, regard it as existent and knowable, and he called it not only "One" but "One Being." Hyp. II [starts] afresh from this notion of a One which has being, and [shows] that such a One, just because it is not absolutely one, unique and indivisible, can have some of the further attributes which Parmenides deduced, but equally well other attributes which he denied. It can have many parts or aspects or elements; and there can be "Others," in a number of different senses. If we add (as Parmenides did) the attributes of spatial extension and shape, there is no reason why it should not have motion and all the kinds of change in time. In fact there is nothing to arrest our thought from proceeding all the way from the conception of a "One Entity" to the existence in space and time of a multitude of physical bodies, capable of motion and of every kind of change, and perceptible by the senses. ⁹⁷

The defects which the *Parmenides* reveals in the logic of Parmenides, according to Professor Cornford, are mostly failures to detect ambiguity. Parmenides would never have reached his results if he had observed and separated the various senses of "one" and "exist," and so forth.

Professor Cornford further holds that Plato, by thus refuting the logic of Parmenides, was able to restore that which Parmenides had destroyed, namely, the Pythagorean cosmology. The *Parmenides* lays the logical basis for the Pythagorean type of cosmology stated in the *Timaeus*. For example, the great-and-small or the Indefinite Dyad, which is the unlimited element in Plato's cosmology, is the subject of Hypothesis VII and is also introduced in Hypotheses III and IV. ⁹⁸

So much for Professor Cornford's first interpretation. It may be summed up as the view that the second part of the *Parmenides* removes Parmenides from the path of the physicist by convicting him of ambiguity, and lays the logical foundation for a Pythagorean physics; and it may be called the "anti-Elea theory."

Professor Cornford would probably prefer to adopt the anti-Elea theory by

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

itself, without any additional hypothesis, if he judged it possible; but certain aspects of the second part of the dialogue make that impossible. One of these is that there is no explicit mention of ambiguity in the dialogue; and the other is that there appear to be many fallacies. The anti-Elea theory says that each movement of the second part of the *Parmenides* is a valid and important contribution to logic; Professor Cornford therefore requires some additional hypothesis to explain why these movements seem very fallacious. The anti-Elea theory also says that this dialogue points out ambiguities in the logic of Parmenides; therefore Professor Cornford needs an additional hypothesis to explain why there is no mention of ambiguity in the dialogue.

The second hypothesis, which Professor Cornford adds to his first to meet these difficulties, is in general the same as Grote's. It is a form of the gymnastic theory, according to which the *Parmenides*, instead of describing and analyzing sorts of fallacy, presents cases thereof and leaves the task of analysis to the reader.

The form which Professor Cornford would like to give to the gymnastic theory, if he could, would be that each movement takes a different sense of "one" or "being" or some other word, but within each movement the same sense is preserved throughout. Thus we should be given an exercise in distinguishing the different senses in the different movements; and, when we had done that, we could discover in each movement, taking it in its proper sense, an important contribution to logic.

Even if Professor Cornford could maintain this most favorable form of the gymnastic theory for him, the theory would still weaken his other interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides*. For the purpose attributed to the dialogue by the one theory will not combine well with that attributed to it by the other. A piece of writing containing concealed ambiguities, just so far as it is well adapted to puzzle a student and make him search for fallacies, is ill adapted to reveal to him the precise fallacies in a thinker whose defects are not yet exposed. You cannot effectively say at the same time "Here are the ambiguities" and "Where are the ambiguities?" It is too much to hope that a student will first be well puzzled by the arguments; then, after considerable exercise, discover and define the different senses used in the different movements; and then realize that Parmenides confused these senses and that the movements show what happens if we keep them separate. To make the world aware for the first time of hitherto unnoticed ambiguities, you must point to them as clearly as you can, not hide them in a puzzle. Professor Cornford has to add the gymnastic theory, in order to square his anti-Elea theory with the text, but at the same time the gymnastic theory makes the anti-Elea theory less probable. The anti-Elea theory needs and yet is injured by the gymnastic theory.

But the text will not even allow Professor Cornford to maintain the form of the gymnastic theory most suitable to him. He confesses with admirable

candor that fallacies sometimes occur even within a single movement.⁹⁹ He also notes places where, in the course of a movement using a word in one sense, Plato resumes a previous sense.¹⁰⁰

The exercise in detecting fallacies thus becomes intertwined with the argument against Parmenides in so intimate a manner that surely no reader would ever get beyond the former. I venture to suggest that Professor Cornford applies at every stage whichever of two disparate hypotheses suits his book just then. Whenever he can, he represents an argument as a "brilliant refutation" of some Eleatic thesis, for that is what he would prefer to hold all the time; but, when his apologizing skill is defeated by some unusually gross fallacy, he applies the gymnastic interpretation and declares that Plato is here setting us a fallacy to detect. The result is an incredible hodgepodge. It is impossible to believe that Plato, desiring to publish a refutation of Parmenides' logic and the foundation of a better one, would have inserted fallacies here and there to puzzle the reader. He could not have helped seeing that the second purpose defeats the first.

This alternate application of different hypotheses explains Professor Cornford's swinging from the highest praise of Plato's arguments to attributions of fallacy. We hear of "astonishing lucidity," "brilliant refutations," "sound conclusions," "fine and important distinctions." Yet we also hear that Plato is content to draw a true conclusion from true premises which do not entail it, and that he did not scruple to introduce a *non sequitur* here and there.¹⁰¹

This alternation between different hypotheses also explains why Professor Cornford sometimes seems to call the same argument now valid and now invalid. How can the fifth movement return to a previous sense of "is" halfway through itself,¹⁰² and yet be "as a whole" a brilliant refutation of an Eleatic dogma?¹⁰³ If the consequences deduced in Hypotheses I and II "do actually follow,"¹⁰⁴ why does he thereafter point out fallacies in them?¹⁰⁵

The same alternation between different hypotheses explains, thirdly, why Professor Cornford sometimes seems to be making the peculiar suggestion that, just by pointing to a fallacy in the argument, he is showing us that Plato was *not* being fallacious! Thus, having told us of an argument that it introduces fresh assumptions, "which obviously contradict those on which we have so far proceeded,"¹⁰⁶ and that "Plato's purpose [here] is to puzzle the reader by apparent contradictions and set him thinking out the difference between the various senses of 'not one,'" ¹⁰⁷ we read as follows: "We may

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 130.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 170, 227.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-51, 157, 160-64.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

claim that this curious section supports the view that Plato is not merely indulging in a parade of sophistical arguments. If that were all, he would hardly have been at the pains to construct so intricate a piece of reasoning."¹⁰⁸ Do you really turn a bad argument into a good one by pointing out that fresh assumptions have been introduced, which obviously contradict the previous ones? And how can a fallacy in the inference fail to vitiate the conclusion?¹⁰⁹

Professor Cornford muffles the clash of his anti-Elea theory with the gymnastic theory by his misinterpretation of the deductive form of the movements. By the "deductive form" he means the fact that, within each movement, every single proposition except the first is represented as following from the first, either directly or indirectly, without the aid of any other premise. The form in which the movements are cast suggests that the original hypothesis by itself necessitates every subsequent statement in that movement. In a modern phraseology, the speaker pretends that the number of the postulates in the postulate-set for each movement is one and one only.

This "deductive form" is false, as everyone would nowadays agree. Professor Cornford finds three ways in which it misrepresents the facts. In the first place, premises additional to the original hypothesis are surreptitiously introduced from time to time. In the second place, Plato, in order to preserve this deductive form, often says "A is B" or "A must be B," when all he means, and all his argument justifies, is that there is no reason why A should not be B,¹¹⁰ e.g., "we must understand the statement that 'the One Entity, being limited, *will have shape*' as meaning that the attribute of extension *can*, without any illogicality, be added."¹¹¹ Professor Cornford finds that the deductive form frequently "embarrasses" Plato in this way, by compelling him to say that A is B when he means only that Parmenides has not proved that A is not B.¹¹² Thirdly, he finds that this same deductive form makes Plato represent as demonstrations or inferences what are really definitions. This occurs especially at the beginning of a movement; there the first few propositions, though presented as consequences of the hypothesis, are really definitions of the sense to be given to the hypothesis in the coming movement.¹¹³ It occurs also in the middle of movements.¹¹⁴

Why did Plato adopt this misleading deductive form? I venture to suggest that Professor Cornford gives a false answer; and that, when we see the true answer, the full incompatibility of the anti-Elea theory with the gymnastic theory becomes apparent.

Professor Cornford's explanation of the deductive form is as follows:

By casting the whole into the form of a deduction, I understand Plato to indicate that there is no logical barrier such as Parmenides' goddess set up between the

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹¹² E.g., *ibid.*, p. 150.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 172, 186.

deductions of the first part of his poem and the mythical cosmogony of the second part. The existence of a manifold and changing world in time is not an irrational or selfcontradictory illusion of mortals. Reasoning will carry us all the way from Parmenides' own hypothesis of a One which has being to the notion of the sensible body with contrary qualities. The Pythagorean evolution, starting from the Monad and ending with the sensible body, is restored and justified. But this train of reasoning simply postulates the addition of one attribute after another, in a logical order. It must not be confused with an account of how a sensible world could actually come into existence, by 'emanation' from a supreme One. There is no hint of any moving cause. The production of a sensible world can be explained only in the imagery of a creation myth such as we find in the *Timaeus*.¹¹⁶

This explanation provides Professor Cornford with a measure of reconciliation between his two interpretations of the second part of *Parmenides*—the anti-Elea theory and the "gymnastic" theory. Plato's adoption of the deductive form appears, in the first place, as a part of the anti-Elea theory: it is designed to indicate that, contrary to what Parmenides said, we can construct a logically impeccable account of the world our senses report. But it is a part of the anti-Elea theory which leads on fairly well to the gymnastic theory; for, having once adopted the deductive form, Plato was compelled to use *non sequitur*'s, furtively introduced premises, and definitions disguised as demonstrations; and these are fallacies on which the student must exercise his logical acumen. The deductive form therefore discharges, according to Professor Cornford, two services: first, it indicates that Parmenides' logic cannot hinder us from rational cosmology, and, second, it enables Plato to set us exercises in detecting fallacy while at the same time presenting what is really a valid argument.

About this suggestion two points must be made; and the first is that this deductive form would have been a ridiculously ineffective way of doing what Professor Cornford says it was intended to do. For let us consider. What we have in the text is eight movements, each professing to be a rigid deductive system having only one initial postulate. And what Plato expects us to infer from that scheme, according to Professor Cornford, is that there are no such logical obstacles as Parmenides supposed to an empirical cosmology. Surely there is not the faintest connection between the premise and the conclusion. Surely no single reader would ever grasp what Plato was trying to convey.

The other point is that this deductive form is not something peculiar to the *Parmenides*. It is the form which Plato believed common to all deductions by the hypothetical method and to every *elenchus*. As I have urged in my book on *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Plato's standing and unquestioned assumption was that an argument can and usually does proceed from one single postulate or hypothesis, without requiring any additional premise. Plato in the *Parmenides* is not slyly but consciously insinuating premises which he

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

knows to be additional assumptions. He is genuinely failing to notice the extra premises as such, just as he fails to notice them in his most serious arguments in other dialogues, just as in the last argument in the *Phaedo*, for example, he genuinely regards the theory of Ideas as the only premise required to arrive at the conclusion that soul is immortal.

The deductive form of the movements in the *Parmenides* is not something which Plato sat loose to as Professor Cornford supposes; it was his whole conception of deduction, and he never got beyond it. It follows that Plato was not so serenely above the fallacies and ambiguities and surreptitious premises of those movements as Professor Cornford declares. He knew there was something wrong; but he could not say what it was with any sureness and abstractness.

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NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A NOTE ON MANILIUS i. 431-42

In Book i from 262 Manilius describes the constellations, beginning with the zodiac and going eastward around that circle, as is the custom. He then describes the north circumpolar constellations, except for Cepheus and Cassiopeia, treated *en famille* with Andromeda at 354-60. Then the constellations north of the zodiac (308-70), following from west to east, with occasional deviations to the south, a line about 45° north of the equator. To this eastward movement Boötes and Corona form an initial exception, but their position is specifically noted by the phrases *a tergo* (316) and *parte ex alia* (319). With trifling exceptions the order used here by Manilius agrees with that of Hipparchus, Geminus, and Hyginus.¹ This irregular procession is marked by the seven successive words *proxima* (337), *hinc* (342), *tum* (343), *tum* (347), *succedit* (351), *tum vicina* (361), *subeunt* (365). We come now to the constellations south of the zodiac (373-442). In this narrower band we begin with Orion and go eastward for the third time. Here, too, the order is essentially that of Hipparchus.² This series is joined by the words *subsequitur* (396), *tunc . . . -que* (412), *tum* (412), *cui proximus* (415), *et . . . et una* (417), . . . *et* (418). We can see from this that it is a mannerism of Manilius to employ words indicating proximity, order in the sky, and contiguity.³

We now come to a passage printed by all editors in the same order, with slight variations in the text:

- 431 . . . tunc Iuppiter Arae
sidera constituit, quae nunc quoque maxima fulget,
quam propter Cetus convolvens squamea terga
orbibus insurgit tortis et fluctuat alvo
435 intentans morsum similis iam iamque tenenti,
qualis ad expositae fatum Cepheidos undis
expulit adveniēns ultra sua litora pontum.
tum notius Piscis venti de nomine dictus
exurgit de parte noti. cui iuncta feruntur
440 flexa per ingentis stellarum flumina gyros.
alterius capiti coniungit Aquarius undas
Amnis, et in medium coeunt et sidera miscent.

433 Cetus *codd.*, *edd.* coeptos M¹ coetus M² Cetos Housmannus 1932 quam propter Cetus *codd.* quam Cetus contra Housm., quem emendationem in apparatu critico posuit 435 seclut Bentleius morsum similis G, *edd.* plerique morsu similis L similem morsum M¹, Housm. similis morsu M² 439 cuncta *codd.* iuncta Scaliger, Housm. aut ante aut post 441 excidisse versus statuit Housm.: alterius magno fons exit ab Orione

¹ See Hans Möller, *Studia Maniliana* (Marburg diss., 1901), pp. 32-33. ² *Ibid.*

³ Cf. also *post hunc* (272), *has inter fusus circumque amplexus* (305), *hunc inter mediumque orbem* (308), *proxima* (314).

Such is the received order. The passage bristles with difficulties (some recognized long ago), to which we add some particulars.

First, *quam* (433) seems to refer to Ara. There is no connection of the legends of Cetus and Ara, and therefore *propter* cannot mean "on account of." The alternative meaning "near to" is also impossible, because Ara is far removed from Cetus (at least 70°), and two constellations intervene (the Water of Aquarius and Piscis Notius). *Propter* is therefore unintelligible. To remove this impasse Housman re-wrote 433 to read: *quam Cetus contra convolvens squamea terga* (1903). Here *contra* would mean "in an opposite part" (i.e., of the sky), and the line would make good sense. However, van Wageningen did not adopt this change in his Teubner edition of 1915, and in 1932 Housman returned to the manuscripts. *Praeter*, synonymous with *contra*, is paleographically possible and would thus be easier; but *propter* seems closer to the above-mentioned words denoting juxtaposition in the astronomical procession. Some change is necessary, but exactly what stood in the archetype is not obvious.

Second, 435 was objected to by Bentley because in its present position it ought to describe the pose of the monster in the sky; and he believed that it better described the monster as it once approached Andromeda, while living and breathing and gnashing its teeth. Bentley felt, because Cetus and Andromeda are separated in the sky and (we add) because Cetus withdraws before Andromeda as the sky turns, that the words *similis iam iamque tenenti*, which seemed to imply proximity of Cetus and Andromeda, are inappropriate. Furthermore, Bentley observed that the line was like Vergil *Aeneid* xii. 754. Housman added that *similis* cannot refer to *cetos* (n.). Therefore, Bentley thought the line an interpolation and relegated it to a place after Manilius v. 233, where it would well describe Canis Major in pursuit of Lepus.

However, it is well to consider that Manilius was surely familiar with imaginative drawings of the constellations, probably in some sort of planisphere, and that many of his graphic details were very likely derived from such pictures.⁴ Möller cites seven planispheres in which Cetus is depicted with open jaws, as if threatening to bite.⁵ Moreover, 435, in spite of Bentley, seems far more appropriate to a still picture of the monster than to a real monster in motion. A beast can be pictured as on the point of seizing its prey, even though the prey does not appear in the picture.⁶

⁴ Cf. Möller, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff.

⁵ That this representation of Cetus goes back to the time of Manilius is made almost certain by comparison with the numerous catacomb frescoes of Jonah and the whale, in which the whale is clearly adapted from pictures of Andromeda's monster. These agree in every detail with the medieval pictures of the constellation Cetus (cf. Wilhelm Neuss, *Die Kunst der alten Christen* [Augsburg: B. Filser, 1926], p. 24 and note on p. 137).

⁶ If anyone is still offended by 435 in its present position, it may easily be trajected over two lines to a place after 437. Here it will fit in very appropriately, because these lines then form an admirable précis of the celebrated description (v. 545-55, 579-85, 601-4), and, if we observe the similarity between 435 and v. 601-2 and i. 356, we see that 435 may be a satisfactory part of the *qualis*-description.

Third, Housman, considering the Greek origin of the name *Cetus* and the apparent usage of Manilius in v. 15 and 658, concluded that *Cetus* must be neuter. He asserted that it could not be masculine, offering in evidence v. 602, *illa* (*sc. fera*), where Manilius "would surely have used *ille* if he thought it possible." To avoid connecting *Cetus* and *similis* (435), he embraced the reading of M¹—*similem morsum*—but followed Bentley in rejecting the verse; and to solve the difficulty of *qualis* in 436 he took as its antecedent *alvo* in 434.

In saying that *Cetus* cannot be masculine, Housman is supported by the statement of Servius, commenting on *Aeneid* v. 822, and by the usage of earlier Latin writers except Vitruvius (ix. 5. 3) and of all Latin poets. In later prose the word is generally masculine; and this fact, combined with the use in Vitruvius and two occurrences of *cetum* (acc.) in Plautus, suggests that the *sermo vulgaris* regularly treated *cetus* as masculine. The analogy of *pelagus*, *chaos*, and *melos* also suggests the conclusion that *cetus* was neuter in learned classical speech, masculine in early, late, and vulgar speech.

However, we are not satisfied with Housman's solution of the problem, and, since no emendation suggests itself, we prefer to follow the manuscripts in this passage and refer *qualis* to *Cetus*. With this lapse into vulgar grammar we may compare *lampada* (nom.) (i. 352), which Housman also emends.

Fourth, we note that *tum* (438), which continues the series of expressions denoting order, makes *Piscis Notius* and *Unda* rise after *Cetus*. This variation in the order of *Piscis* and *Cetus* was observed by Möller⁷ and Boll.⁸ Not only because of this inversion of the actual order of appearance of the two groups but also because this constitutes a divergence from the otherwise closely parallel order of *Geminus* and because in lines 394 and 656–57 of Book v Manilius demonstrates that he knows *Piscis Notius* appears before *Cetus*, we believe that *tum* is a mark of corruption. A change of some kind is needed to correct the uranography and make the passage agree with *Geminus* and with Manilius himself in Book v.

Fifth, as the lines stand in the manuscripts, all the rivers of heaven are said to come to *Piscis Notius*. The only real river in the sky is *Eridanus*, a rambling constellation near *Orion*, which ought to come at the close of the southern star groups. The plural *flumina* here and in v. 14 and the mention of *Aquarius* and *alterius* (441) imply that the water from *Aquarius*, which the poet terms *Unda* or *Undae*, may be classified with *Eridanus* as a river. This *Unda* is recognized as a separate star group by *Aratus* (389–99), *Vitruvius* (ix. 5. 3), and *Geminus* (iii. 13). Further, since, in listing the stars in *Aquarius*, *Hipparchus* omits those in the *Water*, it seems that he regarded *Unda* as a separate asterism, and *Martianus Capella* discusses the group separately at viii. 838. Thus it seems clear that the *Water* of *Aquarius* was recognized as a separate southern asterism.

Now Housman says:

cuncta siderum flumina ad Notium Piscem ferri falsissima est; sed quid hoc ad Fayos Stoeberos Iacobos Bechertos? . . . quod duo in unum coire dicit, utrum-

⁷ See n. 1.

⁸ *Bibliotheca mathematica*, II³ (1901), 190.

que ad Cetus deferri testantur globus Farnesianus, Arat. 392-9, Hipparch. i 8 4, Hyg. astr. iii 31; ureor tamen ne poetae haec scribenti obuersata sint Arati uerba εἰς τὴν Ἰαννόβου 365, quae tametsi Eridani mentioni subiiciuntur, alio pertinent.

This is part of his notes to 439-40. Therefore, he follows Scaliger in writing *iuncta* for *cuncta*. A further objection to *cuncta* not noticed by Housman is that *ferri* (in the sense *fluere*) is not combined with a limit-of-motion construction, certainly never with a dative.⁹ Its regular use is with a predicate expression indicating some characteristic of the flow. The reading *iuncta* gives us two such expressions, *cui iuncta* of situation,¹⁰ and in 440 of manner and direction. Manilius' uranography is satisfactory, since Unda actually flows to and touches Piscis Notius,¹¹ while between Eridanus and Piscis Notius there are no ancient constellations except near the beginning of the River, where Cetus intervenes. It would appear from 442 that Manilius used the ungrouped stars between Piscis and Eridanus as a link to join the streams.¹² Thus Eridanus, as truly as Unda, can be called *iuncta* to Piscis Notius.

The last difficulty pertains to the remaining southern constellation, Eridanus, of which we now expect some mention. Housman takes *capiti* in 441 to mean the source of Unda, and *Amnis* and *alterius* (441 and 442) to refer to Unda; and, since *in medium coeunt* obviously reveals two rivers in the poet's mind, there should be some mention of Eridanus, which he provides by inserting a verse that refers to the source of Eridanus, to balance the mention of the source (*capiti*) of Unda (*Amnis*). His verse is closely parallel to Vitruvius (ix. 5. 3) and Aratus (361). If *capiti* does mean "source" and if *Amnis* and *alterius* do designate Unda, Eridanus has unjustifiably been omitted, and we should indicate a lacuna before *alterius* (441). However, there are considerations which seem to argue against Housman's interpretation.

It will be remembered that Housman¹³ supposed the connection of the two streams lay through Cetus, which both of them touch. However, since both streams flow on past Cetus to the south for a considerable distance and since the streams can hardly be thought of as flowing together in Cetus and since *Amnis* is a better designation for Eridanus—called *Eridanus fluvius*, *flumen*, ὁ ποταμός—than for Unda, which is termed only *aqua*, *unda*, ὕδωρ, it seems

⁹ Cf. *Thesaurus*, s.v.

¹⁰ I.e., "next to Piscis Notius"—another of those Manilian expressions of proximity noted above (p. 186).

¹¹ Hyginus ii. 41, iii. 28; Ptolemy *Math. synt.* viii. 1 (ii. 124. 1 [Heiberg]); Eratosthenes *Catast.* 38. 1; *Schol. Arat.* 386, and elsewhere.

¹² Probably an influence of Egyptian planispheres, or Hermetic astrology. The Hermetic texts apply the name *Eridanus* not to the River, which flows from Orion, but to the Water of Aquarius. Manilius may have been misled by a reference in such a text to the union of "Eridanus" and Piscis Notius.

¹³ Quoted above (p. 189). It is unfair to suppose that Housman by *ad Cetus* meant to suggest that the two streams flowed to Cetus and stopped, since the four witnesses which he cites all show that the streams flowed far beyond Cetus.

that *caput* might here better designate the mouth of a river than its source. This sense is well attested in classical and post-classical Latin.¹⁴

A translation of the passage from 438 to 442 would now read:

Then the Southern Fish, named for the Wind, arises from the southern quarter of the sky. Next to it flow the Rivers, winding through huge coils of stars. Aquarius adds his waters at the mouth of the other, the Stream, and they come together and mingle their stars.

Such are the difficulties of the text and the discussion about them. We assume, since Manilius was a careful student of astronomy and a poet whose verbal point is tasteful and expressive, that the passage originally was correct in its astronomy, agreed with other passages of the poet, and was regular in its sequence of ideas. In order to avoid two obelisks marking hopeless corruptions (before *quam* [433] and *tum* [438]) and a possible lacuna before *alterius* (441), we assume (1) that *Cetus* is here masculine, (2) that *propter* is sound, (3) that *flumina* introduces both rivers, (4) that *caput* means the mouth of the stream, and (5) that *Amnis* (*alterius*) is sufficient reference to Eridanus.

Immediately after this passage in the manuscripts are forty-four lines that belong after 354. This suggests that the order of the verses may be disturbed in this passage, and we assume transposition as a likely method for restoration.

We suggest the following changes:

1. Move the five lines 438-42 back over five lines to a place after 432. Then *tum* will indicate that *Piscis Notius* rises after *Ara*, which is correct, and *Unda* will be placed before *Cetus*, where it ought to be.
2. *Quam* (433) represents a change from the original pronoun, whatever it was, that designated the rivers. When the rivers disappeared, this pronoun was altered to agree with *Ara*. We suggest *quae* (*sc. flumina*) as the original word. Now the word *propter* makes excellent sense, expressing the contiguity of *Cetus* to both streams.

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THREE NOTES ON THE *CIRIS*

Ciris 66-67 (Homer on Scylla's mother):

ipse Crataein ait matrem, sed sive Crataeis
sive illam monstro genuit gravena biformi. . . .

Editors assume that the name of Scylla's mother lurking in *gravena* was Echidna. So Housman conjectured "generavit Echidna," and Vollmer and

¹⁴ Cf. *Thesaurus*, s.v., and note especially the town-name *Caput Basensis* (*Not. dign.* occ. xxxii. 9), referring to the "confluence of two streams."

Fairclough followed him, while Helm (*Die Pseudo-Virgilsche Ciris* [1937]) proposed "genuit fera Echidna." All these critics are on the wrong track, since the epithet *gravis*, preserved as to its greater part in *gravena*, must not be sacrificed. Those who retained it ("monstrum genuit grave Echidna biformis" [Haupt], "gravem [to go with "illam"] Lenchantin") chose the wrong case, only *gravis* being possible. It is the dam's epithet, as *biformi* is the sire's. So we have but two syllables at our disposal for the name, and I write *gravis Hydra*. The two names Echidna and Hydra were interchangeable (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 9. 22, where he renders a Sophoclean "Εχιδνα by "Hydra"). The epithet *gravis* goes particularly well with Hydra (cf. Verg. *Georg.* iii. 415, "graves . . . chelydros"; *Aen.* vii. 753, "graviter spirantibus hydrys").

Verses 247-49 (Carme swears):

omnia me potius digna atque indigna laborum
milia visuram, quam te tam tristibus istis
sordibus et seonia patiar tabescere tali.

For the *seonia* or *scoria* of the MSS plenty of emendations have been brought forward, for instance, *senio* (of a young girl!), *sanie*, *furia*. My own proposal reckons with the fact that one of the two vowels, *e* or *o*, must go and that *ni* is often a misreading for *m*. So I read *stoma<cho>*. *Sordibus* denotes Scylla's neglect of her toilet; *stomacho* ("excitement, irritation"), her shattered nerves. The word, despite its humble original meaning, occurs in high poetry (Virgil, Horace). The unknown poet who wrote the *Ciris* has a liking for Greek words; see, for instance, *sophia* (vs. 4), *spelaeum* (vs. 467). My solution preserves the alliteration *sordibus et stomacho*, which some of my predecessors marred with their *morbo*, *cura*, *carie*. It may be compared with the well-known *sudor et sanguis*.

Verses 407-8 (Ciris lamenting):

vos ego, vos adeo, venti, testabor, et aurae,
vos o numantina si qui de gente venitis. . . .

All those who alter the *o* in verse 408 (*vos Pandionia* [Heyne]) block the way to emendation, for this *vos o* at the beginning of the line is a Vergilian echo (*Aen.* ix. 525; see Helm's commentary). The only scholar who was on the right track is Birt, who saw that some participle in *-anti* lurks in *numantina*. I disregard, however, his *mutanti* and prefer to read *plumanti*, "the clan growing feathers." For this meaning of *plumare* cf., for instance, Gellius ii. 29. 4. *Ciris* was fully justified in calling her relations "plumigerous," because not only Progne, apostrophized in verse 410, but also Philomela and Tereus had been changed into birds. There is no reason to write *quae* for *qui*, as the latter is generalizing (τινές), while *quae* (*sc. aves*) would be pedantic.

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A NOTE ON MARCUS AURELIUS CARUS

It has long been the fashion to speak of the "Illyrian" emperors of Rome—the succession of rulers which began with Claudius Gothicus and culminated with the family of Constantine in the fourth century. Writers have emphasized the political predominance of Illyricum, and the recent German historians have delighted in pointing out that the strong, virile Nordics of Illyricum succeeded, where the Semitic emperors (the Severi and Philip the Arabian) failed.

Of course, in speaking of the "Illyrian" emperors, one is forced to overlook or to dismiss the brief reign of the Italian, Marcus Claudius Tacitus; but it is of some interest to discover that another of the "Illyrian" emperors, Marcus Aurelius Carus (A.D. 282–83), was not an Illyrian either. This is, admittedly, a minor point, but it is one which has been long overlooked.

Regarding the birthplace of Carus, the sources give us the following information: Eutropius (ix. 18) says, "Carus . . . Narbone natus in Gallia"; Hieronymus calls Carus "Narbonensis"; and the text of Victor in the *De Caesaribus* (39. 12) reads "Narbone patria." Syncellos (p. 724 [Bonn]) distinguishes Carus as ἀνὴρ Γαλάτης, and Zonaras (xii. 30) also indicates that he was a Gaul. Finally, Sidonius (Carmen xxiii [Ad Consentium], 37 ff.) infers that Carus was a native of Narbo.

On the other hand, the author of the *Vita Cari* (4–5) was inclined to believe that Carus was born in Illyricum, or possibly in Rome or Mediolanum. Scaliger, the first scholar in modern times to consider the question, found arguments to support the theory of the Illyrian origin of Carus.¹ Accepting the *Vita Cari* at its face value—a mistake which modern scholarship has taught us to avoid—Scaliger assumed that the other sources must be in error. He noted that the author of the *Epitome de Caesaribus* (38. 1) referred to Carus as "Narbonae natus," and he evolved the theory that the Narbona of the *Epitome* was a variant spelling for Narona, a Dalmatian city.² Gibbon and later historians followed Scaliger without further question, and the Illyrian origin of Carus has never been disputed.

Scaliger's theory must be characterized as brilliant, but it cannot be maintained in view of the following considerations: (1) The *Vita Cari* and its accompanying biographies in the Augustan History are notoriously unreliable. (2) The *Epitome de Caesaribus* is scarcely more trustworthy, and, if its text is compared with that of Eutropius, a highly significant parallel may be observed:

Epitome 38. 1–2
Carus, Narbonae natus, imperavit
annos duos. Iste confestim
Carinum et Numerianum Caesares
fecit.

Eutropius ix. 18
Carus . . . Narbone natus in Gallia.
Is confestim Carinum et
Numerianum filios Caesares
fecit.

¹ See Bury-Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London, 1900), I, 337.

² *CIL*, III, p. 291.

At this point the *Epitome* was indebted to Eutropius or a common source. At any rate the source employed by Eutropius seems clearly to have indicated that Narbo in Gaul was the birthplace of Carus, and the *Narbonae* of the *Epitome* must represent the error of a careless scribe. Scaliger's theory thus becomes untenable, and we must conclude that Carus was a Gaul rather than an Illyrian.

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THREE-WORD IAMBIC TRIMETERS IN ARISTOPHANES

The use in tragedy of iambic trimeters composed of three words only is regarded as a definite stylistic trait.¹ It may therefore be surprising at first glance that such lines occur with great frequency in comedy. I give below the references to such occurrences in Aristophanes;² I have added also the references in Aristophanes to two-word iambic trimeter lines.

Three-word iambic trimeters: *Acharnians* 3,³ 69, 181, 374,³ 384,³ 823, 1080, 1176 (811 trimeters⁴). *Knights* 175,³ 216, 659, 697, 701,³ 1099,³ 1206, 1344,³ (688 trimeters). *Clouds* 48, 686, 851,³ 1480 (758 trimeters). *Wasps* 32, 35, 128,³ 195, 1342 (752 trimeters). *Peace* 134,³ 269, 831, 874 (695 trimeters). *Birds* 68, 1160, 1179, 1248, 1377 (925 trimeters). *Lysistrata* 27,³ 44,⁵ 219, 220, 430, 1003, 1220, 1277 (711 trimeters). *Thesmophoriazusae* 425, 1061³ (757 trimeters). *Frogs* 99, 204, 474,³ 476, 477, 516,³ 578, 661, 776,³ 837 (841 trimeters). *Ecclesiazusae* 9, 15, 127, 217,³ 274, 370, 419, 429,³ 754 (895 trimeters). *Plutus* 206, 805, 892³ (1,004 trimeters). Total, 66 (8,835 trimeters).⁶

Two-word iambic trimeters: *Acharnians* 382, 603, 605. *Wasps* 220, 1357.⁷ *Peace* 247. *Birds* 825. *Lysistrata* 457, 458. *Frogs* 839. The two examples in the *Lysistrata* consist of one huge word in addition to the interjection ω and have, accordingly, an effect even more noticeable than the other two-word trimeters.⁸

The effect of such lines in tragedy is to increase the impressiveness and solemnity of the passage in which it occurs; in comedy the effect is just the

¹ W. B. Stanford, *Class. Rev.*, LIX (1940), 8 and 187.

² Cited by Hall and Geldart's Oxford text (1900).

³ Examples of three-word iambic trimeters with a fourth word consisting of a monosyllable which has been elided.

⁴ I have stated the number of trimeters in each play in order that the proportion of occurrences may be apparent.

⁵ *Lysistrata* 44 is repeated twice in ll. 219–20, by *Lysistrata* and *Calonice* in the oath.

⁶ Also Aristophanes, *Frag.* 1; cf. *Frags.* 155; 318.8; 387.9; 543; 625.

⁷ A two-word trimeter with a third word consisting of an elided monosyllable.

⁸ All the instances cited above occur in spoken trimeter; there are no occurrences in the 76 melic iambic trimeters in Aristophanes. The majority of instances are found in long speeches; two only—*Knights* 1344 and *Lysistrata* 430—are divided between two speakers.

opposite. Probably paratragedy was intended in most such passages, and a comic effect is produced as a result of the incongruity of the impressive form and the unimpressive thought of the passage. The size of the words, many of them Aristophanic coinages, is rarely appropriate to the thought expressed. In *Acharnians* 69, the trimeter *πεδίῳ ὁδοιπλανοῦντες ἐσκηνημένοι* reinforces the world-weariness affected by the Ambassador. In *Frogs* 204, when Dionysius complains that he, being *ἄπειρος*, *ἀθαλάττωτος*, *ἀσαλαμίνιος*, cannot row, the comic effect of the large words is very apparent and is made greater by the tragic device of the repeated alpha privatives. This device is used again in *Frogs* 837-39, when Euripides says that Aeschylus is

ἄνθρωπον ἀγριοποιόν, αἰθαδόστομον,
ἔχοντ' ἀχάλινον ἀκρατὲς ἀπύλωτον στόμα,
ἀπεριλάλητον, κομποφακελορρήμονα.

The instances of three-word trimeters in *Frogs* 474-77 and in *Ecclesiastusae* 9 and 15 are in passages which, as the scholiast says, introduce many comic effects in travesty of passages from tragedy. That Aristophanes was quite conscious of the effect of these trimeters is indicated, I think, by the fact that he frequently has placed them close together. Thus, *Acharnians* 382 is a two-word trimeter, while line 384 is a three-word trimeter. *Acharnians* 603 and 605 are two-word trimeters. *Knights* 697 and 701 are examples of three-word trimeters, and *Frogs* 474-77 contain three three-word iambic trimeters.

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POETICS 1458 b 12

The reading of A is *τὸ δὲ μέτρον κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν*. On account of valid objections to *μέτρον*,¹ Bywater and Gudeman accept *μέτριον*, the reading of Σ (Spengel). Yet the significance of *μέτρον* in the text has been overlooked. It is possible that *μέτρον* is due to the influence of what may be the true reading, *μέτρων*, at the end of the sentence. It is obvious that *μέτρων* fits the context better than *μερῶν*, which does not refer to anything before or after. Aristotle is concerned in this section with a discussion of the effect of diction in meters. In 1458 b 16 he speaks of *ἐντιθεμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ μέτρον*; he gives metrical examples to prove his point (1458 b 23-1459 a 1); and finally he ends his discussion in this chapter by referring to the appropriate use of diction in the various kinds of meters (1459 a 10-11). *τὸ δὲ μέτριον κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων*, which we may suppose Aristotle to have written, will then mean, "Moderation is [or should be] common to all meters."

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¹ Cf. I. Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), pp. 298-99.

CONSERVATION OF SCHOLARLY JOURNALS

The American Library Association created this last year the Committee on Aid to Libraries in War Areas, headed by John R. Russell, the librarian of the University of Rochester. The Committee is faced with numerous serious problems, and it hopes that American scholars and scientists will be of considerable aid in the solution of one of these problems.

One of the most difficult tasks in library reconstruction after the first world war was that of completing foreign institutional sets of American scholarly, scientific, and technical periodicals. The attempt to avoid a duplication of that situation is now the concern of the Committee.

Many sets of journals will be broken by the financial inability of the institutions to renew subscriptions. As far as possible they will be completed from a stock of periodicals being purchased by the Committee. Many more will have been broken through mail difficulties and loss of shipments, while still other sets will have disappeared in the destruction of libraries. The size of the eventual demand is impossible to estimate, but requests received by the Committee already give evidence that it will be enormous.

With an imminent paper shortage, attempts are being made to collect old periodicals for pulp. Fearing this possible reduction in the already limited supply of scholarly and scientific journals, the Committee hopes to enlist the co-operation of subscribers to this journal in preventing the sacrifice of this type of material to the pulp demand. It is scarcely necessary to mention the appreciation of foreign institutions and scholars for this activity.

Questions concerning the project or concerning the value of particular periodicals to the project should be directed to Wayne M. Hartwell, executive assistant to the Committee on Aid to Libraries in War Areas, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York.

AN APPEAL FROM ENGLAND FOR OFFPRINTS

Dr. F. M. Heichelheim, in a personal letter thanking for an offprint, refers to the difficulty of securing recent American books and articles in England. Even the periodicals are slow to become available. He writes in part:

It would indeed be a great help for research under present conditions, if all American scholars would send us their offprints, and in addition recent offprints from other scholars which are duplicates in their libraries. . . . I shall be very glad to act as a clearing-house for such offprints and to forward them to scholars who will be especially interested in the special problems involved.

Undoubtedly in these difficult days, when, in spite of everything, so much scholarly work is being done in England, it is desirable that American scholars do all in their power to be helpful. Certainly, one way to be helpful is to send offprints either to other interested scholars or to Dr. F. M. Heichelheim, St. Margarets, 52 Glisson Road, Cambridge, England. It is also well to remember the files of *The Year's Work* now in charge of J. G. Barrington-Ward, Christ Church, Oxford, England.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. By WERNER JAEGER. Translated from the second German edition by GILBERT HIGHET. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Pp. xxix+420. \$3.75.

Professor Jaeger announces in the Preface to the first edition of his already famous book (p. vii) that he deals with "a subject hitherto unexplored," i.e., with *paideia*, "the shaping of the Greek character . . . the interaction between the historical process by which their character was formed and the intellectual process by which they constructed their ideal of human personality." In the Preface to the second German edition he adds that he is not trying to replace the history of events but "to describe history in a way which explains the life of man through the creative literature which represents his ideals"; and this first volume "describes the foundation, growth, and crisis of Greek culture during the periods dominated by the heroic and by the civic or political types of personality" and ends with the collapse of the Athenian empire.

Greek literature is, of course, not exactly a "subject hitherto unexplored"; and it would be hard to understand Professor Jaeger's claim to novelty without an attentive reading of his Introduction, which is entitled "The Place of the Greeks in the History of Education." Education, he says, "is essentially a function of the community" and is the "direct expression of its active awareness of a *standard*." The Greeks "believed that education embodied the purpose of all human effort" and was the "ultimate justification for the existence of both the individual and the community" (p. xvii). "The greatest work of art they had to create was Man; . . . education means deliberately moulding human character in accordance with an ideal; . . . above man as a member of the horde, and man as a supposedly independent personality, stands man as an ideal [*der Mensch als Idee*] . . . the universally valid model of humanity which all individuals are bound to imitate" (pp. xxii-xxiv). "In the best period of Greece mind without state was as impossible as a state without minds," and "the greatest works of Hellenism are memorials of a unique sense of the state, which developed uninterruptedly from the heroic age of Homer's epics to Plato's authoritarian state, in which the individual and the community fight their last duel in the territory of philosophy. . . . The true representatives of *paideia* were . . . the poets and musicians, orators (which means statesmen) and philosophers. . . . Thus, the history of Greek culture coincides in all essentials with the history of Greek literature: for Greek literature, in the sense intended by its original creators, was the expression of the process by which the Greek ideal shaped itself [*der Ausdruck der Selbstformung*]

des griechischen Menschen]. . . . Classical scholarship must once more assess the educational value of the ancient world" (p. xxix).

Jaeger has taken the vague and passionate philosophy of Hegel, who glorified the state and minimized artists as men who "give utterance to the universal thought," and has combined with it a kind of Platonic Form of Man—"the universally valid model"—to produce his doctrine of "der kommende dritte Humanismus." Highet renders this phrase modestly as "any future humanism," but the humanism that some of us hope may develop in a happier future will not glorify the state, since the worship of the state has led and still leads men to a barbarous religion of self-worship, nor will it accept the Platonic notion that there exists any universally valid model which we are bound to imitate, since these "universally valid models" invariably turn out to be models set up by one man or one group. So it is, for example, with the model set up by Aristotle, whose ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν applies to his self-sufficient and unloving contemplative philosopher. The ideas and the ideals of the men of genius who created Greek literature are plural, and many of them are in perpetual conflict; they cannot be reduced to unity by any Platonizing magic.

The first two chapters in Book I contain further clues to Jaeger's philosophy of humanism. "It is a fundamental fact," he says (p. 2), ". . . that all higher civilization springs from the differentiation of social classes . . . which is created by natural variations in physical and mental capacity between man and man. . . . Culture is simply the aristocratic ideal of a nation, increasingly intellectualized." Working on this basis, Jaeger tells the history of the idea of areté, which "is the quintessence of early Greek aristocratic education" (p. 3). Homer gives us "both the historical evidence for the life of that epoch and the permanent poetic expression of its ideals." Homer, of course, is, for Jaeger, not a unity; there are "early" and "late" strata in the *Iliad* (p. 15), and the *Odyssey* "portrays a later stage of civilization" than the *Iliad* (p. 13). It is therefore "vitally important" to assign each of the poems to "the century in which it was created"; but "all the intellectual labour which has been spent on such examination" of the poems "has led only to universal doubt and uncertainty."

We are deeply indebted to Jaeger for stating with great clarity the presuppositions with which he sets out to judge the history of Greek culture and of Greek literature; too many historians have taken pains to conceal the intellectual groundwork upon which they were operating. It is interesting to find that his main thesis—the exaltation of the aristocracy as the primary source of national education, culture, and morality—rests upon the theory that the upper class is naturally superior, physically and mentally, to the rest of the people. This theory is simply and purely a racial theory, and its acceptance by Jaeger as "a fundamental fact in the history of culture" puts him on the side of Theognis and Pindar and of various moderns, who are equally and even more desolatingly wrong. Plato, when he wanted to reconcile the lower classes

of his state to a life of toil and of permanent and ignominious deprivation of all civil rights, invented what he called a "Noble Lie" (*Rep.* 414, 415), about God "putting gold in those of you who are capable of ruling, silver into the soldiers, and iron and bronze into the peasants and workmen"; and Plato represents Socrates as reluctant to expose to the criticism of his fellow-Greeks this deliberately manufactured cock-and-bull story. The value of twenty-three hundred years of additional experience is open to some question, if many of us can now treat as a fundamental fact what was then recognizable as a Noble (or should it be "High-born"?) Lie. The creative minority among the Greeks have made immense contributions to art and letters, science and philosophy, and some of them were members of the aristocracy; but there is no evidence whatever that the Eupatridae or the Spartan Peers as "upper classes" created an aristocratic ideal. What they actually did, as classes, was to try to hold fast the power that they had acquired—a course of action which is quite natural and intelligible but which has little to do with any sort of ideals.

Under the influence of these presuppositions concerning the aristocracy and Homer, the Homeric poems are treated as source books. The *Iliad* "blends in an indissoluble unity the old poetic picture of the saga-heroes and the living traditions of the contemporary aristocracy"; the *Odyssey* is "inspired by the life of the aristocrats of its own day, projected with a naïve realism into a more primitive epoch." Jaeger draws an enthusiastic picture, full of inconsistencies, of the historic aristocracy of Homer's time. "Only now and then, in later books, does Homer use areté for moral or spiritual qualities. . . . Everywhere else . . . it denotes the strength and skill of a warrior or athlete, and above all his heroic valour" (p. 4); and we have just been told (p. 3) that "areté is the real attribute of the nobleman." But on page 5 we learn that "the real mark of the nobleman is his sense of duty" and also that "the hero's whole life and effort are a race for the first prize, an unceasing strife for supremacy over his peers." The *Iliad* also proves that the "poets of a new age" are not satisfied with the "old" Iliadic conception of areté; their "new ideal of human perfection" unites nobility of action with nobility of mind, and this part of the speech of Phoenix (ix. 443) was, apparently, invented by the new poets. The episode of Thersites is "one of the few traces of a realistic poetical attitude, to betray the relatively late period which saw the creation of the *Iliad* in its present form" (p. 17). The "new poets" are therefore more realistic and also have higher ideals. The "indissoluble" unity of the *Iliad* does not seem to amount to much.

The *Odyssey* fares no better. Jaeger's thesis concerning the aristocratic origin of morality, culture, and "high refinement" gets him into amusing difficulties when he considers the "brutal, arrogant" suitors. He goes so far as to insist that their exchanges with Telemachus "are, despite the parties' mutual hatred, conducted with impeccable politeness" (p. 18) and that "the suitors do not diminish the poet's admiration for the nobility as a whole" (p. 19). As

a matter of fact, the mocking and jeering of the suitors at Telemachus begins with the speech of Antinoös in Book i and continues till the suitors are exterminated; it does not correspond to the ordinary notion of impeccable politeness. The other point, about Homer's alleged admiration for the nobility, raises the really important question whether, after all, the heroes of Homer are members of the "aristocracy" of Homer's time, even if "Homer" means a number of poets active during several centuries.

The heroes of Homer are heroes, *ἥρωες*, in the full Greek religious sense of the term, just as much as are the heroes of Greek lyric poetry and of Greek tragedy, as I demonstrated in an article published in 1929;¹ and there can be no health and progress in Homeric studies, nor anything but the "doubt and uncertainty" of which Jaeger complains, until students can bring themselves to admit the partially divine status of these heroes, who are a poet's transfiguration, under the stimulus of a faith which he shared with his Greek audience, of great Mycenaean leaders, some of whom are almost certainly real and some imaginary. It is completely impossible to argue from the transfiguration to the historic or rather prehistoric original. We cannot tell what the real Agamemnon was like by examining the Agamemnon of the *Iliad*; the latter is a poet's creation, no less than the Agamemnon of Aeschylus. Homer does not "admire the nobility"; neither the *Iliad* nor the *Odyssey* is a *Tendenz-schrift*. Homer glorifies the heroes as a class of partially divine men who lived long ago and in whose doings the gods were intensely interested, since the heroes were akin to them; but Homer treats each important individual hero, as far as his character is concerned, as a separate case; and Homer does not hesitate to blame those heroes whom he considers blameworthy. There are few more devastating portraits in literature than that of the brave but stupid, vain, and greedy commander-in-chief or than that of the gluttonous, lecherous, treacherous young heroes who assail Penelope and Telemachus.

When Jaeger puts his theses temporarily aside, he writes some excellent pages of criticism on the poems; I refer particularly to his sketch of Telemachus and to the eloquent passage on the Shield of Achilles. But we look in vain for any recognition, at least any that is clearly expressed, of the fact that *plectuntur Achivi* for the madness of their leaders; and Jaeger treats Atē as "a divine force whom man's strength can scarcely escape" (p. 47) and says that the Greeks recognized Atē "als das ewige Widerspiel des Handelns und Wagens"—a statement that has no ascertainable meaning. Atē is divine, precisely because it is a force in human life, just as Phobos is divine. Homer does not seek to excuse either Agamemnon or Achilles for their folly; on the contrary, their responsibility is increased by their high station. And if we are looking for moral lessons in Homer, that doctrine is surely one of the most important.

Jaeger takes Hesiod in his stride. "Even the coarse, dull peasantry was profoundly influenced by its contact with the finer culture of the nobility"; but

¹ "Homer and the Cult of Heroes," *TAPA*, LX (1929), 57-74.

the "Muses enabled Hesiod to create eternal poetry out of the ideals of the farmer's work and life" (p. 56). Jaeger notices that the nobles are "gift-eating" and that they misuse their power; but on the same page (57) we are told that "in the country, it is naturally the landed gentry who are the leaders of the higher spiritual life." I cannot reconcile these contradictions. Jaeger follows the blind leadership of Wilamowitz (*Sappho und Simonides*, p. 169) in mistranslating *Works and Days* (286 ff.), where he insists that *kakórhē* and *áperhē* "do not signify the moral qualities of vice and virtue, as the later Greeks and Romans believed" (p. 68).

The next topic is "State-Education in Sparta." The elegies of Tyrtaeus "are inspired by a mighty educational ideal" in the justified demands which they make "on the self-sacrifice and patriotism" of the Spartans. "The Spartan ideal has for two thousand years kept the position in the history of civilization which Plato assigned to it" (p. 84). No one is likely to deny the courage of the Spartans. But we have the duty to inquire whether an organized military effort to acquire and to retain large amounts of loot, human and nonhuman, is a valuable ideal and whether those Spartans who got themselves killed in the pursuit of this ideal were really sacrificing themselves. Robbery with violence is not quite identical with self-sacrifice. In the following sections, on the city-state, Ionian and Aeolian poetry, and Solon, the praise of the state continues. "The new conception" is that "righteousness is the *areté* of the perfect citizen"; and "the ethical systems of Plato and Aristotle were based on the morality of the early city-state" (pp. 103, 104). "The polis is the sum of all its citizens and of all the aspects of their lives. . . . Law is the objective expression of the state, and now Law has become king, as the Greeks later said" (Pindar, Frag. 152). This reference to Pindar is really unfortunate, for *nómos* here means "custom," and Pindar is talking about the custom of robbing others if you have the power. "Aristocracy is the first, and the early city-state is the second, of the vital stages in the development of the 'humanistic' ideal of a universal ethico-political culture. . . . Although the early city-state developed into mass-rule, an extreme democracy guided by quite different forces, that development does not alter the true nature of city-state culture; for throughout its political evolution that culture kept its original aristocratic character" (p. 111). *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

The pages on Archilochus, Mimnermus, and Sappho and on their "hedonistic individualism" are pleasantly written; and the section on Solon treats him as "the first Athenian," because "he brought together the state and the spirit, the community and the individual. . . . By creating that unity he struck out the type to which all the men of his race were to conform" (p. 147). This generalization is a little more extreme than the German original—"Er hat durch sie den bleibenden Typus des attischen Menschen für die gesamte künftige Entwicklung seines Volksstammes vorbildhaft ausgeprägt"—but in either form it seems rash. Many Athenians admired Solon, but they made little effort to imitate him.

The purpose of the following section, "Philosophical Speculation," is "to investigate their importance to the age in which they lived . . . and to mark the point at which pure philosophical speculation, after long neglecting the problem of the nature of human *areté*, set to work to solve it, and thereby grew away from individual philosophers to become a great, impersonal, cultural force within society" (pp. 148, 149). Here, again, the translation exaggerates; the original mentions a "*menschenbildende Macht*" but does not explicitly say it is impersonal. The growth of Greek philosophy is pictured as "rational thinking which invades the circle of the universe . . . until in Plato and Socrates it reaches the centre, which is the human soul. . . . The strength of Plato's myth of the soul was such that it could resist the tendency to reduce all Being to a rational system, and could reconquer the already rationalized cosmos, until the Christian religion came to possess and use the newly remade world of myth" (p. 150). A moment later, Jaeger says, apparently referring to Plato, that the "Greek spirit, trained to think of the external cosmos as governed by fixed laws . . . at last discovers an objective view of the internal cosmos" (p. 151). The history of philosophy, even of Greek philosophy, is not identical with the progress of rational thought. Jaeger describes Anaximander's conception of the universe as "the spiritual discovery of the cosmos," which entails "the magnificent new realization that Being is divine"; and his idea of *diké* is "the first stage in the projection of the life of the city-state upon the life of the universe." These statements have very little utilizable meaning.

The account of Pythagoras is similarly confused. Plato, we are told, "certainly served as the model" for the conception that Pythagoras was an influential teacher, and, again, "the question is not whether Pythagoras himself was a teacher; the really great teacher in that age was the spirit of the new science, which is, in the traditions we possess, represented by him." This is in the old tradition of getting rid of traditions and of persons and of filling the artificial vacuum with an empty concept; it reminds me of Herder's dictum concerning early epic—"das Lied das sich selber dichtet"—and is of a piece with the notion that great impersonal forces make human history. As Eduard Meyer said, "*Aller Fortschritt geht von einzelnen Persönlichkeiten aus*"; there is always the creative effort of one or more individuals behind every bit of progress. It is at any rate certain, unless we are to run history backward like a film at the cinema, that Plato was not the model for the conception of Pythagoras as a teacher.

Xenophanes fares even worse. His God is said to be "the same as the whole universe," which is an old and untenable error. How could he be the universe, if he is "all Sight, all Thought, all Hearing"? Xenophanes is said to have followed the doctrines, with regard to the external world, of Anaximander and Anaximenes, "who really created this naturalistic explanation of the universe" (p. 170). This is the reward that Xenophanes obtains for his denunciation, in extravagantly clear language, of the natural science of his day.

Xenophanes mocked at men and their souls, at the new suns which rise every morning, at eclipses which occur when a sun falls into a hole, and at the "roots of the earth," which extend downward to infinity.

Parmenides is said to have expressed "the law of thought which was established by his realization that a logical contradiction cannot be resolved"; but this "discovery of a logical law was regarded by him as an objective discovery, which put him into opposition to all the ideas of the Ionian physicists" (p. 174). The attempt to reduce his doctrine to a logical law—a phrase which must mean a "law of logic"—is as far from the truth as Burnet's statement that "the 'matter' of our physical text-books is just the real of Parmenides." The supreme reality proclaimed by Parmenides was the One Spherical Form, full not of matter but of Thought and Being; he thought that the reality he had discovered was "objective," and what he thought about it is really important to the historian of Greek thought.

The pages on Heraclitus are on the whole excellent. Jaeger well says that "Heraclitean unity is full of tension"; and he emphasizes the influence which this "brilliant insight" was to have upon subsequent thought.

The section on "The Aristocracy," devoted to Theognis and Pindar, glorifies the two poets as we should expect; both of them seem to me to be praised far beyond their deserts. Here is a typical judgment: "Thus carefully and authoritatively stated by Pindar and Theognis, the aristocratic ideal of Greece proper was infinitely superior in educational weight and completeness to the Ionian ideal, with its various self-contradictory attempts to glorify natural life and individual personality" (p. 185). And "their poetry . . . eternalized the aristocratic ideal at the moment when it was most gravely endangered by new forces, and it made the socially constructive powers of that ideal into a permanent possession of the Greek nation" (*ibid.*). There is little socially constructive power in the prayer of Theognis (vss. 349, 350): "May I drink the black blood of my political enemies, and may some good divinity arise to bring this about in accordance with my purpose!" Pindar, of course, is vastly superior to Theognis. But it is a little surprising to find that Pindar, "like Plato, hoped to influence kings for good, to induce them to realize in a changed world his own political dreams. . . . With that mission in mind, he stood in the brilliant court of Hieron of Syracuse, a lonely apostle of truth . . ." (p. 220). If Pindar was a lonely apostle, Theognis must have been a saint.

The remainder of this volume is devoted to the cultural policy of the tyrants (a brief laudatory sketch), to Aeschylus, Sophocles, the sophists, Euripides, Aristophanes, and Thucydides. The best pages in the book are those which deal with the beginnings of Greek drama and with Aeschylus; here Jaeger writes with deep feeling of the Aeschylean doctrines of God and fate, and of their relations to man. Sophocles is praised almost exclusively for his character-drawing. I regret to say that "the grace of refined Attic culture" is illustrated (but not "beautifully," as Jaeger says) by a pederastic anecdote told by Ion of Chios and preserved in Athenaeus (xiii. 603e). Jaeger con-

cludes: "The charm and delicacy reflected in this story are unforgettable elements in the character, not only of Sophocles, but of the whole Athenian society of his time. . . . Sophocles is the highest ideal of the *kalos kagathos*, the Athenian gentleman of the fifth century" (p. 273). The antics of Sophocles with a cupbearer—if the story is true—may be unforgettable, but not precisely for their delicacy and charm.

The long chapter on the sophists defines humanism as "the cultural ideal which after long incubation in the mind of Greece came to birth at last in the teaching of the sophists." True humanism, or culture, is "political culture" (p. 297); and the sophists "made the Greeks realize that culture was the great duty which had fallen to the lot of their nation. . . . The mind of a nation, like the mind of an individual, develops in accordance with an immanent and inevitable law" (p. 301). The sophists' theories of the nature of law and justice "made what had been a party-struggle into a conflict of ideals"; Callicles embodies the "new aristocratic conception" of the "natural inequality of mankind"; we cannot do justice to this "intellectual revolution" today, since "we now believe that politics and morals are two separate worlds," whereas the Greeks in the classical era "thought that political morality and personal morality were practically identical, since the state was the sole source of all moral standards" (pp. 320-23, *passim*).

Toward the end of the fifth century the morals of the Greeks had been broken down by the horrors of class war, and the values of the nation were "rotten with individualism" (p. 333). Euripides was a great lyric poet, and "the first psychologist"; the new elements which formed his style were "the cultural forces of succeeding centuries: bourgeois ideals, rhetoric, and philosophy," which "penetrated mythology, and destroyed it" (p. 354). Aristophanes "defended tragedy against Socrates and the intellectuals."

Thucydides is treated at some length. Herodotus had written political history in a non-political spirit; Thucydides "created political history." He recognized "objective causality," and this is a relief to the observer, since "it raises the observer above the hateful conflict of parties and the ugly problem of guilt and innocence" (p. 390). Thucydides realized "that the power of Athens was the true cause of the war. . . . It is absolutely wrong to imagine that he thought the Sicilian disaster was God's punishment for Athenian aggrandizement, for he was very far from believing that power is a bad thing in itself. . . . The expedition was worse than a sin. . . . It was . . . a chain of mistakes" (p. 401). In the Funeral Oration, Pericles, who here coincides with Thucydides, "deliberately praises a synthesis of the rigidly communal outlook of the Spartan armed camp, and the Ionian principle of the economic and intellectual freedom of each individual citizen." Thucydides recognized the "spiritual hegemony" of Athens. The volume closes with these words: "The highest justification of the political ambitions of Athens, even after their defeat, was the ideal of *paideia*, through which the Athenian spirit found its greatest consolation—the assurance of its own immortality" (p. 408).

Thus, at the beginning and at the end of this book, Professor Jaeger sounds the keynote of his philosophy of history, which is justification, *Rechtfertigung*, through culture, *Erziehung* or *Bildung* or *paideia*. What exactly is that which stands in need of justification? It is the very existence of the Greeks that needs to be justified; it is truly the *raison d'être* of the Greeks that is to be presented to us by this method of investigation (p. xvii). In what manner and by what means is the existence of the Greeks to be justified? It is justified by their creation of a higher type of man, "die Formung eines höheren Menschen." Now just at this point an ambiguity appears. Does this mean that the Greeks created a higher type, in the sense of a higher ideal, or does it mean something wholly different, namely, that the Greeks so trained and educated their young that they were transformed into actually better men? In several passages it seems that the second alternative is chosen: the Greeks are said to use their knowledge of the natural principles governing human life and of the immanent laws by which man exercises his powers as a formative force in education and by it to shape the living man as the potter molds clay (p. 22); this alone is culture and is true humanism, and it implies the essential quality of a human being, his political character (p. xxvi); the élite of the race was trained towards an ideal of human perfection (p. 2). But, apart from such passages, the whole book is based upon the first alternative. The history of Greek culture is said to coincide with the history of Greek literature; Greek literature is said to be the expression of the process by which the Greek ideal shaped itself; and it becomes the duty of scholarship to interpret the imperishable educational achievement of the Greeks.

The generating principle of this book may therefore be summed up as follows: the justification of the existence of the Greeks is the ideal of man that is progressively revealed in Greek literature, which is the ideal of the aristocracy of Greece increasingly intellectualized, which is culture (p. 2). The culture of the Greeks justified not only their existence but also the history they made while existing; for example, the ideal of *paideia* not only justifies the political ambitions of the Athenians but consoles them for defeat by assuring them that their ideal is immortal. The Athenians were sensitive to "delicate variations in style" (p. 334), and their culture was "unique in history"; but their culture seems to have had nothing to do with their common character and conduct, since "their values were rotten with individualism." This doctrine of justification through culture has been powerfully and attractively presented by Professor Jaeger, and there are many pages of good literary criticism in this volume. The doctrine itself is, I am compelled to maintain, completely false, both as history and as a philosophy of history.

The historian has no power to justify the Greeks or any other nation, no power to declare them or to make them righteous; such power belongs not to historians but to gods. But if justification is being used in a washed-out sense and merely means the furnishing of adequate grounds for the existence and

the history of the Greeks, that too is none of the historian's business. The Greeks existed and had a history; it is the duty of the historian to ascertain and to accept the facts and to try to understand them. The political crimes of the Greeks, the atrocious conduct of the Spartans and the Athenians towards each other and towards other Greeks, are not in any sense justified or excused by the fact that Greek men of genius had created a great literature; nor can the diverse visions and aspirations of Greek men of letters and philosophers be compressed and tortured into subservience to a more or less Platonic, oligarchic ideal of "political areté," which is "indispensable because it implies the constant creation and regeneration of a governing class" (p. 111). In the German this "governing class" is a "führende Schicht"; and we have had quite enough of "führende Schichten," whether they are regenerated in accordance with Plato's antidemocratic and cruelly intolerant prescriptions or in accordance with some modern "humanism," which holds that culture cannot "be communicated to the mass of mankind without becoming less rich and less potent" (p. 111).

The present is not the time when scholars should take refuge in ivory towers or preach doctrines of intellectual oligarchy. What should the place of great literature be in any tolerable scheme of education? As we look at the record of the human race, we can readily see that our failure is not in our control of the material world but in our understanding of human life. The peculiar characteristic of great literature is not that it criticizes life or produces an Ideal Man but that it explains, and to a certain extent creates, life, not on the mechanical level where our minds operate easily and successfully, but in the world of partial freedom, of novelty, of constant effort against obstacles—the world that is known to us when we at intervals no longer undergo life but make it. The men of literary genius, and a few philosophers, have this vision; and their genius is to a degree infectious, communicable. To educate ourselves is to submit to the intellectual discipline of trying to comprehend minds that operate at a higher tension than our own. We do not abandon the right to criticize, but we attempt first to make sure that we have understood. The men whose names are on the long roll of Greek genius are, most of them, on the side of growing liberty, of human initiative, of refusal to be imprisoned within any slavery, either that of the body or that of the mind, to a political class or to a quasi-scientific determinism. The multitude is mediocre, to be sure, but mediocrity is not confined to the members of any class, even the most numerous. Our hope for the future is that all students who have the capacity may come into contact with the best minds of Greece and with their successors and that they may not learn to scorn the multitude or to teach that politics and morality are divorced.

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Corpus fabularum Aesopicarum. Edidit AUGUSTUS HAUSRATH. Vol. I, Fasc. 1. Lipsiae in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1940. Pp. xl+208.

In this volume Hausrath gives us the first instalment of a work which he had announced even before the outbreak of war in 1914. The publication of the remainder has been postponed for the time being. From the Preface it appears that Volume I, edited by Hausrath, will be devoted entirely to prose fables; while Volume II, to be edited by J. Gerstinger, will contain fables in verse, the Bodleian paraphrase (Chambry's Class IV), the *Life of Aesop*, and "quae cetera cum his fabulis cohaerent" (p. xix). In his *ordo fabularum* the editor lists 289 prose fables from the MSS of Aesop, of which 181 are included in the present fascicule; but in speaking of fables from other sources (pp. xx-xxv) he makes no mention of the additional fables found in Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient authors (most of which fables are in Koraes and Halm), although he speaks at some length of Aphthonius, Ps.-Dositheus, and Syntipas, whose collections he apparently plans to edit entire in the second fascicule of Volume I, along with a number of already familiar fables retold by such late rhetoricians as Libanius, Themistius, Julian, and Theophylactus. If omissions are to be made for economy's sake, one would prefer that they be confined to the numerous stylistic variations of the same fable, whether by late rhetoricians or by unknown scribes, rather than to leave out the interesting and unique fables found in earlier writers. But perhaps the latter will be included somewhere in the corpus, even though they are not mentioned in the Preface. Still other fables, contributed by the Latin fabulists or implied in proverbs or in brief literary allusions and not to be found even in Koraes, would have to be listed if the collection aimed to be exhaustive for Greco-Roman literature—which is apparently not the case. The Rylands papyrus (No. 493), which is dated by its editor in the early part of the first century and which contains numerous fragments of a collection of prose fables (cf. *AJP*, LXI, 216 ff.), had probably not yet appeared when the first fascicule of this work went to press.

Apart from the Bodleian paraphrase, which comes from Babrius, the prose fables in the MSS of Aesop belong mainly to three successive recensions: Class I ("Augustana"), Class II ("Vindobonensis," in the prose fables a mere paraphrase of Class I), and Class III ("Accursiana," a humanistic revision of parts of Classes II and I). Hausrath, like Chambry, prints these three versions separately in each fable, thereby making a distinction of fundamental importance for the sources and relative antiquity of the various textual forms. But as for the approximate periods in which the three recensions severally were evolved, there is little agreement among Hausrath, Chambry, and the present reviewer. We all agree that Class I is the oldest, dating from perhaps the second or third century after Christ; but Chambry assigns Class II to the fourth or fifth century and Class III to a still earlier period; while Hausrath by his latest pronouncement (pp. x and xxv) would put Class II in the sixth century

and Class III in the ninth, thereby contradicting his previous (and essentially correct) view that Class III dates from the time of the Palaeologi and Class II from the eleventh or twelfth century. Hausrath states that his new conclusions on this subject are derived from considerations of grammar and style; but for me the same data are thoroughly typical of editorial activity in the later Byzantine ages (eleventh century and onward), concerning which, as manifested in popular texts, we have far more abundant and more precise knowledge than we have concerning such activity in the sixth or ninth centuries. I deny that there is anything in Class II that points to the sixth rather than to the twelfth century after Christ. The style of the Accursiana, on the other hand, is humanistic and agrees in many peculiar details¹ with that of

¹ See my *Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop*, pp. 217-28. In his review (*Phil. Woch.*, LVII, 775) Hausrath objected to my "quantitativ eingestellten amerikanischen Methode, die für Erscheinungen, die mit fünf Belegen sicher bewiesen sind, noch 25 Beispiele bucht." This is a misrepresentation. In order to show the currency of a particular phrase or idiom in both the *Letters* of Planudes and in the Accursiana, I refer by page and line to all the occurrences in each text, though these never amount to more than six or eight on one item. In a few cases I speak of "great frequency" or state the number of occurrences without references. Otherwise, my quantitative method consists in citing as many *different* peculiarities of style and phraseology, common to both texts, as possible. These amount to somewhat more than three times twenty-five in number (counting a whole series of particles as one item), and all represent deliberate changes introduced by the Accursiana editor over the traditional Aesopic text.

As regards the significance of the Codex Borbonicus, I confess that I misunderstood Hausrath's interpretation (*Byz. Ztschr.*, Vol. X), although I had read his article repeatedly in the effort to understand it; but he also misinterprets my argument in his review (pp. 774 f.). My point was, and is, that the name of Planudes on this MS means only that Planudes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was commonly regarded as the *original editor* of the Accursiana recension and that any recognizable copy of this recension, however imperfect or revised in detail in comparison with the archetype, might very naturally bear his name, just as do certain MSS of the *Life*. The ascription to Planudes in the Borbonicus does not necessarily mean, as Hausrath assumes, that Planudes edited the precise form of the Accursiana fables therein exhibited. By this contention Hausrath proves altogether too much; for if he applied the same method of interpretation to the MSS of the *Life* that he here applies to the Borbonicus, he would be telling us that Planudes composed four or five different *biographies*, each a revision of the Accursiana archetype. But he ignores the name of Planudes on MSS of the *Life* and makes the appearance of this name on one fifteenth-century MS of the *Fables* prove whatever he wants it to prove.

In *Byz. Ztschr.*, X, 91, Hausrath wrote: "Ein eingehenderes Studium beider Schriften [Accursiana *Life* and *Fables*] lässt eine so weitgehende Übereinstimmung von Sprache und Stil erkennen, dass man ohne weiteres zugeben wird, dass beide denselben Verfasser haben." Right! But now that I have made use of this point in my own argument for Planudean editorship, after having corroborated it independently in detail (*Studies*, pp. 222-27, 227 f.), Hausrath announces (*Phil. Woch.*, LVII, 776) that he has changed his mind: Marc (who hasn't written on this subject since 1910) has convinced him "dass *βίος* und *μῦθος* nicht den gleichen Urheber haben." This is one of several instances I could mention in which Hausrath changes his views to suit the exigencies of controversy, without bothering about the citing of evidence. He does, indeed, promise us (p. v) a

Maximus Planudes, to whom it has been ascribed by tradition, and, in all probability, correctly. But, regardless of style, the approximate date of this recension can be determined beyond any reasonable doubt by a study of the text itself in relation to other MSS. I have already demonstrated in copious and painstaking detail (*TAPA*, LXIV, 235-38; *Studies*, pp. 208-17) the fact that a large part of the Accursiana, in both *Life* and *Fables*, is heavily indebted to a particular, late MS (β) of Class II, which had nearly all the *unique* and obviously *recent* errors and omissions found in the fifteenth-century MS B (Brit. Mus. Add. 17015=Cf in Chambry), and that this MS (β), which was probably the immediate archetype of B, was later than the thirteenth-century MS Ca, from which it had interpolated a number of readings from near the end of the *Life*.² Besides this, there are other indications equally definite that point the same way. As for Class II, although the date of its archetype happens not to be revealed (as far as I know) by any evidence of such definite and conclusive character, nevertheless, there is much in the text tradition and in the history of popular lore in Byzantine times that pleads for a date not earlier than the eleventh century.

Among the many things in Hausrath's Preface which the reviewer holds to be mistaken is the fantastic theory—here (p. v) stated in a more extreme form than ever and quite different, as far as I can see, from anything intended by Crusius, whose authority is invoked to support it—that all the fables in our MSS were produced as exercises by pupils and their teachers in the schools of rhetoric, some of whom wrote (while copying) in a style that can be recognized as "rhetorical," while others, abandoning scholastic standards, deliberately imitated the style of contemporary popular literature (pp. vi, ix). In the principal MSS of Class I the sentence structure is seldom changed, and the variants consist mainly of errors and the occasional substitution of one word or form for another. The reason for this remarkable uniformity in the exercises of pupils widely separated from one another by time and place is, according to Hausrath, that all were copying from the same venerable "libro

book in which his views on the tradition will be more fully explained; but neither his methods nor his conclusions, in my opinion, augur well for what he will give us therein. He will not be able to prove, e.g., his assertion that the β los in Ca has been influenced by the Accursiana or, for that matter, any of the propositions to which objection has been made above.

² See *TAPA*, LXIV, 235, where W=Ca. Some of these Ca readings passed from β into the Accursiana; but Hausrath, not understanding this, supposes (*Phil. Woch.*, LVII, 777) that Ca interpolated from the Acc. There are no Ca readings in the Acc. *Life* except such as are found also in B (or β), and it is certain that the Acc. drew from β rather than vice versa. To cite just one additional illustration, at Westermann 16.16, B and S alone among the MSS of this *Life* have the error $\pi\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\omicron\nu$ in the phrase $\alpha\lambda\ \pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\ \sigma\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\iota\delta\alpha\chi\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu$. B reads $\alpha\lambda\ \delta\ \pi\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\ \sigma\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu$, and the Acc. editor emends by writing $\alpha\lambda\ \epsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \eta\ \gamma\acute{\nu}\omega\mu\eta$, which makes sense, but not the right sense. For other emendations of B's readings by the Acc. editor, see *Studies*, p. 210; *TAPA*, LXIV, 236-38, under Eberhard, pp. 245, 247, 270 (*bis*), 273 (*bis*), 277, 280, 299.

scholastico"; but we are warned (p. viii) not to suppose that these MSS (like the MSS of other popular texts the world over) present "unum librum licentia vel incuria librariorum hunc mirum in modum variatum." As specimens of the "lingua scholastica" or "sermo rhetorum Byzantinorum" in Class II, he cites (p. x) σέλας βούνευρον (= ἐλάφου νεβρόν) and χέλος ἄρρην (= χελώνη ἀετόν). He admits that these absurdities are due to misunderstanding of a traditional text, but he insists that they are rhetorical misunderstandings!

Hausrath rightly distinguishes three families of MSS in Class I, represented, respectively, by CFCas, OE, and A; but he says nothing about the interrelations of these groups, and he fails to classify Cr correctly.³ In my *Studies* I presumed to make only a few tentative remarks about the MSS of Class I in general; but since then a prolonged investigation has clarified my understanding of the subject and has convinced me that the archetype of CFCas (= λ, probably of the thirteenth century) descends independently in the main from the same source as the archetype of ACr (tenth century or earlier);⁴ although I am still unable to place OE in this stemma, it seems to run parallel with the other groups (λ and ACr), but, if so, it has probably been contaminated with them, as well as with Ia. Concerning Cr, which is older by at least one hundred years than the next oldest MS of these fables (E), Hausrath says only that it is a "codex deterioris notae" (p. vii, n. 1)⁵ and that it agrees now with one of the three families mentioned above, now with another. Both statements are highly misleading. All the MSS are crossed to some extent, and each has individual peculiarities of its own; so that what Hausrath says about Cr in this respect is true in equal or greater measure of all the others. What he overlooks is the important fact that no two of these MSS agree anywhere nearly so closely with each other as do Cr and A, with regard both to the number of unique readings that they have in common and to the range, order, and identity of their fables. There can be no doubt that both are descended from the same archetype of the tenth century (date of Cr) or earlier and that that archetype was quite distinct from the archetypes λ and OE. As for Cr being "deterioris notae," this is true of its orthography, but not at all of its text. After making this wilful assumption—that Cr is a poor text—Hausrath wonders why it anticipates "haud paucas virorum doctorum coniecturas vel emendationes" (p. vii, n. 1); and, since he is loath to concede this virtue to

³ Since Hausrath's symbols differ from Chambry's and mine, the following list of equivalents will be useful for reference:

Cr = G, saec. x	Cas = Ca or W, saec. xiii
A = Pb, saec. xiv (or xiii?)	S = Pd, saec. xv
E = Pa, saec. xii	U = Pe, saec. xv
O = Pc, saec. xiv	V = Pi, saec. xiv
C = Pg, saec. xv	B = Ma, saec. xv
F = Mb, saec. xiv	Ba = Mo, saec. xv

⁴ My friend, Mr. Clarence B. Hale, has made a detailed study of this matter, which I hope he may publish in the near future.

⁵ The reviewer happened to be the first to exploit this newly recovered manuscript.

Cr, he suspects that my published collation is inaccurate at these points. Now I readily confess that my collation (*Studies*, pp. 80 ff.) is neither exhaustive (I disclaim that explicitly on p. 80) nor entirely free from errors, and I certainly do not blame Hausrath for not trusting its negative indications; but with the photostats before me I can assure him that the readings of Cr, in all the six passages to which he refers, happen to be the same as indicated in the collation—not quite the same, however, as Hausrath quotes them, since the first reading that he cites ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$, 72.6)⁶ is from a fable that is no longer preserved in Cr at all, as is plainly shown in the collation (pp. 80, 99, 100). Yes, Cr sometimes anticipates the conjectures of modern scholars, although its real value is independent of that fact. Besides the five readings cited by Hausrath, it also anticipates Schneider's $\dot{\upsilon}\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ in 8.9, the same scholar's $\dot{\omega}\pi\pi\alpha$ in 54.1, his $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\kappa\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ in 147.3, and Koraes' $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\tilde{\eta}$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ in 102.7. In 146.2 the $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ of Cr, which Hausrath overlooked in my collation (p. 117), anticipates his own conjecture, made after misquoting Cr. At 17.8 $\langle\mu\acute{\eta}\rangle$, which all editors supply after $\epsilon\iota$, is not in any MS, but there is at least a trace of it in Cr, which reads $\epsilon\iota$ $\tilde{\eta}$ (*sic*). There may be other instances of this sort; I have made no systematic search for them.

The variant readings presented by the MSS of Class I are very numerous, and in many cases one variant is about as plausible, from the standpoint of grammar and style, as another. How, then, is an editor to choose between them in his effort to get at the oldest text? Hausrath, disregarding the relative age of the three traditions and the relationships between them, declares his preference for CFCas on the ground that its style is simpler than that of OE or A and because he supposes that the style of the ancient archetype must have been similar. Both points seem very doubtful to me, and I hold that this method of *recensio* is unnecessarily subjective. I fail to see that CFCas is any simpler or more natural (though here and there it may be more syncopated) than ACr or OE;⁷ and, even if it is simpler in some way, how can anyone be confident that this particular degree or kind of simplicity, rather than that of Cr or O or A, is more typical of the unknown ancient archetype? Styles varied in ancient times no less than in the Byzantine ages. On the other hand, the relative age of our MSS provides an objective criterion, which is especially important in view of the increase of scribal activity and license in the transmission of popular lore from the eleventh century onward; for the archetype of CrA is demonstrably of the tenth century or earlier, whereas that of CFCas cannot be shown to be earlier than the thirteenth; and, though the fable text in λ (CFCas) seems to have been relatively unmixed, the fact that the text of its *Life* comes from a different tradition and is elaborately conflated (*TAPA*,

⁶ Fables are cited by number and line in the edition of Hausrath unless that of Chambray is expressly mentioned.

⁷ Certain learned affectations appear in E and A individually, as Hausrath points out on pp. viii f., and A seems to emend quite a bit in small matters; but there is no indication that these features stem from the archetypes OE and ACr.

LXIV, 213 f.) must cause one to distrust readings in the fables also, when, *ceteris paribus*, these readings differ from those of older MSS. For such reasons, as well as for its completeness (ca. 235 fables, as against 151 in C and far fewer of the same tradition in FCas), the satisfactory character of its text on the whole and its relative freedom from contamination (as compared with E, BBa, F, Cas, or U), CrA must be the editor's chief guide, in so far as any one MS or group of MSS can assume that function; which, I admit, is not very far. So much for principle.

As for practice, Hausrath in reality follows ACr more than he does CFCas, fortunately for the text; and when he does choose C or FCas, in preference to these MSS, the result, although sometimes felicitous, is more often either negative or bad. For illustration let us examine the variants in the first twelve fables.

In *Fable 1*, where C and Cas are not present, Hausrath (hereafter abbreviated Hsr.) favors two readings of F, against A or ACr, namely, *φιλιαν . . . σπεισάμενοι* for *φ. ποιησάμενοι* in line 1, which is also in Ba and Ia and may have come from the latter, and *πετεινόν* (FE) for *πτηνόν* of ACr in line 10. But he rejects readings of F four times in favor of those of A or ACr, and once he follows E in preference to all others. *Fable 2*, line 3, *ἤθελε*. Hsr. without note, but it stands only in A; all the others (CFCr, etc.) have *ἠθέλησε*. *Ibid.*, *τοῦ* before *πολλοῦ* CF, *om.* Hsr. with ACr. No note. Line 8, *αὐτοῦ* A Hsr., *ἐαυτοῦ* CFCr. No note. *Fable 3* is not in C, F, or Cas. In *Fable 4* (F and Cas not present) four of C's variants are rejected in favor of equivalents in A or ACr, and C is nowhere followed alone. The reading ascribed to C only in line 3 is also that of ACr, except that all three have *αὐτῇ* after *μεθεῖναι*, which Hsr. omits in quoting C. In *Fable 5* the editor professes to follow the Ia recension principally, but he rejects more of C than of ACr. *Fable 6* (F and Cas not present), line 1, word order of A followed against that of CCrE without note. Line 5, *παραγαγεῖν* AU and Hsr. without note, *προ*-CE, *προσ*-Cr. Lines 7-8, *ιδιοποιήσασθαι* CEU and Hsr., *ἐξιδιοπ*-ACr. Line 14, *μειζόνως* (unnecessary) A and Hsr., *om.* CCrEU. No note. *Ibid.*, *σὺ* A Hsr., *σὺν σοὶ* CCrEU, although only E and U are cited. *Ibid.*, C's *κάν* rejected for A's *εἰ καὶ*. In *Fable 7* the text printed by Hsr. agrees throughout with ACr except for *οὕτω* (CF) in place of *οὕτως* (l. 6). But variants of F and Cas are rejected in lines 1 and 4, and of C in line 7. In *Fable 8*, line 7, F alone is right with *ἐξέφηεν*, which the editor adopts; but, since the note cites only the erroneous variants of A and S, we wrongly infer that this reading is also in E and U. In line 8, F's *αὐτῇ*, shared by ES, is right against the *-ῇ* of ACr. But, in lines 5, 6, and 9, readings of Cr or CrE are chosen in preference to variants in F. Of *Fable 9* the editor states: "Duae exstant huius fabulae formae, alteram dedit C, exornaverunt CrAO, alteram praebent EV." The two main forms are rightly distinguished (CCrAO and EV); but, after tabulating all the variants line by line in parallel columns, I find not the slightest justification for stating that ACrO, or any one of those MSS, has elaborated C. If anything, C has paraphrased ACr. The variants

are too numerous to be analyzed here. *Fable 10*, line 3, ἐπιτυχούσα A Hsr., περιτ- CCrEUa παρατ- F (not D); but the critical note, by failing to mention C, Cr, F, and S, falsely implies that these also have ἐπιτυχούσα. In *Fable 11*, line 3, προβλήτος (CE Hsr.) is right against the reading of ACr; and C's ἐξάλλεσθαι (dubious) is chosen in line 4; but, in lines 5, 7, 8, and 9, readings of C are rejected in favor of those in ACr. The text of *Fable 12* as printed by Hsr. agrees with ACr throughout, except for one or two misspellings and A's omission of ἐστὶ in line 5; but three real variants of C are discarded (C's ἐπιτυχούσα in l. 4 is not cited).

As noted above, Hsr. often follows A alone without warning, when one would infer from his *apparatus* that the adopted reading comes from C or other MSS; so also 4.4, word order ἱερ. γ. αὐτῇ only in A; 4.9, ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ ὅτι only in A, which, incidentally, has ὥς; 17.3, προσαγαγεῖν A only, προαγ-(recte) CCrEBBaIa; 22.11, omission of ἀλλ' before οὐδέ, against CECr, etc.; 33.6, ἔφη for ἔφασκε (C not present); 67.7, omission of γε after μέντοι against CFEUa, though only FUa are cited in the note; 68.6, εἰπέ A only; 79.3, word order peculiar to A; 92.15, ἀλλὰ διὰ (A) against διὰ δὲ of CCrEa, though C and Cr are not mentioned in the note.

But sometimes the editor follows C (F, Cas) in spite of their awkwardness. It is not easy to discern on what principles he prefers δοκοῦσι τινες of CFE in 73.8 to δ. τ. εἶναι of ACrO;⁸ εἰντοὺς εἰς μείζονα κακὰ εἰσιᾶσιν of CFCaA in 78.6 to the more idiomatic . . . ἐνσείουσιν of Cr or the . . . ἐμβάλλουσιν of OE;⁹ or ἀφικόμενος λίθους αὐτὸν ἐξώσαντες ἀπήλασαν (nom. abs.) of F and the Acc., in 123.4-5, to the perfectly good ἀφικόμενος . . . λ. βαλλόμενος ἐξηλάθη of ACrE.

The recension called Ia consists of some 143 fables taken mainly from Class I and stylistically altered in a modest degree. Hsr. plans to edit this version separately,¹⁰ which is a good idea, inasmuch as Chambry merely noted its numerous variants in the *apparatus* to his Class I fables. Concerning the age of this recension, I am glad to confess that Hsr. (p. xv) is essentially right and that I was wrong.¹¹ It probably antedates the tenth century; for I think I can now prove that it influenced not only E (Pa) in the twelfth century (contrary to my previous supposition that Ia was indebted to Pa [p. 165]) but also the common archetype of the families CrA and CFCas, which can hardly have

⁸ The frequent omission of ἐστὶ or εἶναι, when possible, is a conspicuous, individual affectation of cod. E which Hsr. should have noted. The fact that CF here share the omission is one of many indications that their archetype (λ) has been crossed with the twelfth-century E.

⁹ Cf. Chambry, 266.10: εἰς συμφορὰς ἐνσεύμενοι (CrE, . . . εἰντοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες CF). In Lucian I note five occurrences each of ἐνσεῖω and ἐμβ. in similar phrases (cf. Schmid, *Atticismus*, IV, 281).

¹⁰ In a book on the text tradition of Aesop; see above at end of n. 1.

¹¹ *Studies*, pp. 147, 165, 229. My inference about Pf (p. 147) was hasty and superficial; but I did not stake anything else on this conclusion (cf. p. 156 [top]).

been later than the ninth century and was probably earlier. Incidentally, Ia in turn has been influenced by Aphthonius (cf. Chambry, 94, p. 194 and Aphth. 30) and is therefore later than the fourth century. As Hsr. rightly observes (p. xv), the MSS which best represent the original form of this recension are Harl., K, D, and Havniensis, though I am unfamiliar with the last of these.

The MSS of Class II (pp. x f.) are full of variants and very much confused and conflated. I agree with Hsr. that V (Ch) and P (Cb) belong among the truest representatives of this class and that his text represents a definite improvement over Chambry's, in that he makes it independent of the elaborately conflated Cas. But his classification of these MSS contains much that is arbitrary. After distinguishing between the main tradition and a group of MSS whose fables he calls *variatae*, he fails to keep this distinction and distributes his MSS between the two groups with scant regard either for their text or for their fable content. Thus L is assigned to the primary tradition and M (Mc) to the *variatae*, although the latter is not much more than a copy of L (*Studies*, p. 183); and the same is true of Br (Cf) and N (Ce), which are likewise put into separate categories, in spite of the fact that both undoubtedly come from the same archetype (*ibid.*, p. 181). Moreover, although neither E nor Cas have the slightest connection with Class III, which the designation "fab. Vind. *variatae* III δ" suggests, and although Cas is nothing if not *variatus* in its text, yet Cas is put in the primary group and E in Class III δ. For Class III, Hsr. lists a larger number of MSS than does Chambry, and he divides them into four groups, apparently on the basis of the fables that they contain rather than upon their textual differences, which are relatively few. Although I doubt the validity of this classification, I will not take issue with the editor, since my firsthand acquaintance with these forty-five or more MSS, nearly all of which are of the fifteenth century, is less extensive than his, and even he is uncertain about their relationships and says little about them. Moreover, the text is so uniform in this humanistic tradition that elaborate collating and comparison are not likely to yield very substantial results. Since a large part of these fables have been recast on the basis of the CeCf text of Class II (*Studies*, pp. 209 ff.; cf. *supra*, p. 209), the best criterion by which to judge the originality of otherwise equally plausible variants is often the degree of similarity that they show to that particular branch of Class II. But Hsr., unwilling to take this from me, ignores it.

In a useful summary of previous editions (pp. xvi ff.) Hsr. calls attention to the importance of Hudson's edition of 1718 with its many felicitous emendations, and he identifies for the first time the MSS to which that scholar referred by such dubious designations as "MS Gall.," "MS," and "ἄλλως." Seven new MSS of the fables of Aphthonius are listed (pp. xxi f.), and the problem of *recensio* in the fables of Syntipas is well stated. In the latter both MV and AB must be used, and it is sometimes hard to choose between them, as I have discovered in editing the text myself. However, I prefer MV on the

whole to Hsr.'s AB, and I think that the peculiar form of its epimythia, οὔτος δηλοῖ, which Hsr. rejects, is original.¹²

Having spoken of the editorial principles and historical concepts outlined in Hsr.'s Preface and of the nature of the tradition in Classes I, II, and III, it remains to consider further the manner in which the text of Class I has been edited; for that text, being the oldest and the basis, direct or indirect, for the greater part of Recensions II and III, is far the most important.

In choosing readings for the text there is often room for disagreement between equally rational and conscientious editors; although a strict regard for the principles of recension, could they be agreed upon, would result in a greater degree of uniformity than that which obtains between the editions of Chambry and Hsr. The latter often improves on Chambry by refusing to adopt odd readings of E, to which manuscript the French editor was unduly partial. He also corrects some erroneous reports by Chambry (e.g., on 1.15, 20.6, 55.1, 69.12, 80.9, 112.4, 181.6), although he makes a far greater number of such errors in his own *apparatus*. He is more diligent than Chambry in citing the textual contributions of modern scholars, and he makes more emendations. Among the best of these in my opinion are those on 14.3, 16.11, 56.7 (σὺ for οὐ; cf. 170.6), 65.4-5, 96.10, and 97.1. In the first of these Hsr. writes *κατὰ τι* (vas τῷβους) *ἐνταῦθα*, which is certainly the right idea and much better than the vague *κ. τινα τόπον* of A and Chambry (probably an emendation by A). However, I suspect that the original reading was *κατὰ τινας τάφους*, with omission of the superfluous *ἐνταῦθα*, which looks like a corruption of *-vas τάφους*. In Cr the words are crowded together, *vas* has been lost or has passed into *ἐν*, and *θα* is written above *ἐν* in the middle of the line.

In the following passages the editor's choice of readings seems to the reviewer to be more than dubious: In 17.3, *προσαγαγέιν* peculiar to A, is chosen in place of *προαγ-* in all other MSS; but the idea of bringing one to do something by means of persuasion, as here, is better expressed by *προ-* than by *προσ-*. In 36.5-7 the queer combination *ἐμπνουν . . . ἄπνουν* plus *ἄψυχον . . . ἐμπνουν*, achieved only by deleting *ἄψυχον* in the first colon, is preferred to the

¹² Besides the reasons given in *Studies* (p. 189, n. 26), it may be observed that one of the earliest Syriac translations (S. Hochfeld [ed.], *Beiträge zur syr. Fabelliteratur* [Halle, 1893]), like the kindred text of Landsberger and the Arabic version of the so-called Loqman, never uses a word for *μῦθος* (sc. *malta*) but regularly introduces the epimythium with *malpa* (*dein*) *hade* (= "haec autem docet"), *hade luqbal* ("this is against"), and similar expressions. Moreover, in Hochfeld, No. 31 (=Synt. 28) the wording of the Syriac, *hade malpa luqbal ailein* (lit., "this teaches against those who") looks more like a translation of MV's pleonastic or conflated *οὔτος δηλοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν . . .* than of AB's *ὁ μῦθος οὔτος ἐλέγχει τοὺς . . .*

Incidentally, M is not of the fifteenth century, as Hsr. states in three different places, but of the middle of the fourteenth, as has been recognized by all scholars who have handled it and as is attested by the signature on it of Andreas Libadenos of Trebizond (cf. Krumbacher, *Byz. Lit.* [2d ed.], p. 422). And concerning cod. A on p. xxii (bottom), one should read "sancti synodi 436" instead of "571"; and I suspect that not even the number of the folio is 571, but 531 (according to my notes on Matthaei's catalogue).

far better-attested and more natural ἐμπ. . . . ἄψυχον plus ἄψ. . . . ἐμπ., merely because A has written ἡ ἄπνουν (obviously a marginal gloss) into the text before ἡ ἄψυχον in the first colon. If ἄπνουν is here substituted for ἄψ. on the ground that subsequent mention of strangulation requires it (which I deny), then, for the same reason, it should be substituted for ἄψ. in the second colon; but that would involve a double defiance of the tradition. In 42.6 πολυπλασίως (τὴν φορὰν ἀπεδίδου) of FSU is preferred to the adjective πολλαπλασίαν (variously misspelled) of the best MSS, i.e., CrEA. In 44.11–12 ὕδραν . . . ὑφ' ἧς of ABBA is adopted in place of ὕδρον . . . ὑφ' οὗ of the main tradition (CrEOCIa), while in 92.2 A's ὕδραν is (rightly) rejected for ὕδρον of the other MSS. Proceeding on the gratuitous assumption that the archetype had no epimythium in 56.9–10, the editor discards the perfectly normal epimythium, preserved in CrAOE and Ia, and prints in brackets in the text the very differently worded epimythium of C, which states the same idea more awkwardly. "Titutabant rhetorum discipuli," he comments; *immo editor!* In 62.1 the reading χειμῶνος ὥραν (acc. to express the time in which) is chosen from BBa (a late paraphrase according to Hsr.) in preference to the χ. ὥρα of CrA or the genitive of cod. U. In 83.3 the editor rightly reads πάγη and rejects A's unique παγίδι, but in line 7 he selects A's παγίδος (elsewhere only in BBa), against all the best MSS (πάγης)—not merely ECrU, as stated in the note, but also F, O, and Ia. In 87.4 ἄρα ἡμᾶς οὐ of BBaU is read in place of the equally plausible and less clumsy ἡμᾶς γὰρ οὐ of ECr (to be read with an interrogation mark at the end) or the ἡμᾶς γάρ of OCas. If γὰρ is an error for ἄρα, why not place the latter in the position of γὰρ after ἡμᾶς?

In a few instances readings which are preserved in all the MSS are omitted in the text without note: 1.4, εἰσελθοῦσα before εἰς. 6.12, καὶ after ἀλλὰ. 6.13, σοὶ after χθές. 53.8, οὖν after ἀτὰρ (important). 93.1, αἰεὶ after διετέλει (though omitted in BBaU). Or a reading in the text which purports to be that of the MSS is something else: 3.1, ἀπορία for ἐρημία of all MSS. 8.8, ἐξεγύμνωσεν for ἀπ.-(ἐπ.-S, which alone is noted). 24.4, ἐδύνατο for ἦδ-. 32.2, γινόμενος for γεν-. 26.6, αὐτὸν before ὥς is not in any MS. 26.11, περιάγων in place of the aorist subj., although the present is cited by Chambry from two inferior MSS of Ia. 90.9, ἀγαλματογλύφης instead of -φος. 92.16, λόγου for λόγων.

In spite of these errors, the text on the whole is accurately printed, and the choice of readings is *normally* judicious and in accord with the best testimony. In editing the first one hundred fables, I have found myself more often in agreement with Hsr. than with Chambry, although the latter's edition remains indispensable by virtue of its fuller, more systematic, and more trustworthy report of the MSS.

Hsr.'s *apparatus* apparently does not aim to be complete, even for the seven or fewer principal MSS of Class I which are listed for each fable; and the hit-and-miss method by which variants or the MSS containing them are cited or not cited often makes it impossible for the reader to discover what the source

or authority is for the reading given in the text,¹³ whether such important MSS as Cr, A, O, or E have any noteworthy variants,¹⁴ or whether all the authority has been cited for a given variant.¹⁵ We are told in the Preface (p. xx) that no care has been taken about such trifling matters as "utrum librarii epimythiorum initia δ μῦθος δηλοῖ ὅτι . . . an εὐκαιρος ὁ μῦθος πρὸς . . . , etc., conformaverint, in quibus enumerandis et St. et Ch. chartae non pepercerunt." This is sheer philological anarchy. But no paper is spared in No. 4, where the wretchedly conflated δ λόγος δηλοῖ ὅτι οὕτω of A (which the reader wrongly assumes to be the text of C) is printed without warning that all MSS save A omit δ -ὅτι; or in No. 171, where an extra epimythium, composed by Minoides Minas, is quoted in full. It is a reasonable principle to abbreviate the *apparatus* by leaving out insignificant variants or the readings of MSS which have been judged to be late or undependable paraphrases (as BBa, S, and U; cf. p. viii), although, as the editor notes, such readings are *occasionally* worth citing as possible clues when the main tradition is in doubt; but Hsr.'s *apparatus* is full of citations from these paraphrases, even when their variants are worthless, while at the same time an incomplete and thereby confusing account is rendered of the main tradition.

Lastly, a frequent type of error in the *apparatus* is the failure to report the readings of the MSS correctly. I have noted about one hundred places where the readings of MSS are explicitly misreported.¹⁶ How confused and inaccurate

¹³ For the editor's clandestine following of A, see above, p. 213. In 1.23 the future $\delta\alpha\kappa\rho\acute{o}\upsilon\sigma\sigma\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ given in the text (possibly from D in Ia) is not in any of the seven Class I MSS here listed, all of which have the present; and the right form is cited only incidentally in the notes as a reading of A. On Fable 72 presumable readings of Cr are cited, contrary to the indications in my collation that this fable is no longer extant in Cr; it has been lost on a torn-out leaf together with the three preceding fables, whose absence in Cr is duly recognized by Hsr. Concerning the verse in 62.5, the editor notes only that it was recognized as such by Huschke, overlooking the fact that it comes from a newly recovered fable of Babrius (in Cr), published by Husselman in *TAPA*, LXVI (1936), 123. Incidentally, the earliest allusion to the fable itself, not mentioned in the *testimonia*, is probably Theognis 602.

¹⁴ So in 9.13, A's $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\beta\eta\beta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega$ for $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\sigma\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega$ is neglected; in 36.9 E's omission of δ $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ is noted, but not that of the equally important $\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\alpha\iota$; in 63.2, the omission of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ in CrOE (not a mere error, but a familiar asyndeton) is overlooked; in 69.8, C, the principal MS, is not cited for $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\pi\eta\gamma\acute{\iota}\delta\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu$, although it shares this variant with E; and the reading adopted in the text, $\pi\rho\omicron\alpha\pi\omicron\nu$, is from AO instead of from CAOU as one would logically infer; in 146.4, Cr as well as OE should be cited for the very different (and probably original) reading $\epsilon\lambda\tau\alpha$ $\tau\eta\lambda\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$, etc.; and in 175.3 not only OEa but also ACr have the reading adopted in the text. But these are only a few samples.

¹⁵ Cf. n. 14; *supra*, p. 212; and elsewhere in this review.

¹⁶ These are, with the exception of the passages mentioned below, as follows: 1.8, 11, 18, 22; 2.2; 3.1; 4.3-4; 5.3 (*bis*), 4 (*bis*); 8.2 (misprint?), 3, 8, and 9 (3, 8, and 9 all misreport S); 10.3 and 4; 11.5; 13.6 (*ter*) and 7; 16.3, 8, 11, and 12; 17.1; 18.8; 21.5 and 23 (both with Sternbach, of which the reader is warned); 21.11; 32.5; 34 (Class II).2 (E has $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\lambda\iota\pi\epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$); 36.2-3 (reading of E; see Chambry, No. 50, on Pa for the complete truth simply stated); 39a.10; 44.11; 51.5; 52.7; 53.2; 53, odd version on p. 74—this form of the fable is not in B, as stated; 55.2, 7, and 9; 58.6; 61.2; 63.1; 64.6; 67.8 (A and E); 68.3 (F and a); 68.6 (a); 75.1 (C); 75.15 (F and C confused); 76.9 (*read* $\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\delta\acute{\eta}$ CFEBa); 76.10 ($\tilde{\tau}$); 76.11 (Cr); 79.3 (O, F); 79.4 (not St, but E²); 79.6 ($\theta\epsilon\omega\tilde{\iota}$ C); 81.5 (*read* E for F);

this *apparatus* can be seen from Fables 9 and 101. In 9.1, *ἐμπεσοῦσα* is not the reading of A, as stated, but of C. In line 8, C reads *ἄμα* with the others, not *ἄμε*; while a more noteworthy variant of C in the next line (*σκοπομένης* for *-πούντος*) is not cited. In line 9 again, the reading cited as that of ESBBa is not that of any of these MSS; it misrepresents EBBa in that it omits *ἐὰν μόνον θελήσῃς* (*θέλῃς* B, *θέλεις* Ba), which comes after *οἶδα*; and it falsifies S still more, in that S's reading is radically different and precisely the same as that of A cited in the next colon of the *apparatus* (where τ. λ. is a misprint for τ. α.). In the next entry, under line 10, *ἐὰν μόνον θελήσῃς* of E (BBa), omitted above, is reported in a context to which it does not belong, and reported inaccurately at that (*θέλεις* Ba, not *-ης*), with the result that ESBBa is cited twice, against ACr once, on what purports to be the same variant.¹⁷ In the quotation from ACr (l. 10) read *τείχω* for *τοίχω*; but even so this statement misrepresents Cr by ignoring its differences from A as recorded in my collation, namely, *ἐὰν γ. θελήσῃς* in place of A's *εἰ γ. θελήσεις* and *προερίσας ἐγκλίνει* instead of A's *προσερεῖσαι ἐγκλινας*. Failure to mention such variants as these in the oldest of our MSS can hardly be excused in an edition that reports innumerable slighter variants in what is admitted to be a paraphrase of the main tradition, namely BBa. Again in line 10, the exceptional *σου* of BBa, so conscientiously noted, comes after instead of before *πόδας*. In line 17, S does not share the reading *ἐπελάθετο* with EVBBa but reads *ἀπηλλάττετο*; and in line 18 C reads *παρβαίνουσῃς* with Cr and not *-ούσας*. There is a similar complex of errors in the *apparatus* to Fable 101, but I must refrain from describing them.

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Mythos und Sage bei den Griechen. By LUDWIG RADERMACHER. Wien and Leipzig: Rudolf M. Rohrer Verlag, 1938. Pp. 360. Rm. 9.50 (paper); Rm. 12 (bound).

In this book a veteran Austrian scholar has set down valuable contributions to the science, especially to the methodology, of myth and legend. The plan is unusual but effective. Apart from the numerous notes, which are placed at the end of the book, the work is divided into two almost equal parts

81.11 (E, A); 84.3 (E); 85.2 (F); 86.4 (C has *ικανή* and ACrC have *ὑπάρχει*); 86.7 (*μὲν* not in A); 88.2 (*read* E for A); 91.6 (Cr); 92.3 (A); 92.5 (*read* E for F); 92.6 (E); 92.7 and 8 (C *bis*); 93.2 (Cr); 93.3 (B); 94.2 (Cr); 96.8 (*αὐτῆς* C); 96.10 (Cr); 96.12 (E); 97.1 (O reads very differently: *τὸ ἦθος πρὸς πάντα ἀργαλίαν λίαν*. With this real, but uncited reading of O in mind, Hsr. deletes *λίαν* as dittography, but he wrongly ascribes the combination *ἀργ. λ.* to a instead of O); 97.3 (A); 97.4 (CO have *ἐλθοῦσῃς*); 100.5 (F); 102.9 (a); 123.2 (E has *ῶστε* and *νομίσαι* is not in Cr); 147.4 (Cr has only *νοσούντα*, not *ν.* and *νοσείν*); 150.10 (E and Cr); 156.3 (reads thus: "*στὰς πρὸ τοῦ στομίου* Cas," then later, "*στὰς om.* Cas"); 169.5 (E); 160.11 and 178.7 (word order of Cr).

¹⁷ Chambry (p. 40) rightly prints the paraphrastic EBBa separately from the text of ACS(Cr) and thereby achieves lucidity as well as accuracy.

—"Preliminary Inquiries" and "Essays." The first part is largely historical and deals with these topics: the beginnings of analysis and explanation; the followers of the comparative method; the contributions of philologists and archeologists; myth, legend, and folk tale (*Märchen*); the technique of comparison; questions of origin and date; the archaic form and its duration.

The author discusses some theories and procedures that are now discarded and almost forgotten, but in his short Preface he rightly maintains that lessons may be learned even from what is today universally rejected. He defends his use of the term "science" for such studies in a sentence that is worth quoting and still more worth remembering: "Mir scheint nun, der Charakter einer geistigen Betätigung als Wissenschaft wird nicht sowohl durch den Gegenstand bestimmt, dem sie zugewendet ist, als vielmehr durch den Umstand, dass sie über ausgebildeten Arbeitsmethoden verfügt und sich über das mit Hilfe ihrer Methoden Erreichbare im klaren ist." Perhaps the highest praise that can be given to Radermacher's book is that it conforms to his own definition of what is scientific. Thus he is enabled to follow a safe course among the views of symbolists, allegorists, ethnographers, folklorists, philologists, and archeologists.

It is not easy in a notice of moderate length to criticize a work of which a full half is itself given up to criticism of previous methods and theories. It may be more useful—at least, it will serve as a sample—to give an outline of a considerable section of the chapter on "The Technique of Comparison," which the author devotes to the story of Bellerophon. The starting-point is, of course, the narrative of Glaukos in *Iliad* vi. The beginnings of the story, Anteia's love for Bellerophon and her revenge when he refuses her, are obviously a form of a well-known novella, the Joseph-formula. Since the theme does not belong exclusively to the Bellerophon story, it may be a later component of the complex. Radermacher says, in fact (p. 103), that novellistic features are always under suspicion of being later additions when they appear in an ancient legend—a broad statement, and yet it is probably true that the novella, concerning itself with the ways of human agents in their relations to one another, represents a more advanced type of observation and reflection than myth and legend in the proper sense of those words. But the later adventures of Bellerophon—the tasks imposed by King Iobates—are linked with the Anteia incident, because the slander and injustice done to their hero have their required counterpoise in his success in the very undertakings that were meant to bring about his death. And here enters an element that is foreign to the typical novella, namely, the marvelous, in the form of the monster Chimera and in the story of Bellerophon's victory over her with the help of the wonder horse, Pegasos. Such things fall into the domain of the *Märchen*. Pegasos is not mentioned by Homer, but Radermacher acutely suggests that the clear-sighted poet could find no place for a flying horse in a heroic epic; the detail is not on that account to be rejected as post-Homeric.

The theme of a hero riding a wonder horse and overcoming a monster has

its parallels in the fairy and folk tales of non-Greek peoples. Was the radiant champion riding a steed that soars in the heavens originally a god? In some of the folk tales the hero has solar characteristics, and the celestial winged steed is a feature of the story that points in the same direction. But if Bellerophon is a god of the sun, how are we to explain his genealogical connection with Poseidon (Glaukos) and the monster wave that his curse brings upon Lycia (Plut. *Mor.* 247F-248B)? The arguments by which Radermacher reconciles these contradictions are tenuous and may not convince all readers, but they are not fantastic and are worth considering. The fact that both Lycians and Ionians traced their ancestry to Bellerophon also marks him as divine, since nobility comes of descent from the gods. The name Pegasus has an ending (-asos) that is native to Caria, and the rider of a winged steed is an ancient phenomenon in a sphere of culture that comprises both Assyria and Asia Minor. The Chimera is a monster of eastern origin; the symbolic meaning of Bellerophon's victory over her cannot be certainly determined, and Radermacher prudently refrains from subscribing to any theory about it. His conclusion is that Bellerophon was originally a god worshiped in the region about the eastern end of the Mediterranean, who became established in certain parts of Greece but was thrust into the background by other incoming deities and was lowered to the rank of a hero. What is told of his chief exploit has taken on the characteristics of a *Märchen*, and a widespread novella-form has been added to the story.

Radermacher's analysis owes some debts to previous writers, as he freely acknowledges; but it is marked by judicious discrimination throughout, and the sources and authorities cited in the notes enable the reader to check his views easily. There are some lapses; a reference to a study of Malten's has apparently dropped out (p. 312, n. 227, speaks of it as "cited above," but the reference is lacking). Attention may be called to the fact that the glass plaque from Dendra which Persson, followed by Radermacher, took to be a representation of the Chimera is now more reasonably interpreted as two goats, one behind the other (Anne Roes, *JHS*, LIV [1934], 21-25, and M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, p. 332, n. 1, in the I. von Müller *Handbuch*).

The methods that Radermacher approves in the first division of the book are put into practice in the second, which comprises two excellent studies, "Jason" and "Theseus." The first is indispensable for the student of the Argonautic legend and its treatment in literature. Here, by the way, although the author usually cites English works as scrupulously as German, one misses a reference to Miss J. R. Bacon's *The Voyage of the Argonauts* (1925). The study of Theseus is equally important for a different kind of legend; its last division—"Mensch oder Gott?"—is particularly valuable. Further discussion of the details of this important work is impossible here. It can be highly recommended as a wise and learned study of a difficult subject which has led many ingenious minds astray.

In two important respects the appearance of the book is pleasing—the paper is good, and the type is admirably clear. But one serious fault sadly detracts from the good impression made by type and paper, namely, the unbearably long paragraphs. There is actually one running over nine and a half pages (pp. 85–95), and several others of six to eight pages. It is strange that a writer who is far from insensitive to aesthetic considerations should allow his book to leave the press with this uninviting, not to say forbidding, appearance.

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CAMPBELL BONNER

Archaic Sculpture in Boeotia. By FREDERICK R. GRACE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. 86+83 illus. at end. \$5.00.

This book is open to certain obvious criticisms, yet it has considerable value. It is a handsome quarto volume with good print, wide margins, and pale lavender binding. The illustrations are good. Some of them, as appears from the absence of any statement to the contrary, are made from the author's own photographs; and a number of things previously unpublished, chiefly terra cottas, are included. Two classes of terra cottas, discussed in chapter iii, are not illustrated at all. The illustrations have no captions, and neither with them nor in the List of Illustrations is there anything to tell the reader where the objects shown are discussed. There is no index, but the detailed Table of Contents partly serves the purpose of an index.

The author does not concern himself with literature or tradition but studies objects found in Boeotia. The arrangement of material is generally clear, though three *kouroi* are discussed chiefly in chapter iv ("Figurines with Moulded Heads") instead of in chapter v ("Monumental Sculpture"). The chapter on relief *pithoi* is only a brief supplement to Hampe's book. The writing is often prolix, involved, and awkward. "It is no part of the intent of this discussion to attempt to elucidate the provenance" of this style, but it seems to result partly from the author's striving for variety of expression.

The Introduction contains some statements in regard to the author's approach to the history of sculpture. "It is no longer my belief that clearly marked local schools are distinguishable or ever existed in Greek sculpture of the sixth century . . . the really significant changes in Greek sculpture during this period were transmitted from place to place very quickly, became, in short, universal to the Greek world almost immediately upon conception." Strictly construed, the former sentence may mean only that it is impossible, by studying a piece of archaic sculpture, to tell in what region it was carved or where its author was born; and this would be true. But when the first sentence is read with the second and with other passages, it appears (though perfect clarity is hardly attained) that Mr. Grace is professing that remarkable doctrine according to which all differences or similarities in the style of Greek art (or almost all) are accounted for by chronology. This is far from true; and the

passage which appears on the jacket as a publisher's note is about as discouraging as anything that one could read at the beginning of a book on Greek art.

This attitude is more or less clearly reiterated in various places throughout the book, but the author is not very consistent. He finds a wave of Corinthian influence beginning about 650, and another wave about 550 from the "Ionian islands." The Apollo of Tenea is termed Corinthian, and a bronze statuette which Langlotz classed as Argive is declared Boeotian. Several groups of "pappades," representing the work of individual craftsmen, are presented, and it is observed that the same could be done for more primitive figurines. Mr. Grace's practice is better than his professed theory. He sees, as anyone with open eyes must see, that specimens of Greek art or craft were created by individuals with individual styles. These styles influenced, and were influenced by, the styles of other artists, who usually and normally, but not necessarily or always, would be neighbors. In this way—and not because of "local geographical, sociological, and political conditions"—there came to be styles which flourished particularly in single regions but might very well appear elsewhere, either in waves of influence or in single examples.

To most readers the account of large sculptures in stone will be the most interesting part of the book. In disagreement with Lullies, who had suggested notably late dates for the Dermys and Kitylos and other sculptures, Grace believes that early-looking sculpture in Boeotia is no later than early-looking sculpture anywhere else. In his argument he deals with mannerism, inorganic planes, and other topics, matching Lullies point to point. It is evident that he has studied the sculptures attentively and intelligently, and his conclusions about them are reasonable.

In an appendix he discusses two terra cotta heads found at Amyclae, in which Kunze saw the "Ausdruck zweier entgegengesetzter Welten" (Mycean and Geometric). Grace correctly points out that the terra cottas cannot be separated. This should be an instructive example to those who are prone to see worlds, instead of men, expressing themselves in works of art.

The Boston vase signed by Amasis is generally reckoned a late work; Grace calls it early (p. 34). "Pontish" (p. 35) is not an improvement on the usual "Pontic." It may not be helpful to all students of Boeotian art to describe a saucer as "a little larger than a silver dollar." Many of the sculptures have been so much discussed that a complete list of citations would be unnecessary and inordinately long, but Grace's references could advantageously be extended. He never cites *University Prints* or Miss Richter's *Sculpture and Sculptors*, which are generally accessible collections of illustrations, or any epigraphical publication for the sculptures with inscriptions. Ordinarily he does not cite individual illustrations for particular parts or aspects of the sculptures, though such citations would be useful to a critical reader. For an Amasis amphora he cites CVA and Pfuhl, but not Hoppin; immediately after, for an-

other vase, he cites Furtwängler-Reichhold, but not Pfuhl. Cross-references are sometimes unsatisfactory. The citations of *CVA* are not easily usable, and Hampe's example is no excuse. There is frequent inconsistency in abbreviation and reference; the author seems to have a distaste for uniformity; but no reference that I have checked has been completely wrong. 'Εφ. Ἀρχ is regularly so printed, as though the second word were complete, and in its first three appearances the phi is a Scandinavian ϕ! Elsewhere an omicron is clearly taken from a font of English type, and the title of Kourouniotis' book on Eleusis (p. 72) must be the most remarkable Greek ever printed by the Harvard Press.

The list of small flaws or irregularities could be extended, and the book cannot be considered a highly finished product; but Mr. Grace establishes himself as a respectable authority on Boeotian art.

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Calabria: The First Italy. By GERTRUDE SLAUGHTER. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1939. Pp. xiv+330. \$4.00.

Calabria was "the first Italy," Mrs. Slaughter explains in her Preface, because it was to this part of the peninsula that the Greeks first applied the name "Italia." The book surveys the history of this "mountain ridge between two seas," from the prehistoric period before the coming of the Greeks, when Calabria was inhabited by a race of "splendid barbarians" closely akin to the Siculans of Sicily, down to the time when the Calabrian knight, Mattia Preti, decorated the walls of the cathedral at Malta. The material is grouped under six main headings: "Magna Graecia," "Roman Dominion," "Byzantine Calabria," "The Norman Kingdom," "Anjou and Aragon," and "The Spanish Regime"; and in each section the discussion centers around famous personalities: Pythagoras, the sage of Croton, Cassiodorus, Barlaam of Gerace. These great figures are presented in their setting, both of time and of place. We can visualize the rocky hillsides, the vast forests of pine and oak and beech on the gneiss-and-granite ridge called the Sila, the bright flowers and masses of fern, and, near at hand or in the distance, always the blue sea. Beautiful illustrations bring before us the remains of earlier ages, such as the single towering column of the Temple of Hera near Crotone, the lovely head of a caryatid from Taranto, or the Byzantine Church of San Marco at Rossano. Mrs. Slaughter draws sympathetic pictures of people as different as Pythagoras, with his serene beauty, his magnetic personality, and his emphasis on "the harmonious perfection of mind and body"; the Calabrian pope, Zacharias, gentle and affectionate, endowed with a quiet humor and yet determined to uphold proper standards among the "rustic pagans"; and the ruddy, flax-haired Robert Guiscard, luring the baron of Bisignano into ambush or introducing his armed followers into a walled town in the guise of monks about to

bury a dead brother. There are pleasant reminiscences of Horace's odes and Vergil's *Georgics*, and one hears the cicada supplying the missing notes on the lyre of a Locrian poet and the cranes crying above the body of the murdered Ibycus.

In spite of the author's defense of herself against this charge in the Preface, the reader is likely to suspect that the continuity of culture in Calabria is slightly exaggerated and to feel that, in considering the resemblances between two different ages, it does make a difference whether an old plant continues to grow in the same soil or whether it has been "uprooted and replanted at a later day." Most readers will wish that a date had been given for Mattia Preti, with whom the book closes, and that the material in general had been presented with more emphasis on chronology. In chapter ii an account of the Stone Age follows the discussion of the coming of the Greeks to Italy, and in chapter xviii an anecdote of a fourteenth-century abbot interrupts the history of ninth-century saints. The story of Cicero's two visits to Vibo Valentia is told with very little suggestion of the turmoil in Cicero's mind when he took refuge at Sica's villa on his way into exile or of the earth-shaking events that preceded his arrival there in the summer of 44 B.C. The statement that some of the Greek monks of Calabria "went to Florence to give lessons in the Greek language, and one of them had Petrarch for his pupil" (p. 151) seems to be due to a confusion between the instruction in the elements of the language given to Petrarch by Barlaam at Avignon in 1342 and the study of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* made by Boccaccio under Leontius Pilatus in Florence between 1360 and 1362. And, certainly, when we remember that Robert of Anjou died in January, 1343, it cannot be said that "in his reign Calabrian scholars taught Greek in Florence and translated Greek literature for Florentine humanists" (p. 246).

The spellings *Philanthus* and *Aulous* (p. 96) need correction, as does the form *Bruttii*, repeatedly used as a place name instead of *Bruttium*. The inscription quoted on page 239 from the bust of Pier delle Vigne at Capua seems to contain two misprints, although I have not been able to check the text. One might question the characterization of Naevius as "the earliest Roman dramatist" and also the implication that he treated the story of Aeneas in dramatic form (p. 27), as well as the statement that Aristophanes "retained the construction of the great tragedies" (p. 112).

But these are minor points which do not interfere with one's pleasure and real profit in reading the book. One lays it down with a deep sense of the debt of the scholarly world to Calabria—a debt almost breath-taking in its inclusion of the gold tablets of Orphic votaries, the bronze plates on which were recorded both the *Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus* and the *Lex Iulia municipalis*, and the marvelous sixth-century Greek manuscript of the Gospels, with silver letters on purple vellum. One realizes, too, the quality, unchanged through the ages, of the Calabrian people, "simple and honest, digni-

fied and reserved"—a race who have never lost their spirit, their respect for learning, or their pride in their own past; and one is grateful to Mrs. Slaughter for making us better acquainted with them.

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The Tebtunis Papyri, Vol. III, Part II. By ARTHUR S. HUNT, J. GILBERT SMYLY, and C. C. EDGAR. ("University of California Publications in Graeco-Roman Archaeology," Vol. IV [1938].) Pp. xxiv+345+4 pls.

The texts which appear as the second part of *Tebtunis Papyri*, Volume III, have passed through the hands of four papyrologists of the first rank—Grenfell, Hunt, Smyly, and Edgar. The masterly handling of the difficult Ptolemaic texts in this volume clearly demonstrates the expertness of the editors and emphasizes the loss to papyrology occasioned by the death of three of the men named. Only Smyly survives to carry on the work. Of the 267 papyri treated, 197 are so seriously damaged as to rank as minor fragments, and few of the remaining 70 have escaped grave mutilations. In spite of the difficulties which damaged and fragmentary writings invariably present, the printed texts throughout exhibit the close consistency and texture of expert workmanship, and a conscientious examination of the plates reveals that the editors have neither overreached nor understated the written evidence.

The volume has six major divisions, of which the first (826-34) contains documents relating to the land survey. These afford a valuable supplement to the extensive material in Volume I, dealing with the same subjects—the amounts of unwatered, sandy, salt, or neglected land, the state of the sowing, and the parcel-by-parcel survey. Most interesting is 834, a list of house property in an unnamed town on "the great river"—a main canal¹—which gives the description, location, and valuation of a number of houses. Taxation was undoubtedly the purpose of the list, yet at least six of the houses listed in this short fragment were tax exempt (*ἀπελύθη*).

The second section (835-43) consists of tax receipts. Of especial interest is 837, a *sitologus* report of a single day's receipts, indicating the care with which the revenues were computed and checked by the administration as they were being received. Evidence of a similar close control over money revenue is furnished by 839, where the agents of both the *basilico-grammateus* and the *oikonomos* attest a receipt for the tax of one-third on dovescots.

In the following section (844-78), devoted to taxation returns and accounts, the first text is a fragment which sets forth the operations of an oil mill. The date places the account within a year or two of the revenue laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus. This chronological proximity gives to it an added

¹ See Claire Préaux's review, *Chronique d'Égypte*, XXVIII (1939), 387.

interest as a contemporary record of the actual functioning of the rigid monopoly decreed in the revenue laws. With 844 may be compared 865, an account of money derived by the monopoly from the sale of oil.

In 847, lines 21-22 probably describe the operation known in the Roman period as *διέρασις*,² the transfer of grain from towns of the Fayum by small boats which traveled up the distributing canals to the river port of Ptolemais Hormou. The rendering of the lines should, I believe, be "100 artabas of wheat disembarked at Ptolemais, moreover unladed from the boats of Psen. . . ." The *πλοῖα* mentioned here would by this interpretation be equivalent to the small craft known as *διεράματα* in the Roman period. The abbreviation, *συ() ν() α*, can with likelihood be resolved as *σὺ(ν) ν(αύλοις) α*, "with freight charge, one artaba"; cf. *BGU*, III, 802. xv. 2-3, where the expression *ἀ(νὰ) (ἀρτάβην) α* is to be interpreted as the *ναῦλον* rate per hundred artabas for transport from Arsinoë to Ptolemais Hormou.

Grain payments received are recorded in 848-50, in which the total amount of a payment, reckoned in donkeys or sacks and in artabas, is first given, and the amounts of various additional charges are thereafter subtracted. Thus, contrary to the usual procedure, the gross amount paid is placed first and the net amount last. There is no justification for the editor's statement that this net amount leaves a balance to be paid subsequently. The account merely records the payments made, with no implication as to what was due. The net payment may be, for all that the text says, the full net amount due or more or less than that amount.

In 856, which deals with the business of the state granaries, there are a number of entries recording in detail the amount and source of the grain loaded into various Nile boats for shipment to Alexandria. These entries make evident the care with which the consignments of grain from each village were traced through the several stages of the journey to Alexandria. The function of such careful transport records must have been twofold: (1) to insure that each *sitologus* and each village received proper credit and quittance at each stage for grain delivered and (2) to enable each consignment to be identified even after arrival at Alexandria, so that, in case of shortage, adulteration, or spoilage through the fault of a *sitologus*, the particular *sitologus* who was responsible could be called to account.

The private accounts (884-94) add considerably to the evidence on prices. For wine, beer, oil, bread, clothing, and daily wages, the prices given are specific and of importance.

The literary fragments, none of impressive extent, comprise three of Homer, one of the *Bacchae*, and two that are not identified. The 191 minor documents with which this series closes offer great variety. Although the majority are tantalizingly incomplete, there are many of sufficient extent to

² Preisigke's *Wörterbuch* is in error. See F. Oertel, *Die Liturgie* (Leipzig, 1917), p. 130, and Procopius, *Aed.* vi. i. 3 n. in the "Loeb Classical Library."

be worthy of study. For example, the procedure in the annual land survey is illuminated by 927 and 922; sidelights on irrigation are given by 908, 936, and 961-62, and on the police system by 904, 907, 927, and 986-90.

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The Quality of Mercy: The Gentler Virtues in Greek Literature. By GRACE H. MACURDY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xiii + 185. \$2.00.

This is one of the comparatively few books, important in substance and eloquent in expression, that are the best justification of classical scholarship; and in a world that at the moment seems so lacking in the gentler virtues Professor Macurdy's study is doubly welcome. That the ancient Greeks were not lacking in these virtues is her thesis, twice summarized (pp. xi-xiii; 118 f.). From Homeric *aidos* and *themis* through Hesiod's *dike* and the *dikaioσύνη* of the classical period to the "golden rule" of Plato's Socrates (*Rep.* 335b) and the *agape* of the New Testament—that is the sequence to be traced and illustrated in detail; nor are evidences of opposite qualities ignored.

In the story of Meleager in the *Iliad* is preserved a token of the humanity of even the old epic; the treatment of Priam by Achilles, "his rough speech . . . combined with his tenderness to him," is only one of many evidences for the poet's age; while the *Doloneia*, "a book without *aidos*," is held to be a cynical and sophisticated addition to the poem and is contrasted with the *Rhesus* (accepted as probably by Euripides). In the *Odyssey*, "a civilized poem," it is true, as Aristotle puts it, that "the pleasure is not that of tragedy" but consists rather in the "ethical" portrayal of humanity; truth and pity are replaced by hospitality, tragedy by occasional pathos; the one exceptional episode, "unrelieved by any touch of humanity," is the slaughter of the suitors and the maidservants (and Professor Murray sees signs of retouching in the episode).

To the usual comparisons of Hesiod's pleas for justice with those of Amos and Micah, Miss Macurdy adds interesting analogies with the Psalms and traces the influence of Hesiod's conception of *dike* from Aeschylus to Wordsworth. Admirable is her concise treatment of personified virtues from Homer onward (pp. 59-64); it should be pointed out, however, that in spite of the oft quoted remark of Pausanias (i. 17. 1) that the Athenians were the only Greeks who gave a cult to Pity, proof to the contrary has been found at Epidaurus. With Solon it is *eunomia*, with Pindar, Simonides, and Bacchylides, *arete*, that comes to the fore; Herodotus inculcates the avoidance of *hybris* and the preservation of *isonomia*, which is the forerunner of democracy. In democratic, fifth-century Athens it is *sophrosyne* that displaces *aidos* and becomes "the most distinctively Hellenic of all the virtues."

Tragedy, we have been reminded both by Plato and by Aristotle, though

with differing conclusions, has much to do with pity; both philosophers, however, take for granted the moral purpose of tragedy. Miss Macurdy well emphasizes the pre-eminent role of *sophrosyne* in Aeschylus; but I find somewhat extreme her statement (p. 98) that in the *Prometheus Bound* "Zeus is the example of *hubris*" and (p. 99) that in the sequel he "must acquire the 'democratic' virtues of *sophrosyne* and justice," even if Prometheus is rightly held to be the representative of "philanthropy." (The quotation at this point of Plato, *Rep.* 500d, is rather misleading.) It may be true, moreover, that the "Unwritten Laws" and the "Heavenly Laws" of Sophocles have to do chiefly with ritual piety and should not be exploited, as they often are, as proof of a profound ethical spirit; and again that the gods of Sophocles "were relentless and inhuman," while "his men and women were moved by *aidos* and *sophrosyne* and pity" (p. 119); if so, the poet's humanity is the greater, and it is perhaps unnecessary to say that he "is not interested in ideas" (p. 137). In dealing with Euripides, Miss Macurdy returns to one of her earlier interests and finds the most congenial part of her subject. His *Electra* she regards as a protest against the spirit of the Sophoclean *Electra* (whether or not Euripides was writing first), the *Heracles* as criticism of the *Oedipus Tyrannus*; she defends the character of Alceste against Professor Norwood's analysis; she ranks the prayer of *Troades* (884-88) above the Sophoclean chorus on the "Heavenly Laws" (*OT*, 863 ff.); and she presents many an example of Euripides' "exquisite sensibility, his pity for the oppressed, and bitter hatred of cruelty and the oppressor" (p. 131). Despite the low moral standards of the New Comedy, Menander "has the same love for the gentler virtues as has his intellectual ancestor, Euripides" (p. 169).

Among writers of prose, Herodotus is notable for the tenderness of his stories of children; Thucydides, sparing in moral comment, upholds high standards of honor and decency by the very manner of his accounts of the massacres of children, of Melians, and (almost) of Mitylenians and by his stories of the plague and of civil strife in Corcyra. For the sentiment of average men, there are the orators. Finally, "the 'justice' of the Platonic Socrates comprehended all the higher morality of the Greeks from the *aidos* of the Heroic Age, the Unwritten Laws which Antigone obeyed, the *sophrosyne* of the early Athenian democracy, and the humanity and pity of Euripides" (p. 177); it is an anticipation of the Christian "love," which is the fulfilment of law.

This bare outline gives little idea of the charm and richness of the book. I have indicated a few places in which differences of opinion might be justified. I think, too, that less space need have been given to agreement or disagreement with certain vagaries of such good scholars as W. Schmid, H. Weinstock, and G. Thomson; and mention might have been made of the essay by C. B. Gulick, "Notions of Humanity among the Greeks" (*Harvard Essays on Classical Subjects* [1912]) and of the late Professor J. W. Hewitt's articles on

Greek ideas of gratitude, another "gentle virtue." But these slight considerations need not detract from the pleasure which awaits any reader of this delightful study.

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Ancient Libraries. By JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940. Pp. 120. \$2.00.

This readable and attractively printed little book is divided into four chapters, devoted respectively to the libraries of the Ancient East, Ancient Greece, and Ancient Rome and to the technique of ancient bookmaking. A glossary of Latin terms and nineteen pages of notes, largely bibliographical in character, are added at the end. The book is presumably meant to be an introduction for beginners, from which the interested student can pass on to consult more advanced monographs or articles. Hence it is most regrettable that the author did not take a little more care when compiling his essay. Omissions, contradictions, inaccuracies, and downright mistakes leave the reader with the impression that it was very hastily thrown together. We are told, for instance, on consecutive pages (pp. 18-19) that "at the end of the fifth century books were plentiful and cheap in Greece," that "the Greek book trade grew slowly," and that "it is a false inference to assume that all kinds of books abounded during the Attic period." When the author has not made up his mind about the existing evidence, what is the elementary student to think? Mr. Thompson's interpretation of Aristophanes *Frogs* 1114, which occurs in this passage, is almost certainly wrong. As Van Leeuwen and B. B. Rogers have shown (cf. Rogers' note *ad loc.*), the allusion is not to a general book trade but to copies of the *Frogs* that became available before the second performance of the play. It is now generally agreed that Julius Caesar did not destroy the Museum Library at Alexandria (p. 23) but a dump of books on the quay awaiting export (cf. the discussion in T. Rice Holmes, *Roman Republic*, III, 487-89). Greek works were being translated or adapted by Livius Andronicus more than a generation before Fabius Pictor wrote his Greek annals (p. 27); and the reason why he chose to write in Greek at a time when Rome was beginning to be drawn into eastern Mediterranean politics was, as Matthias Gelzer has shown, because he was trying to put the Roman point of view before Greek readers. What exactly are we to understand by Asinius Pollio's great victory (p. 30) in 39 B.C.? It is not true that "in the early middle ages papyrus was only used for short notes, accounts, and unimportant matters of record" (p. 68). The reader will find the real facts admirably set out by Miss Deanesly in the *Transactions of the R. Historical Society*, XXIII (1941), 26-30. Why does Mr. Thompson make no mention of the library in the Ptolemaion at Athens? It must have been of considerable size and importance, since

an inscription (*IG*, II, 468, 25) attests that in one year *ephebi* who had finished their education made a gift to the library of one hundred volumes. Isocrates, so far from referring "specifically to titles of legal works" (p. 80), uses the general phrase *τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις* (*Philippus* 12); consequently, modern commentators are still uncertain whether the allusion is to Plato or to Antisthenes or to someone else. In his account of the Alexandrian library (pp. 22-24) Mr. Thompson omits some important facts—for example, that under Aurelian in 272 it was partly destroyed by fire and that Theodosius I was responsible for removing books from there. Nor does he mention the singularly interesting passage about the library in Ambrosiaster, *Quaestio* CXIV (*CSEL*, Vol. L). It may be suggested that the attitude of the Church to pagan literature was neither so simple nor so uniformly unfavorable as Mr. Thompson (p. 41) would have us believe. Finally, the following errata should be noted: *παθεῖν* should be *μαθεῖν* in the citation at the head of page 17; "Vestimus" (p. 33) should be "Vestinus"; Plato's "*Politics*" (p. 72) should be "*Republic*"; Episteme (p. 85) was a personification of Learning or Science, not of Faith; "Victor" and "*Istoria*" (p. 93) should be "Pictor" and "*Historia*." What is *eschatol* in the Glossary (p. 99)? Presumably Mr. Thompson is thinking of the *ἄπαξ εἰρημένον* in Martial ii. 6. 3, *eschatocollion*; but this signified the end of a papyrus roll not the end of a codex. The Xenophon reference on page 104, note 34, should be "vii.5.14," not "vii.5.2."

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The Genuineness of the Ninth and Third Letters of Isocrates. By LESLIE FRANCIS SMITH. (Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the faculty of philosophy, Columbia University.) Lancaster, Pa., 1940. Pp. 44.

The authenticity of these two Isocratean letters has been disputed for many years, and the literature on the subject is extensive. Mr. Smith submits the various arguments, pro and con, that have been used by scholars to a searching re-examination and occasionally adds some new observations of his own. Perhaps his most substantial contribution is the analysis of the ancient *Lives* of Isocrates; his attempt to reconcile the accounts of Dionysius and the Pseudoplutarch, while he would reject the anonymous *Life*, seems well founded. His reconstruction of events after the battle of Chaeronea is also reasonable. Whether those who maintain that these two letters are not genuine will now see the error of their ways may be doubted. As recently as 1939 Miss Schmitz-Kahlmann, in an appendix to her monograph on the historical *exempla* in Isocrates (cf. *CP*, XXXV, 445-46), rejected the ninth letter on grounds of style and content! Mr. Smith does not refer to her book, presumably because it was published too late for him to consult. Mr. Smith has handled his subject matter with competence. By so doing he has rendered a

useful service to students of Isocrates and of Greek history in the fourth century. But his style is sometimes careless, and the tone of his writing is deplorable. In the course of one page (3-4) "I" is used ten times, and there are actually eight consecutive sentences beginning with this pronoun. It occurs three times in three sentences on page 35 and three times in two sentences on page 41. "In my opinion" or "it is my opinion" occurs three times on page 21 and six times elsewhere. Such egotism might be pardonable, if irritating, in a scholar of wide reputation and venerable years; in a younger man it is intolerable. The failure of Mr. Smith's teachers to correct this fault is not less surprising than the acceptance as a doctoral dissertation in an important university of what is after all no more than a fairly long article.

M. L. W. LAISTNER

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Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World. By M. CARY, professor of ancient history, University of London, and T. J. HAARHOFF, professor of classics, University of the Witwatersrand. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1940. Pp. xi+348+12 pls. 8s. 6d.

This little book is unusual in its comprehensiveness and in the manner in which Greek and Roman material is connected and compared. In ten chapters the following subjects are considered: "The Geographic Background," "The Political Background," "The Material Background," "Social Life," "The Written and the Spoken Word," "Philosophy and Science," "Greek and Roman Art," "Greek and Roman Literature," "Education and Scholarship," and "Greek and Roman Religion." The task undertaken is difficult, but the two authors are exceptionally well qualified for it by long and varied research and experience as teachers and authors. As a whole they have been successful. To be sure, all subjects are treated very briefly; and the merging of the accounts of various phases of Greek and Roman life sometimes—in spite of the care of the authors—obscures differences in the usages of various times and places. Thus the statement, "The principal metal for currency in the ancient world was silver, with bronze for small change" (p. 122), ignores, among other things, the use of silver for small change in early Athens. On the other hand, different periods are, in the main, carefully distinguished in the excellent account of slavery (pp. 127-32). At the same time, the emphasis on what Greece and Rome had in common is a great advantage. In few, if any, places can the student obtain in such brief compass so adequate an impression of the extent and variety of available knowledge concerning classical civilization. The scholar, too, will find food for thought in many acute observations such as that on bilingualism and monoglotism (p. 292), though he may find disagreement with some of his own pet theories. Actual mistakes are few for so complex a work. It is confusing to find the discovery of the use of monsoons

for trade with India credited both to Eudoxus (p. 203) and to Hippalus (p. 121, cf. p. 210). This slip is unfortunate, for no one is better qualified than Cary to deal with problems of ancient geography and discoveries.

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The Economics of Ancient Greece. By H. MICHELL. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xii+415. \$4.00.

The appearance of Professor Michell's book has solved a bibliographical problem for the reviewer. Some two years ago he spent a number of hours trying to run it down in book lists and booksellers' catalogues after coming across the title in the notes to Heichelheim's *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums* in the hope of using it for required reading in his course. Now that it has appeared, he is glad to call it to the attention of scholars in the fields of ancient and of economic history. It is an excellent book, which fills in a noticeable gap in the secondary literature, not only in English, but also in other languages.

The author covers the economic history of the Greeks, in Hellas in detail and more cursorily abroad, from the rise of the *polis* to the coming of Alexander the Great. The book is divided into ten chapters which cover "The Background of Greek Economics," "Agriculture," "Mining and Minerals," "Labour," "Industry," "Commerce" (two chaps.), "Trade in Various Products. Greeks and Phoenicians. Piracy" (one chap.), "Money and Banking," "Public Finance." These are followed by a select bibliography, which is really select, and an index. References are given in the footnotes to the sources and to the more specialized literature on individual points, but the sources are not quoted *in extenso*. The author's intention was to give a *mise au point* to the present state of the various problems, and in this he has succeeded very well.

The reader receives a clear impression of the many fundamental differences between Greek economy and our own, which is perhaps the most valuable aspect of the book, as all comparative work tends to emphasize the likenesses rather than the differences. Probably the most useful of the chapters is that upon agriculture, where a large body of material is carefully collected, sifted, and interpreted from the technical point of view. In some of the other chapters material is available in English and other languages, but we have no single book where so many pertinent facts are as conveniently gathered together in one place.

The author is not inclined to ascribe the decline of Greek economic life to any one factor but rather to attribute it to a combination of reasons. The effect of slavery he considers (pp. 166-68) to have been less deleterious than were the baneful features inherent in Greek public finance and state management (pp. 391-93). Greece was a small country with limited resources; the

land question was always acute; and, with the advent of money economy, a parallel strife between rich and poor was evoked which became acute and envenomed when Athens' declining star made the disposal of the state's depleted income a still more burning question. Economic development inevitably tended to evolve into a descending spiral. Such appear to be the author's main theses, and with them the reviewer finds himself in hearty agreement. It would have been interesting, however, to have an intimation of the writer's views on some of Heichelheim's theories on this period.

The typography is excellent, but we might note in passing that "Patros" (p. 27) should be "Patras," and "Herodes" (p. 173) "Herondas."

ROBERT P. BLAKE

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Freedom of Speech in the Roman Republic. By LAURA ROBINSON. (Diss., Baltimore, 1940.) Pp. 93.

This Johns Hopkins dissertation was completed in 1937, Tenney Frank *duce et auspice*. The timeliness of the subject permits the writer to vault from 451 B.C. on one page to the B.B.C. on the next. The treatment and style are sober, however; there are hardly any side glances at the contemporary scene, nor does the doctoral concept of *παιρησία* allow slang, except for one lapse: "Furius Bibaculus was always broke."

After brief preliminary remarks on Athenian freedom of speech, based on Max Radin's article (*AJP*, 1927), the history of the subject at Rome is explored down to the end of the Augustan principate, and an epilogue sketches further developments down to the time of Nerva. The Roman dramatists, presenting plays under state supervision at public games, learned from the unpleasant experience of Naevius that it was necessary to avoid criticism of living men and current politics, unless in guarded hints. The early orators, on the other hand, had abundant freedom of speech; and many abused the privilege for personal and political ends, prosecuting and impeaching right and left with scant regard for truth and justice. Defamation, prohibited on the stage, ran rampant before the bar and on the rostra. Satire was untrammelled, and Lucilius, being personally in a well-entrenched position, spared nobody's feelings (*primores populi arripuit*) and castigated the dead with the living.

Freedom of speech, being firmly established by tradition, did not wholly die out even under a dictatorship: witness the moderately bold speeches that Cicero gave under Sulla. Private and public oratory continued to know little restraint in the Ciceronian age, and in the senate there was absolute freedom until the end began to come under Caesar. The *poetae novi* shot their epigrammatic shafts and tossed their lampoons with Lucilian freedom and obscenity. We find what amounted to restrictions emerging in the last years before Caesar's death, expanding under the Second Triumvirate, and becoming

really potent and rather sweeping after 31 B.C. Augustus curbed libel by a broad interpretation of the *lex maiestatis*.

The discussion of Horace's *Satires* is lengthy and makes full use of Frank's observations and clever combinations. The general theory is that Horace attacked many contemporaries by the use of cryptonyms (twenty-six are listed on p. 76). The identification of many people to whom Horace made veiled allusion is a ticklish matter and is here carried into more detail than the argument strictly demands. On the other hand, Miss Robinson neglects to say anything about Ovid and the *carmen et error* that led to his banishment; or about Horace's friendly admonition to Pollio (*Carm.* ii. 1) to tread cautiously in writing a history of the recent civil wars; or about the destruction (*iubente Augusto*) of the original ending of the *Georgics* after Gallus fell into disgrace; or about the mysterious disappearance of all the poetry of Gallus. Thus the treatment of the Augustan age is lopsided: more than enough about Horace's *Satires*, but total silence about other pertinent matters.

The Introduction propounds, but the treatise does not explicitly answer, some good questions: Did the Romans acquire a greater disfavor for slander and seditious utterances than for libel? Did they have a "finer sense of personal right to protection of reputation than did other peoples"? It appears likely that Miss Robinson's answer to the first question would be affirmative. The second question cannot be answered without elaborate comparisons with other peoples; these comparisons are, of course, not supplied, and in their absence one can only conjecture that the answer would be negative. On the whole, it does not seem that freedom of speech, since it was so sadly abused, is among our great legacies from Rome.

The Index is very careful and complete, but there is no collected bibliography. Misprints are few, although "cryptonym" appears three times. Indeed astonishing is the translation of *κακηγορία* as "offence against the market place." A number of false references suggest lack of verification; but the reader who learns quickly from the discussion of Horace's *Satires* will have no trouble in spotting such a reference as Vell. v.132 (p. 59) as a cryptonym for Appian's *Bellum civile*.

CLARENCE A. FORBES

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Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy. By GILBERT MURRAY. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. Pp. xii+242. \$3.00.

A new interpretation of such a well-loved author as Aeschylus is always welcome, and when the interpretation comes from the pen of Gilbert Murray it is doubly welcome. He has written what he himself calls a popular study (p. vi), an attempt at understanding the Aeschylean plays as great literature and great drama. By calling Aeschylus the creator of tragedy he attributes to him the creation of the form of literature which we now call tragic whether

it appears in dramatic or in novel form. Inasmuch as he is writing a popular study, Murray does not enter to any great extent into controversial matters. For example, with regard to the origin of tragedy he merely restates his Year-ritual theory (p. 6) without comment.

Murray studies three characteristics of the poet which allow him to be called "creator of tragedy." In chapter i, with regard to his gift of *semmotês* Murray shows how in the *Prometheus* and the *Suppliants* Aeschylus took very trivial myths and built the majestic structures of these two tragedies. In chapter ii he studies Aeschylus' bold experimentation in stage technique and his diction. Chapter iii is devoted to Aeschylus as the poet of ideas, for it is in his interest in the problems of the world and of human life that he is able to achieve what Murray calls the creation of tragedy, i.e., in each myth he sees a conflict, and he makes of the conflict one of the eternal problems of life.

These chapters are followed by studies of the individual plays and of the fragments which further exemplify these three characteristics. Far from convincing is the attempt (pp. 113 f.) to show that the four plays produced in 472 B.C., of which the *Persae* alone is extant, formed some sort of continuous story. The further suggestion that there was a regular celebration of the theme of the *Persae* at the Great Dionysia each year between 478 and 472 seems plausible. In the Introduction (p. ix) Murray has corrected his suggestion (p. 168) about a *Perseus* trilogy. The final chapter is devoted to an analysis of the *Oresteia* and is followed by a so-called scenario of the *Agamemnon*, which adds little or nothing to the understanding of the play.

GERTRUDE SMITH

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A New Introduction to Greek. By ALSTON HURD CHASE and HENRY PHILLIPS, JR. Ann Arbor: Edwards Bros., Inc., lithoprinters, 1941. Pp. vi+112. The price is \$2.25 when copies are ordered direct from Alston Hurd Chase, Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass., or from Henry Phillips, Jr., Phillips Exeter Academy, Exeter, N.H.

In their Preface, the authors point out that this book comprises material which has been used for some years in mimeographed form and that publication in a more permanent form is still desirable. Accordingly, the present work represents an experiment to whose final success the authors invite other teachers of Greek to contribute, and we shall not object too strongly if the present outward form of the book gives the impression rather of a mimeographed syllabus than of a textbook.

As regards arrangement and content, the book has many merits. The elements of morphology and syntax, together with an extremely wide range of vocabulary, are compressed into the compass of thirty-four lessons, which are meant to be completed in one semester. In their conviction that "Beginners

to-day must early meet Democritus, Plato, Thucydides and Herodotus if they are ever to be encouraged to go farther,"¹ the authors have chosen "real Greek" in preference to "made Greek" for the reading in the lessons. The last twenty-one lessons contain material suitable for memorizing and discussion, in the form of quotations which are to be translated in class under supervision of the instructor. Much here depends upon the skill of the instructor; this book is not one that teaches itself. The authors are to be congratulated on their choice of the verb *παιδεύω* in preference to the traditional *λίσσω* for paradigms of the thematic verb and on their early introduction of the athematic verbs² and of the aorist tense.³ The most commonly used introductory Greek texts either begin with all tenses of the indicative and later bring in the other moods or begin with all forms which are built on the stem of continued action and postpone much too long the aorist and other stems. In the book under discussion, the tenses, moods, and voices are introduced in an order that more nearly represents the relative frequency of their use. The etymological relations between English and Greek are consistently emphasized. English borrowings or derivatives from Greek are even used in connection with the alphabet to illustrate the pronunciation of Greek. (In this connection, the question arises whether the words "xylophone" and "psittacosis" are reliable indexes, on the acrophonic principle, to the pronunciation of ξ and ψ.)

Some disadvantages of the book are attributable to condensation. Formidable arrays of paradigms confront the student in almost every lesson, and yet the Appendix does not furnish systematic tables of paradigms for quick reference, and there is no index. The amount of simple reading for practice is all too limited. According to the authors' statement, the book is not intended for use below the junior college level. Even so, much is taken for granted; e.g., where adjectives are introduced, the authors apparently think it unnecessary to supply any rule regarding the agreement of adjectives or to state that some Greek adjectives have only the second-declension endings. Without the latter bit of information, how can the student really understand the sentence *ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ*?⁴ And what is he expected to make of *καλὸν ἡσυχία*,⁵ on the basis of the printed information at his disposal? In certain instances, the difficulties of learning are increased, owing to the authors' predilection for making the general precede the particular—e.g., on pages 48 f., abstract formulas for two types of conditional sentence precede examples. Surely it would be better to give the example first and to let the rule or formula be drawn from the example.

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¹ Preface, p. iii.

² Lesson 12.

³ Lesson 7.

⁴ P. 6.

⁵ P. 9.

Fire in the Cosmological Speculations of Heraclitus. By WILLIAM C. KIRK, JR. (Princeton University diss., 1938.) Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Co., 1940. Pp. 60.

The point of departure in this study is the determination not to accept as authentic any doctrine not found in the actual words of Heraclitus. The entire treatment consists in the extraction of as much meaning as possible from the small number of fragments in which fire is mentioned, with a supplementary consideration of a few passages from the doxography. The statements of Aristotle and the doxographers are considered valuable "only to corroborate what we may discover from studying Heraclitus' own words" (p. 1).

Probably no one would question that the primary source for any thinker's ideas must be his own words, as far as they are available, but Kirk sometimes seems to show a somewhat excessive skepticism of the doxographers. Is it universally true that they "made no effort to present a true and accurate exposition of earlier systems" (p. 36)? In any case it is a fact not to be forgotten that in certain important respects the words of the early thinkers have to be interpreted and understood by judicious use of the reports of later writers.

In general it is questionable whether this rigid method was the most fruitful one possible. It might have been better, rather than constricting the basis of treatment so severely, to extend it by considering the historical situation, Heraclitus' relations with his predecessors and contemporaries, and other aspects of his system. To bind one's self absolutely to the explicitly attested quotations of the author's words is really subservience to purely formal literary tradition—second only to that of those who accept on an equal basis all statements about the philosopher or his views.

There is a certain narrowness in Kirk's general interpretation of Heraclitus' philosophy. In spite of his emancipation from the doxographical tradition, he does not really go beyond the Aristotelian interpretation of Heraclitus' fire as a primary substance from which all others are derived; and he treats this as the keystone of the system. It may be true that "Heraclitus is one of the Greek philosophers who sought to explain the whole universe in terms of some one basic entity" (p. 2), but it is doubtful whether this should be considered the central element in the Heraclitean philosophy. Kirk has nothing to say of the "dialectical" character of natural process, the war of opposites, or other topics which one might think would be important for the understanding of the position of fire. In speaking of Heraclitus' place in the history of philosophy, he finds that the significant point is the identification of fire with soul; he speaks of an attempt "to bridge the gap between mind and matter"; but, apparently realizing that this was not the issue to the philosopher, he calls it an "unconscious attempt."

In the detail of his interpretation it is hard to see that Kirk has added much to what was already known. He introduces no new criterion for distinguishing the genuine beliefs of the philosopher from later accretions. It might have

been helpful had he discussed more fully the difference between the Heraclitean and Stoic world-views. It is baffling to be told that confusion with Stoicism is one of the greatest obstacles to the understanding of Heracliteanism and then to learn that "very possibly Heracleitus would have used the Stoic terminology if he had been acquainted with it" (p. 50).

One of Kirk's four principal passages, in which the actual words of Heraclitus are cited, is Fragment 90 (Diels): *πυρός τ' ἀνταμείβεσθαι πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὥκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός*. It is doubtful whether these words will bear the interpretation which Kirk puts upon them—that fire is a sort of standard of value for natural phenomena, as gold is for goods. Surely, *ἀνταμείβεσθαι* indicates an actual exchange. The idea of fire as a standard of value leads to a strange interpretation of Fragment 66 (Diels) (*πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται*): "if for the sake of comparison we place fire over against another substance, the fire as standard of value will produce a judgment of the other substance" (p. 14).

On page 9 *καταλείψεται* has been printed for *καταλήψεται*, and there is a rather large number of other misprints.

EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.

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Greek Cities. By REX MARTIENSSEN. Pp. 58.

This article occupies nearly all of the January, 1941, issue of the *South African Architectural Record*, a prosperous-looking magazine published at Johannesburg. There is a brief introduction by T. J. Haarhoff, professor of classics in the University of the Witwatersrand. Mr. Martienssen discusses somewhat the types of structures in a Greek city, but he is interested chiefly in the architectural scheme of the city as a whole and in the aesthetics of town-planning as developed by the Greeks. Evidently an architect, he is up to date in his acquaintance with archeological literature: he uses recent works by Pendlebury, Doxiadis, Krischen, and Stevens (whose Periclean Entrance Court is not approved), as well as others by Choisy, Penrose, and Le Corbusier. His treatment is fully independent, however, and rich in interest and stimulation. He published previously (November, 1939) in the same periodical a paper on the Hellenistic house. It is gratifying to find in South Africa such examples of enterprising study in the classical field.

F. P. JOHNSON

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BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Books submitted are not returnable.]

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